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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on skilled workers and the roles they play
in economic development. In the first chapter, I use an overlapping generations
model of education choice and skilled migration to study conditions under which
a low-skill economy can grow its skilled labor force in the presence of skilled em-
igration. This occurs when skill premiums are low, and there are individuals in
the economy who can afford an education. The model is calibrated to data on 23
low and middle-income countries. For 22 of the 23 countries, any increase in the
rate of skilled emigration leads to a net decline in the steady-state proportion of
skilled workers. This is because increasing skilled emigration rates increases fu-
ture expected benefits to skill, but leaves current schooling costs the same. So
more people do not obtain an education because cost constraints are binding. I
then provide empirical evidence that the cost of education is relatively high in de-
veloping countries, and that these costs are likely binding using information on
the (un)availability of student loan programs. Poland is the only country which
benefits from skilled emigration due to a combination of very low skill premiums
and low costs of education. For brain drain to lead to a net increase in human cap-
ital, reducing education costs and relaxing credit constraints are important policy
responses.
The second chapter studies the effects of education policies emphasizing basic
education at the expense of higher levels of education. Larger estimates of the
wage returns to basic education compared to higher levels of education, after ad-
justing for public costs, are often cited as evidence of over-investment in higher
education. These estimates have provided a justification for the shift of public
funding towards basic education in many developing countries. This paper shows
that these estimates are not reliable for education policy when productivity de-
pends on the proportion of higher educated workers (a productivity externality),
and higher educated workers are an input in the production of basic education (a
human capital externality). A methodological contribution is describing how the
productivity and human capital externalities could be separately identified. Us-
ing data on cross-country agricultural productivity gaps, and returns to education
for immigrants in the U.S. by country of origin, I show that the productivity and
human capital effects of higher educated workers are quantitatively important.
The productivity and human capital effects are equal to, and in some cases greater
than, the oft-cited difference between estimates of the public-cost-adjusted returns
to basic and higher education. For most countries in the dataset, the externalities
are large enough to rationalize observed education investments as optimal.
The final chapter studies the relative productivities of skilled and unskilled
workers across countries. I break down the cross-country ratio of the productivity
of skilled to unskilled workers into two components: the human capital embodied
in skilled workers, and the physical productivity of skilled and unskilled workers
which reflect production techniques. I find that skilled workers from rich countries
embody more human capital (compared to poor countries), and skilled workers in
rich countries are also more physically productive. This is interpreted as skilled
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workers from high-income countries being of better quality, and firms in high-
income countries adopting more technologies that are skilled-complementary. Fur-
thermore, for most of the 49 countries in my dataset, I find their production tech-
niques to be inappropriate; the estimated physical productivity of skilled workers,
relative to the unskilled, is too low given the skilled-unskilled labour ratio. Most
countries could increase output by increasing the physical productivity of skilled
workers, and decreasing that of unskilled workers. I also find that poorer countries
tend to be farther away from their appropriate technologies. I compute 7-fold and
4-fold increases in GDP-per-capita for countries in the 2 lowest income quartiles,
just from increasing the relative physical productivity of skilled to unskilled work-
ers. The results suggest large barriers to the adoption of skilled worker comple-
mentary technologies, and also present a rationale for why increases in schooling
attainment have not led to growth in several countries.
Keywords: Macroeconomics, Skilled Workers, Economic Development
JEL Classification numbers: E13, F22, I25, J61, O11, O15, O38
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Why is gross domestic product (GDP) per person only $2048 in Ghana compared
to $48,112 in the U.S. (The World Bank, 2012)? The quest to understand why
some nations are richer than others is as old as economics itself, and we know
from this literature that GDP per person in the U.S. is over 20-times as large as
it is in Ghana because the U.S. uses factors of production more productively, has
accumulated more factors of production, or both. This thesis is concerned with un-
derstanding how cross-country differences in one particular factor of production,
the proportion of skilled workers, contributes to differences in GDP per person.
Skilled workers are defined as individuals who have, at least, completed pri-
mary schooling. This broad definition includes high school graduates, and indi-
viduals with vocational, professional and university degrees. The data reveal that
about 40% of individuals aged 15 and over in Ghana have not completed primary
schooling, compared to less than 1% of individuals in the U.S (Barro and Lee,
2010). In this thesis, I study why the proportion of skilled workers is so low in
Ghana, and how the low proportion of skilled workers in Ghana translates into a
20-fold difference in GDP per capita (compared to the U.S.). A second encompass-
ing theme in the thesis is the use of macroeconomic models and data to study the
process of economic development.
The thesis is organized into three chapters. The first chapter deals with chal-
lenges posed by a brain drain for the expansion of the skilled workforce in many
developing countries. Recent studies argue that a brain drain could increase pri-
vate investment in education. Individuals who hope to emigrate acquire more ed-
ucation but not everyone who intends to emigrate ends up leaving, so an increase
in the rate of skilled emigration could lead to a net increase in the proportion of
skilled workers. I test the quantitative significance of this “brain gain” effect us-
ing a model of skill acquisition and emigration that is calibrated to estimates of
cross-country skill premiums. I find that a brain drain lowers the proportion of
skilled workers in the set of developing countries that I examine. This is because
at over 50% of GDP per capita, the cost of higher education is large relative to in-
come in many of these countries. Binding credit constraints make further private
investments in education difficult.
The second chapter studies how education policies that emphasize public in-
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vestment in basic education at the expense of higher levels of education, may in-
hibit the growth of a skilled workforce and economic development. These policies
have been partly driven by social return estimates showing that returns are larger
for basic education. In the chapter, I show that the standard estimates of social
returns are not suitable for education policy. The chapter presents a framework
that can be used to quantify the importance of higher educated workers for the
human capital of basic educated workers and aggregate productivity. I find that
after accounting for non-wage effects of higher educated workers, the social re-
turn to higher levels of education is a lot larger than standard estimates indicate.
Reducing investments in higher levels of education leads to significantly lower
productivity, and even lower returns to basic education as quality declines. In the
process, I also show how the low proportion of higher educated workers in devel-
oping countries accounts for the low education quality and productivity observed
in these same countries.
The final chapter investigates the sources of low productivity in developing
countries. I build on the finding that relative to skilled workers, unskilled work-
ers are more productive in low-income countries (Caselli and Coleman, 2006). This
finding is regularly seen as a result of low-income countries choosing production
techniques which are more complementary with unskilled workers. To assess this
claim, I first decompose the productivity of skilled workers (relative to the un-
skilled) into productivity arising from the human capital embodied in the worker,
and productivity resulting from the greater availability of production techniques
complementary with skilled workers (physical productivity). I find that skilled
workers are relatively more productive in high income countries, because they
have more embodied human capital and high-income countries also use produc-
tion techniques which are complementary with skilled workers.
I then assess the appropriateness of the estimated physical productivities (pro-
duction techniques). I argue that the estimated physical productivity of skilled
workers in low-income countries are too low to be considered appropriate. In
Ghana for example, skilled workers are 50 times less physically productive com-
pared to unskilled workers, and in Venezuela they are 100 times less physically
productive. These relative productivity numbers are too low given that skilled
workers are just as numerous as the unskilled in these countries, and embody
more human capital. I further compare the estimated physical productivities to
what would be optimal if firms chose technologies appropriately. I find that low-
income countries are systematically farther behind from their optimal physical
productivities. The poorest countries in the dataset could quadruple GDP per
capita by increasing the physical productivity of skilled relative to unskilled work-
ers, leaving all else the same. This suggests significant barriers to the adoption of
technologies complementary to skilled workers in low-income countries.
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Chapter 2
Can Brain Drain Be Good For
Human Capital Growth? Evidence
From Cross-Country Skill
Premiums and Education Costs
2.1 Introduction
A brain drain is the emigration of high-ability skilled labor from developing to
more developed countries. Skilled workers are attracted to developing countries
by relatively higher wages and better working environments. Developed countries
actively adopt policies to attract even more skilled workers. For example, Canada
and Australia pursue policies which admit immigrants based on skill level, and
adaptability to the working environment.1 Skilled migrants and their destination
countries benefit from the increased mobility of skilled workers, but skilled mi-
grants remain the single largest beneficiaries from the brain drain (Gibson and
McKenzie, 2010).
However, the emigration of skilled labor presents a major challenge to economic
growth for developing countries. Brain drain is of economic interest because it lim-
its the ability of a poor economy to retain and increase its stock of human capital,
which is widely identified as an important driver of economic growth. Table 2.1
provides some evidence on the over-representation of skilled workers in the pool of
migrants from developing to developed nations.2 The share of skilled workers in
the adult population for low income countries is estimated at 3.5%. This pales in
comparison to the percentage of skilled workers in the pool of emigrants originat-
ing from this group, which stands at 45.1%. The trend has been one of increased
1See Commander et al. (2003) for a discussion. There is currently a bill on the floor of the U.S.
Congress demanding automatic permanent residence to foreign postgraduates. This is part of an
ongoing global competition between countries for skilled workers
2For the estimates in Table 2.1, skilled workers are defined as individuals who have completed
tertiary education.
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skilled emigration relative to the unskilled. The ratio of the skilled to unskilled
emigration rate was 33.7 in 1975, but in the year 2000 this ratio stands at 55.
These numbers indicate that the proportion of skilled workers among migrants is
considerably high and increasing.
Table 2.1: Emigration rates by country and skill groups
Rate of Emigration(%) Share of Skilled Workers(%)
By Country Size Total Skilled Among residents Among migrants
Large countries(Pop>25 million) 1.3 4.1 11.3 36.4
Upper-Middle(25>Pop>10) 3.1 8.8 11 33.2
Lower-Middle(10>Pop>2.5) 5.8 13.5 13 33.1
Small(Pop<2.5) 10.3 27.5 10.5 34.7
By Income Group Total Skilled Among residents Among migrants
High Income 2.8 3.5 30.7 38.3
Upper-Middle Income 4.2 7.9 13 25.2
Lower-Middle Income 3.2 7.6 14.2 35.4
Low Income 0.5 6.1 3.5 45.1
UN Least Developed 1 13.2 2.3 34
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004)
What is the impact of increasing skill-biased emigration rates on developing
countries? Recent models of brain drain (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998;
Vidal, 1998) emphasize the positive role an opportunity to emigrate could play on
the decision to obtain an education. This positive effect of emigration on education
decisions is known as the brain effect of brain drain. Nevertheless, skilled workers
are simply lost to the home country when they emigrate, the impact of the loss of
skilled workers is known as the drain effect. The theory of beneficial brain drain
has been well developed over the years, but there remains a gap in the literature
on the relative size of the brain and drain effects, and how they may differ across
countries.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by constructing, and calibrating, an over-
lapping generations (OLG) model of endogenous skill formation with skilled emi-
gration. The model can be used to quantify the size of the brain and drain effects,
and investigate how and why they differ across countries. In particular, I solve for
the steady state of the model, and use it to quantitatively investigate the relative
sizes of the brain and drain effects given different emigration rates. Attention is
paid to how these effects might vary across countries depending on costs of educa-
tion. These costs broadly refer to the quality of education, teaching infrastructure
(books, schools, teachers), borrowing constraints, basic health outcomes and other
factors beyond an individual’s ability which influence the decision to obtain an
education.
There are three main results in the paper. First, I find that if skill levels are low
in an economy due to high costs of an education, increased emigration rates only
reduce the proportion of skilled workers in the economy. The cost of education is
high if the marginal individual is not obtaining an education because they cannot
afford it, and not because the benefits are not high enough. Such an economy is
cost-constrained. An increase in the rate of skilled emigration does increase the
expected skill premium, but since it does not alleviate the affordability problem, it
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cannot lead to an increase in the proportion of individuals obtaining an education.
The brain effect is non-existent for these economies, and the drain effect reduces
the proportion of skilled workers in the economy. The only economies that stand to
benefit from a brain drain are those where skill premiums are low. Skill premiums
are low when the marginal individual chooses not get an education, even when
they can afford it.
Secondly, I calibrate parameters of the model to skilled-unskilled labor ratios
and wage premiums for a cross-section of 23 low and middle-income countries.
I find that with the exception of Poland, skill levels are low in most of these
countries because the marginal individual is cost-constrained. Increased rates
of emigration lower the proportion of skilled labor for most of the countries. If
skilled-labor is interpreted as those having a tertiary education, there is no brain
effect for all countries other than Poland. They all lose from the brain drain be-
cause even though skill premiums are higher, they just cannot afford to pay for
the up-front cost of education. Lastly, I find that if skilled labor is interpreted as
secondary-educated workers, then for most countries there is a quantitatively sig-
nificant brain effect since secondary education is more affordable. However, the
brain effect is not strong enough to prevent a decrease in the proportion of skilled
workers brought about by the drain effect. It turns out that most countries are
net-losers from the brain drain at the secondary school level as well.
Poland finds itself in a seemingly unique situation with relatively lower costs
of schooling, but very low skill premiums for its skill level. Poland has an unusu-
ally low skill premium for an economy with its proportion of skilled workers – the
wage premium for tertiary educated workers in Poland is lower than those for sec-
ondary educated workers in all countries in the dataset. An increase in the rate
of emigration increases the skilled-unskilled labor force, because the marginal in-
dividual is constrained by the low skill premium, and the opportunity to emigrate
relaxes this constraint.
This result is important given the literature on whether increased emigration
can act as a substitute for education subsidies, as in Docquier et al. (2008). The
results here show that the marginal student in a typical developing country is
cost-constrained, thus increased emigration rates cannot act as a substitute for
subsidies. Increased emigration only helps when the problem, at the margin, is
one of low returns to education. I present evidence in Section 5 showing that, for
many developing countries, current costs of education are high, and the lack of
comprehensive student loan programs present significant barriers to education.3
These results imply that a reduction in barriers to education, at all levels, could
be an effective response to rising skilled emigration in developing countries.
The next section presents a brief survey of the literature on brain drain and
its impact on sending countries. Then, I present the model of skill formation and
emigration, and derive some properties of the steady state equilibrium. The fourth
3See Duflo (2001); Task Force on Higher Education and Society (2002); Glewwe and Kremer
(2006); Gibson and McKenzie (2010) for more evidence that costs of schooling are the important
constraints to improving the proportion of the educated in developing countries.
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section describes how parameters of the model are calibrated, solves for the steady
state, and backs out the brain and drain effects for the countries in the dataset. I
then present some data which indicate that financial barriers to tertiary education
exist in many developing countries, which would limit the size of the brain effect.
The final section concludes, and suggests some areas for future research.
2.2 Related Literature
There are several channels through which skilled emigration can theoretically
impact sending nations; it can result in a reshuffling of the labor market which
affects wages and employment for those left behind (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974;
Miyagiwa, 1991). Brain drain has consequences for human capital accumulation
and retention (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Vidal, 1998). Migrants can
impact the sending country through network effects and remittances (Commander
et al., 2004). In this section, I briefly summarize the key insights from classic
models of brain drain, and the newer beneficial brain drain models which focus on
the impact it can have on human capital accumulation.
Classic models of brain drain
Early models of brain drain pioneered by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), with a
modern reincarnation in Miyagiwa (1991), emphasize the impact of brain drain
on employment levels and wages. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) study the impact
of the brain drain on developing countries in the context of sticky wage models.
The general finding from this line of research is that in most circumstances, brain
drain is bad for those left behind in the source country. Brain drain unambiguously
denies an economy access to its human capital.4
The early literature also pointed out the fiscal imbalances a brain drain might
create. Over 70% of the costs of education in developing countries is financed
from public sources (The World Bank, 2009). This implies that the decision to
invest in human capital is not an entirely private one, and the loss also generates
externalities. If the government finances current education hoping to increase its
future tax base, and possibly increase funding for education in the future, then
emigration leads to a loss in the government’s future revenues and a reduction
in funding for future public education. This led Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973) to
propose a special income tax imposed on migrants by their countries of origin to
make up for this fiscal loss. Egger et al. (2007) and Desai et al. (2004) study the
welfare impacts and feasibility of such a taxation scheme. Skilled emigrant taxes
schemes have not been widely adopted by sending countries.5 Perhaps the fact
that skilled emigrants can switch their country of citizenship renders the tax on
emigrating human capital impractical.
4Commander et al. (2003) has a good summary of this class of models
5A reviewer kindly pointed out that Belarus adopts such a scheme, which makes it the only
country I am aware of taxing skilled migrants.
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Newer beneficial brain drain models
The exogeneity of the decision to invest in education is important for the negative
effects of brain drain obtained in the early literature. The recent literature em-
phasizes the idea that the prospect of skilled emigration can induce greater skill
formation (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Vidal, 1998). Key to these models
is the assumption that individuals take the probability of migrating to a higher
wage economy into account when investing in education. On a micro-level, there
is empirical evidence in support of this assumption. Gibson and McKenzie (2010)
using survey data from 5 high-emigration countries, find that individuals invest
early on in skills which may aid emigration prospects. In Ghana, for example, they
find that individuals take special English and SAT classes, and change their pro-
grams of study in school in order to improve their chances of working or studying
overseas.
The main finding from this line of research is that the prospect of emigration
may induce additional human capital formation (the brain effect), and in certain
situations, this can outweigh the loss in human capital brought about by skilled
emigration (the drain effect). However, the literature on the net empirical effect
of skilled emigration remains relatively sparse, and to the best of my knowledge,
there is nothing on the relative sizes of the brain and drain effects across different
economies.
Docquier et al. (2010) is closest in spirit to what I do here. They attempt to
quantify the impact of the brain drain from a sending country’s perspective. The
authors construct and calibrate an overlapping generations (OLG) model of the
world economy, divided into 10 regions. They find that the main impact of the
brain drain lies in the inability of high skilled emigration nations to innovate.
Their model differs from mine in that human capital (which is a crucial channel
through which emigration can positively impact growth) is assumed to grow ex-
ogenously; this means that they cannot say much on the size of the “brain effect”.
In Beine et al. (2008), the authors set out to uncover countries who have ex-
perienced a net increase in their human capital stocks due to increased migration
prospects. To this end, they obtain estimates of the elasticity of human capital
stock to changes in skilled emigration rates between 1990 and 2000. Every coun-
try is assigned the emigration rate of their unskilled, and the estimated elasticity
is used to estimate what the human capital stock would have been had the skilled
been allowed to migrate at the unskilled rate. The difference between this coun-
terfactual and the observed human capital stock is interpreted as the effect of high
skilled emigration. The results show that doubling the probability of emigration
increases the stock of human capital by 5%. Similar to the result here, they also
find that most countries are net losers from the brain drain.
Due to the fact that Beine et al. do not run their counterfactual within a richer
model of migration and human capital formation, there is no clear idea of the size
of the brain effect and how it relates to the drain effect across countries. The au-
thors cannot say whether the cross-country difference in ex-post human capital
stock is due to differences in the brain effect, or differences in the drain effect.
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This distinction is important because understanding the factors which contribute
to the net effect of brain drain (as opposed to the net effect itself) is more infor-
mative towards policy. Quantifying the brain and drain effects within a model not
only allows us to uncover the winners/losers, but also uncover the mechanisms
which produced the winners/losers. Given the recent literature on increased em-
igration as a possible alternative to education subsidies (see for example Stark
et al. (1998) and Docquier et al. (2008)), an understanding of the size of the brain
effect compared to education subsidies is important.
Zhang (2001) quantifies the size of the drain effect for the Chinese economy,
while ignoring the brain effect. Using information on the number of emigrants
and an estimate of their value to the Chinese economy, the numbers indicate that
China has lost about 4-5 billion U.S. dollars annually due to increased emigra-
tion from 1978-1997. Desai et al. (2009) examine the fiscal loss associated with
the brain drain in India’s IT sector. They are mostly concerned with the loss in
government revenue due to a reduced tax base. To this end, they estimate a con-
terfactual income distribution of the emigrants and calibrate the tax structure to
match that of the Indian economy. They then back out the loss in government rev-
enue due to emigration. They find that the loss is about one-half to one percent of
India’s gross national income.6 A common problem with these papers is that if the
brain effect is large, then they ignore the potential gains to government revenues
from an increase in the proportion of skilled workers due to increasing brain drain.
This paper adds to the literature by focusing on the impact of skilled emigration
on the skilled-unskilled labor ratio, and decomposing this impact into a brain and
a drain effect. I also show that patterns of education costs and skill premiums,
across countries, reveal important information regarding the potential impact of
skilled emigration. These relationships, to the best of my knowledge, have not
been quantitatively evaluated in the literature.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Economic Environment
The model is an OLG model of a small, open, infinitely-lived economy consist-
ing of individuals who live for T periods. The finite-life of individuals in the
model captures the life-cycle nature of education and migration decisions. The
OLG structure of the model takes into account important inter-generational link-
ages to human capital formation (Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Docquier et al.
(2010)). At any given time, t, the economy is made up of individuals of different
ages a ∈ {0, 1, 2..., T} born at time t− a.
Individuals of a given cohort are born with different “ability” endowments, ψ ∈
[0,Ψ]; individuals born at any given time, draw their abilities from a continuous
density function given by g(ψ), which is associated with the continuous cumulative
6This loss is large, India’s gross national income in 2008 is about 3.34 trillion purchasing power
parity dollars (The World Bank, 2012)
10 CHAPTER 2. BRAIN DRAIN AND HUMAN CAPITAL
density function G(ψ). These endowments are meant to capture private ability to
pay in order to acquire an education. A higher ability to pay, captured by a higher
value of ψ, translates to a lower cost of education. Ability levels are commonly
known, the only uncertainty in the model lies in whether a young individual who
has chosen to obtain an education would emigrate.
Migration is only allowed after the first period of life provided individuals have
obtained an education.7 Skilled individuals who emigrate earn an exogenous wage
premium given by ρ > 1, and the population of newborns grow exogenously at rate
n. The rate at which the skilled emigrate is exogenously specified by pi, which
is assumed to be constant at every time period.8 For tractability, it is assumed
that when individuals emigrate, they take all of their human capital and savings
along with them, which rules out network effects. Successful migrants pay cost
m after emigrating; this captures the costs of transportation and settling down in
the destination countries.
The interest rate on savings, rt, is exogenously determined in the world econ-
omy, and the population of skilled migrants are assumed to be too small to influ-
ence wages in the receiving country. The last two assumptions are consistent with
a small open economy where capital can flow freely, but labor flows are restricted.
I abstract from labor-leisure decisions, return migration decisions, remittance de-
cisions, and decisions to migrate later in life so as to isolate the “brain effect”. Data
on the nature of return migration are poor, making it infeasible to include in this
study. Docquier et al. (2010) find that remittances are not a major factor in the
impact of skilled migration on human capital formation.
The assumption that there are only 2 levels of education, skilled and unskilled
(s, u), can be interpreted as capturing the level at which individuals become eli-
gible to migrate as skilled workers - which in the case of developing to developed
country migration, often corresponds to having a tertiary education. As it turns
out, the interpretation of the level of education at which an individual becomes
eligible to migrate may be important for the brain gain, and I explore this possi-
bility further in Section 4. As a practical consideration, assuming only two skill
types simplifies the production function and makes it comparable to those used
in the literature. The unavailability of migration data for more than 3 levels of
education makes a model with finer levels of eduction difficult to quantify.
2.3.2 Aggregate State Variables
In any given period t, the aggregate state is given by Ωt = (Kt, {ψ∗t−a}Ta=1), which
consists of the aggregate capital stock Kt, and ψ∗t−a denoting the ability level of the
individual born in period t − a who is just indifferent between obtaining and not
obtaining an education. If everyone benefits from obtaining an education, then
7This is consistent with the data which show that unskilled workers migrate at very low rates.
8A constant rate of migration makes the model tractable but is not crucial for the steady-state
results in the model. However, the endogeneity of pi may be important especially when comparing
two economies of very different sizes, but as a first attempt at the problem and given that most
countries in the dataset are of comparable sizes, I take emigration rates as exogenous.
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ψ∗t−a = 0. It is assumed that parameters are such that the most able individual
always finds it strictly beneficial to obtain an education, so that ψ∗t−a ∈ [0,Ψ) for all
t and a. Finally, when solving their problems, individuals posit that the aggregate
state evolves according to the functions: Kt+1 = Γ(Ωt) and ψ∗t = H(Ωt).
2.3.3 Consumer Problems
In this section, consumer problems are defined recursively beginning with the
retired individuals of age T . Within a specific cohort, there are at most 3 types
of individuals, the unskilled who always remain home {u, h}, the skilled who did
not migrate {s, h}, and the skilled who migrated to a foreign country {s, f}. The
consumer problem can be defined backwards beginning with age T individuals. In
what follows, the wage rate, w, depends on the aggregate state Ωt, and interest rate
depends on time period t, the time subscript is suppressed for ease of exposition.
Instantaneous utility is given by U(κ) = κ1−γ−1
1−γ , where κ is current consumption
and γ is the degree of relative risk aversion.
Age T individuals (Retired)
Given the aggregate state Ωt, age T individuals only differ by their savings b, and
location denoted by home, h, or foreign, f . These individuals are retired, and
interest income is their only source of income. An age T individual with asset b
consumes the income from his savings, and his continuation utility is given by:
VT (b) = U(Rb) where, R = (1 + r).
Age 1 to T-1 individuals (Middle-aged)
All individuals of age a ∈ {1, 2...T − 1} are endowed with 1 unit of time which they
supply inelastically to the labor market. The individual state in this age group is
summarized by savings b ≥ 0, location l ∈ {h, f}, and skill level j ∈ {s, u}. The
continuation utility of an individual in this group who is of age a is given by:
V la,j(b,Ω) = maxb′{U(wlj +Rb− b′ −m1{a=1,l=f}) + βV la+1,j(b′,Ω′)}
s.t.
Ω′ = (Γ(Ω), H(Ω)), wfs = ρw
h
s , b
′ > 0, ρ > 1.
Let their decision rule be denoted by bla+1,j(b,Ω), where β is the discount factor.
The migration premium on skilled wages is given by ρ > 1, and is exogenously
specified. Lastly, note that if a = 1, and the individual has emigrated, the emigrant
also has to pay migration costs m.
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Age 0 individuals (Young)
Young age 0 individuals are endowed with E units of the consumption good, and
they decide whether to acquire an education (become skilled) at cost c(ψi).9 They
also decide on how much of their endowment to allocate towards savings b ≥ 0,
which imposes a strict borrowing constraint. The cost of becoming educated c(ψi)
is assumed to be strictly decreasing.
If they obtain an education, they emigrate with probability pi at the end of the
period, where they earn a wage rate which is directly proportional to the wage rate
of the skilled who do not migrate. Individual state is represented by ability level
ψi. For a young individual, investing in an education yields continuation utility
given by:
V s0 (ψi,Ω) = maxb′{U(E − c(ψi)− b′) + β[piV f1 (b′,Ω′) + (1− pi)V h1,s(b′,Ω′)]}10
s.t. Ω′ = (Γ(Ω), H(Ω)), b′ > 0.
If an individual does not invest in an education, his continuation utility is given
by:
V u0 (ψi,Ω) = maxb′{U(E − b′) + βV h1,u(b′,Ω′)}
s.t. Ω′ = (Γ(Ω), H(Ω)), b′ > 0.
Let the savings decision rule of a young individual be denoted by b1,j(ψi,Ω),
where j ∈ {s, u}. The young individual in deciding whether to invest in an educa-
tion, solves:
V0(ψi,Ω) = maxs,u{V u0 (ψi,Ω), V s0 (ψi,Ω)}.
A young individual will invest in an education if V s0 (ψi,Ω)− V u0 (ψi,Ω) ≥ 0.
2.3.4 Firm Problem
Firms are perfectly competitive, country-specific, and live for just one period. They
rent capital and labor, produce and then disappear. Production is governed by a
constant returns to scale production function given by:
Yt = A0K
α
t (Lt)
1−α.
9It is true that investment in human capital possibly occurs over the life cycle, but I am in-
terested in human capital investment which is relevant to one’s ability to migrate (these include
investing in careers in high demand at probable destinations, ability to speak the foreign language,
and knowledge of foreign cultures). As available data in Gibson and McKenzie (2010) and Beine
et al. (2007) show, this type of human capital investment occurs relatively early in life.
10The skill type of migrants is suppressed since only those who get an education get to migrate.
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Where, Kt is aggregate stock of capital in period t which completely depreciates
every period. A0 is a scale parameter which is exogenously specified. Lt is an
aggregate of skilled and unskilled labor, I use the CES aggregator: Lt = [µ(Lst)η +
(1 − µ)(Lut )η]1/η, where s and u stand for skilled and unskilled respectively.11 The
weight on skilled labor µ is restricted to be between zero and one.
Given wu(Ωt), rt, ws(Ωt), the representative firm solves the profit maximization
problem:
max{Yt,Lut ,Lst ,Kt}Yt − wut Lut − wstLst − rtKt
subject to Yt = A0Kαt (Lt)1−α.
2.3.5 Definition of a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Given the population of initial old N0, g(ψ), (n, pi, ρ, {ψ∗t−a}Ta=112, {rt}∞t=0), a recursive
C.E. for every period t, consists of the value functions for all types of consumers,
and their decision rules. Wage functions, whu(Ωt), whs (Ωt), aggregate laws of motion
Ωt+1 = (Γ(Ωt), H(Ωt)), and firm output Yt and input decisions Lst , Lut and Kt such
that:
1 Given prices and aggregate laws of motion, the value functions and decision
rules solve the appropriate individual problems.
2 Taking pricing functions as given, firm input-output decisions maximize firm
profits.
3 Markets clear in every period:
(i) Labor market:
Lut =
T−1∑
a=1
N0,t−a
∫ ψ∗t−a
0
g(ψ)dψ,
Lst =
T−1∑
a=1
N0,t−a(1− pi)
∫ Ψ
ψ∗t−a
g(ψ)dψ.
The labor market consists of the market for skilled and unskilled la-
bor for all middle-aged agents. The market clearing condition requires
that the total number of employed unskilled labor be equal to the total
number of unskilled in the population.
11I do not just add up skilled and unskilled labor because available evidence from U.S. data shows
that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor lies somewhere between 1
and 2, which is far from perfect substitutability (Ciccone and Peri, 2005).
12The only restriction on ψ∗t−a is that it is not equal to Ψ or zero for all age groups. This ensures
that wages are well defined to begin. When I describe the steady state, then it becomes clear that
on an equilibrium, it is never the case that everyone(or nobody) gets an education.
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(ii) Goods market:
Yt +N0,tE = χt +Bt +
∫ Ψ
ψ∗t
c(ψ)g(ψ)dψ.
Where Yt = rtKt+wut Lut +wstLst and N0,tE is the total endowment of young
agents. χt is total consumption for all agents in the economy, Bt is total
savings for all agents, and the last term is the total consumption cost for
those who obtain an education.13
4 Aggregate laws of motion are consistent with individual decisions. In partic-
ular, H(Ωt) equals ψ∗t which is the cut-off ability for the young born in period
t.
2.3.6 The Decision Rules and Value Functions
In this section, I describe the decision rules and value functions for young agents.
This would be useful in understanding how individual decisions change with
prices, and in computing the steady state. First, let Xa,lt,j = w
a,l
t,j + Rb
a
t denote the
individual’s wage and rental income at period t. If a = 1, and the individual has
successfully migrated, Xa,lt,j is net of migration cost m. Old, age T , individuals earn
no wage income, and only consumer their savings with interest.
Savings and Continuation utility for a > 0, and young unskilled agents:
Let U(κ) = ln(κ) be the instantaneous utility function. Deriving the decision rules
and value functions for this group of agents is straightforward. Since the interest
rate is exogenous, with perfect credit markets and no borrowing constraints, for
any skill level and location, individuals would consume a given fraction of their
lifetime wealth in each period. However, with the no-borrowing constraint, if it
turns out that the individual wants to consume more than the current income
Xa,lt,j , savings equal zero.14
The continuation utility for an individual at age a ∈ {1, 2..., T − 1}, location
l ∈ {h, f}, with skill level j ∈ {s, u}, as well as young unskilled agents will depend
on their current and future wage and rental incomes. All unskilled individuals of
a given age have the same lifetime utility regardless of ability. For skilled indi-
viduals and conditional on location, lifetime utility would vary by savings when
young.
Continuation utility for young skilled agents: The continuation utility for
young skilled agents will be increasing in ability. To see why, let Xt(ψ) = E − c(ψ)
denote the income of young agents net of education costs.
13Kt does not have to equal Bt since the interest rate is exogenously given, and capital is allowed
to move freely across borders.
14I do not have to worry about precautionary savings for middle-aged and unskilled agents be-
cause there is no income risk.
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The cost of education c(ψ) is given by the function e−ψ + C. The cost func-
tion has a component which is general to all individuals in the economy, C, and
a component which varies with ability, e−ψ. C is meant to capture general bar-
riers to education, such as limited class capacity, poor teachers, access to quality
books, libraries and teaching facilities. These are direct costs of education, which
the individual cannot borrow against, and the no-borrowing constraint is partly
intended to capture the effects of these costs.
Higher ability simply acts as an increase in current income, an income effect,
which increases savings (weakly), because a poorer individual cannot be saving
more than a richer one with identical future income prospects.15 Since higher
ability skilled individuals have more assets at the completion of schooling, and
face the same future income prospects as lower ability skilled individuals, they
also have higher continuation utilities. Thus, the the continuation utility of a
young skilled agent, Vt,s(ψ), is increasing in ability. Further, Vt,s(ψ) is set to equal
−∞ if education costs are greater than income, that is Xt(ψ) ≤ 0.
Cut-off Ability: It is easy to see that for all t, and for all agents of a ∈
{0, 1, 2..., T}, location l ∈ {h, f}, skill level j ∈ {s, u}, continuation utility, V a,lt,j ,
is increasing in current income, Xa,lt,j . Further, Vt,s(ψ) is increasing in ψ, because if
for any two individuals ψ1 > ψ2, then Xt(ψ1) > Xt(ψ2). A similar argument leads to
the conclusion that the continuation utility of young unskilled agents, Vt,u, is con-
stant across all young types, since Xt,u = E. Therefore a cut-off ability ψ∗t exists in
equilibrium, and is given by:
ψ∗t =
{ {ψ | Vt,s(ψ)− Vt,u = 0}
0 if Vt,s(ψ)− Vt,u > 0 ∀ ψi .
A young individual acquires an education if the value of becoming skilled is
greater than the value of being unskilled, that is Vt,s(ψ) > Vt,u. As I discuss later,
ψ∗t is never zero (or Ψ) since decreasing marginal returns impose an upper bound
on the proportion of educated and uneducated individuals, so an equilibrium exists
with a mix of the skilled and unskilled. This upper bound is derived in Section 4 in
the context of a steady-state equilibrium. Next, I describe the steady state of the
model. In particular, it is shown that the unique steady state is such that there is
a mix of the skilled and unskilled.
2.3.7 Steady State Equilibrium
Definition of a Steady State: Given a constant gross interest rate R = (1 +
r), a steady state of the model is defined as an equilibrium where all aggregate
variables grow at a constant rate, and the wage pricing functions are constant.
Equivalently, the economy is on a steady state if the cut-off ability ψ∗t equals ψ∗ in
all time periods.
15A simple algebraic proof involving derivatives for the case where pi < .5 is also available.
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Given R∗, N0, g(ψ), and ψ˜, a steady state is determined by the prices from the
firm’s problem, and the cut-off ability which yields the proportion of skilled. The
set of equations below from the firm’s problem gives the prices:
w∗u = (1− µ)(1− α)AoKαt L1−α−ηt Lη−1t,u , (2.1)
w∗s = µ(1− α)AoKtαL1−α−ηt Lη−1t,s , (2.2)
w∗f = ρw
∗
s . (2.3)
Taking prices as defined above, asset holdings and continuation values can be
derived as described in Section 3.6 for every generation. In the steady state, the
continuation values of the young skilled and unskilled will be independent of time
since prices are assumed to be constant. This implies that the cut-off ability, ψ∗, is
constant across generations.
The aggregate variables are given by:
K∗t =
( αAo
R∗ − 1
) 1
(1−α)
L∗t ,
L∗ut =
T−1∑
a=1
N0,t−a
∫ ψ˜
0
g(ψ)dψ,
L∗st =
T−1∑
a=1
N0,t−a(1− pi)
∫ Ψ
ψ˜
g(ψ)dψ,
L∗t = [µ(L
∗s
t )
η + (1− µ)(L∗ut )η]1/η.
The economy is on a steady state if ψ∗ is consistent with the prices and ψ∗ = ψ˜.
Now assume that ψ∗t = ψ∗ in all time periods and the interest rate is constant,
from the aggregate variables above, it is evident that all aggregate variables Yt, Nt,
Lst , Lut , and Kt grow at rate n. Accordingly, per-capita variables as well as wages
are constant over time. To see why this is the case, notice that since ψ∗ is constant,
the share of the skilled and unskilled in the population will be a constant. This
means that Lst and Lut grow with the newborns at constant rate n, and the rest of
the aggregate variables follow. This implies that we are on a steady state if and
only if the cut-off ability is constant across generations.
Result 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of the Steady State) Given a set of pa-
rameters such that (E − C) ∈ (e−Ψ, 1], the probability of migration pi < .5, and
m < M where M is a big positive number, the model yields a unique steady state.
The steady state has the property that a positive fraction, but not all individuals in
the economy get an education.
The assumption on E − C ensures that barriers to education C are not large
enough to prevent top-ability individuals from obtaining an education. The re-
striction on pi is technical and guarantees that savings by young individuals are
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well defined, however it is also consistent with data on the rate of skilled emi-
gration. The assumption on m ensures that when wage premiums are sufficiently
high, some people will choose to migrate. A few definitions are in order before I
present a sketch of the proof.
Let ψ˜ be the cut-off ability for all generations who are already living in the
economy, which includes all retired and middle-aged agents.16 Define G(ψ˜) as
the proportion of those who chose to get educated for living generations. Due to
emigration, this may not equal the proportion of skilled currently living in the
economy. Let ψ∗ be the cut-off ability for the newborns consistent with the prices
implied by G(ψ˜). Finally, G(ψ∗) is the proportion of newborns who choose to get an
education given G(ψ˜).
Define a “transition” function that maps elements of G(ψ˜) into G(ψ∗). The func-
tion takes a given proportion of skilled in the population, and gives us the propor-
tion of newborns in the population who will get an education. A fixed point of this
function is a steady state of the model, since the cut-off ability will be the same
across all generations. Technically, the function is undefined at 0 and 1 because
from eqs. (2.1) to (2.3), wages are undefined at those points.
However, in the interval (0, 1), the transition function depicted in Figure 2.1
has the property summarised below. Result 1 is true if the remark is true, so I
present a proof of the statement.
Remark Given the conditions in Result 1, as G(ψ˜) approaches zero, the transition
function lies above the 45-degree line. It is continuous, decreasing, hits zero at
some point in the interval, and remains at zero thereafter.
The function is decreasing in the interval (0, 1): If G(ψ˜)1 < G(ψ˜)2, then
ws(G(ψ˜)1) > ws(G(ψ˜)2) from the definition of wages in eqs. (2.1) and (2.2). It follows
that the skill premium is decreasing in the proportion of skilled. Since the cost of
an education for individual i is independent of the proportion of skilled, G(ψ∗) is
increasing as G(ψ˜) is decreasing.
However, even when skill premiums are arbitrarily high, not everyone gets an
education because education has to be prepaid from endowments. There is an
upper-bound on the proportion of individuals in the population who can afford an
education, given by G(ψ¯), where ψ¯ is such that E − C − e−ψ¯ = 0, or ψ¯ = −ln(E −
C). Given the restrictions on E − C, it is clear that ψ¯ < Ψ and the function lies
above the 45-degree line when skilled wages are sufficiently high.17 The upper
bound that is due to cost constraints explains why the function flattens out as the
proportion of the skilled approaches to zero.
The function equals zero in the interval because there is a limit on the amount
of people who will want to get skilled even if education was costless due to di-
minishing marginal returns. For a given individual with no cost constraints, an
16Since in a steady state the cut-off ability must be the same for all generations, it is sufficient
to start off with a cut-off ability which is the same for all living generations. So finding a steady
state is just finding a cut-off ability for the newborns which is equal to the one which the economy
started off with, and is an equilibrium given the prices implied by the initial cut-off ability.
17Also notice that G(ψ¯) is decreasing with general barriers to education C.
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Figure 2.1: The “Transition” Function
education cannot be worthwhile unless the wage of skilled migrants is at least as
great as unskilled wages: ρws ≥ wu. Substituting the expression for wages given
in eqs. (2.1) to (2.3) into the inequality, and rearranging using the relationship
between the proportion of educated and the proportion of skilled workers in the
population, (1−pi)G(ψ)
1−G(ψ) =
Ls
Lu
, we get that for anyone to be getting an education, it must
be that:
G(ψ˜) ≤ x
1− pi + x < 1 , where x =
[ µρ
1− µ
] 1
1−η
. (2.4)
The above condition restricts the proportion of individuals who will like to get
an education even if it was costless because pi < 1 and x > 0. It means that for
G(ψ˜) ≥ x
1−pi+x , nobody will choose to get an education because the wage premium is
too small. For any proportion of educated workers such that G(ψ˜) ≥ x
1−pi+x , nobody
will choose to get an education, and G(ψ∗) = 0 . This upper-bound that is due
to skill-premium constraints explains why the function touches zero and remains
there in the interval (0, 1).
Taken together, these properties of the function along with continuity(which is
not shown) establish that it crosses the 45-degree line once in the interval, thus
there always exists a unique steady state with a strictly positive mix of the edu-
cated and uneducated.
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2.4 Analyses and Results
2.4.1 Qualitative Properties of The Brain and Drain Effects
This section examines how the steady-state proportion of skilled labor changes
with the rate of skilled emigration. Consider the following thought experiment:
Suppose prices are held fixed, what is the impact of a higher rate of emigration
on the steady state proportion of individuals who obtain an education, and the
skilled-unskilled labor ratio? The answer captures the brain effect, which is the
impact of an increase in the probability of emigration on the proportion of skilled
workers.
The drain effect captures the change in the proportion of skilled workers due
to emigration. This also includes any changes in the proportion of skilled workers
as a result of the impact of emigration on prices. Notice that the drain effect could
also lead to an increase in the proportion of skilled as a result of increased scarcity
of skilled labour. The brain and drain effects depend on important features of the
economy that I elaborate upon.
Figure 2.2: The Brain and Drain Effects with Low Costs of Education
Consider the economy depicted in Figure effig:1.2, with the intersection of the
solid line and the 45-degree line being the original steady state. As drawn, just
less than 40% of the individuals in this economy obtain an education. With an
increase in the rate of skilled emigration, the brain effect shifts the transition
function right to the “XX-line”. This follows from equation 2.4 above; an increase
in pi increases the upper bound on the proportion of individuals who can get an
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education(if it was free). The new steady state moves to the intersection of the
“XX-line” and the 45-degree line.
Relative to the initial steady state, the brain effect encourages more people who
can afford to get an education to do so. This increases the steady-state proportion
of individuals getting an education. The drain effect accounts for the impact of
increased rates of emigration on skill prices. Since relatively more skilled individ-
uals are now leaving the economy, skilled wages rise relative to unskilled wages,
so even more people are encouraged to get an education. The proportion of the
educated in the new steady state is at the intersection of the dashed-line and the
45-degree line.
Even though relatively more individuals are now getting an education, the pro-
portion of skilled individuals left behind after emigration may rise or fall. The pro-
portion of skilled in the economy is given by (1 − pi)G(ψ∗), where ψ∗ is the steady
state cutoff ability. The change in the proportion of skilled individuals is equal
to the change in the proportion of those who get an education less the change in
the rate of emigration. If the change in the rate of emigration is relatively greater
than the increase in the proportion of educated, the economy will end up with rel-
atively less skilled people even though relatively more people get an education.
Figure 2.3: The Brain and Drain Effects with High Costs of Education
Increased emigration need not lead to an increase in the proportion of natives
acquiring an education. Suppose we had an economy in the situation depicted
in Figure 2.3 with its steady state in the relatively flat portion of the transition
function. Recall that the transition function flattens out because there is a limit on
the number of individuals who can prepay for an education even if skilled wages
are arbitrarily high, as the initial proportion of skilled approaches zero. An upper
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bound is given by ψ¯ = −ln(E−C). All else equal, an economy with a higher general
barrier C will have a lower y-intercept.
In the economy of Figure 2.3 everyone who is able to pay for an education is
already doing so. An increase in the rate of emigration has no impact on the pro-
portion of those who get an education. There is no brain effect, and the drain effect
just reduces the proportion of skilled labor in the population. The differential im-
pact of the brain drain arises because education in the economy in Figure 2.2 is
“skill-premium constrained”, while that in Figure 2.3 is “cost-constrained”.
Graphically,the economy in Figure 2.2 is on the downward sloping region of the
transition function (Figure 2.1), and the one in 2.3 is on the flat portion (these are
the only two possibilities, there cannot be a steady state where nobody gets an
education by assumption). An economy is skill-premium constrained if the steady
state proportion of higher educated workers is less than the upper-bound imposed
by the general cost of education E −C. Thus a small increase in the expected skill
premium is enough to induce the marginal individual to obtain an education. In a
cost-constrained economy, small increases in the expected skill premium does not
induce the marginal individual to obtain an education, because he cannot borrow
to finance his education.
This leads to the result below outlining the conditions under which a brain
drain can be beneficial:
Result 2 In a steady state, the brain drain increases the proportion of skilled work-
ers if and only if:
• The economy is initially skill-premium constrained, and
• The increase in the proportion of educated workers induced by an increase
in the probability of emigration is greater than the increase in the outflow of
skilled workers.
All else equal, an economy is more likely to be skill-premium constrained if
skilled labor is used inefficiently (µ is smaller), the foreign wage premium, ρ, is
smaller, or the probability of emigration, pi, is smaller. From equation 2.4, this
means that holding the general cost of education C constant, the horizontal in-
tercept of the skill-premium constrained economy is closer to zero. It follows that
if an economy is skill-premium constrained, the brain effect is positive by defi-
nition since the probability of emigration increases the skill premium. However,
the drain effect may still lead to a net decrease in the proportion of skilled work-
ers. For a cost-constrained economy, a brain drain will unambiguously reduce the
proportion of skilled workers. A cost-constrained economy has a high barrier to
education C all else the same, and a brain drain will unambiguously reduce the
proportion of skilled workers.
The next section uses the model to test for the presence and size of the brain
and drain effect in a cross-section of 23 low and middle-income countries.
22 CHAPTER 2. BRAIN DRAIN AND HUMAN CAPITAL
2.4.2 Data and Parameters
The steady-state of the model is calibrated to observed skilled-unskilled labor ra-
tios and wage premiums. Data come from two primary sources: Data on skilled-
unskilled labor ratios and wage premiums come from Caselli and Coleman (2006)
who use the data to estimate skill weights across countries. Data on emigration
rates come from Docquier and Marfouk (2004) and Beine et al. (2007) who provide
cross-country estimates for secondary, and tertiary educated workers respectively.
The data show that the proportion of tertiary educated workers is low for this
group of countries, suggesting that a brain effect is unlikely in this case(high cost
relative to observed skill premiums). I also investigate the possibility of a brain
gain at the level of secondary educated workers since the proportion of secondary
educated workers is relatively higher for countries in the dataset.
The paper by Caselli and Coleman has estimates of the skilled-unskilled la-
bor ratio, as well as the skilled-unskilled wage premium for about 50 countries.
From their dataset, I take the skilled-unskilled labor ratio and wage premium for
countries with incomes below $10,000 excluding China and India.18
Table 2.2: General Parameters
Parameter (Baseline) Value Source(s)
β 0.95
R 1.15 5-year U.S. Real Interest Rate
α 1/3 Gollin (2002)
η 0.375 Ciconne and Peri (2005); Caselli and Coleman (2006)
ρ 4 Clemens et al. (2010)
Ao 1
T 9
n 1.3 World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision
Ψ 2.5 Chosen to ensure an interior solution in the steady state
m 1 Chosen to ensure an interior solution in the steady state
E 0.2
General Parameters: Table 2.2 lists parameters which are general to all coun-
tries. I set the discount factor β equal to a conventional value of .99, a time period
is equivalent to 5 years of life which makes β equal to .95. The steady state in-
terest rate R∗ is fixed at 1.15 which corresponds to the average annual U.S. real
interest rate between 1981 and 2001 of 1.027. Following Gollin (2002) who has
estimates of the capital and labor income shares in developing countries corrected
for self-employment, I set the capital income share α to 1/3. Using U.S. data, Ci-
ccone and Peri (2005) estimate the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labor. Their estimates imply that η lies somewhere between 0 and .5, η
is set to .375 for an elasticity of substitution of 1.6.
Demographic parameters are chosen to match information available from
World population prospects: the 2008 revision (WPP). The age groups are assumed
18I also exclude Jamaica because their wage premium appears to be an outlier at 50. The second
highest wage premium is Botswana with a premium of 14.5. Indonesia was also excluded because
the dataset shows they have 0 tertiary educated workers.
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to be 5 year groups from age 20 to 65, which means that T=9, and all individuals
die at 70. The steady-state population growth rate n is taken as the world average
from 1995 to 2010, which is equal to 1.3. The top ability level Ψ, and the migration
cost m are chosen to ensure that a steady-state cut-off ability exists in the interval
(0,Ψ);19 Ψ is set to 2.5, and m is set to 1.
Endowment for the young E is fixed at .2.20 The migration wage premium ρ
is set to 4; it is taken from Clemens et al. (2010) who estimate wage premiums
for immigrants in the U.S. compared to identical workers in their country of ori-
gin. Finally, ψ is assumed to be distributed on the interval [0,Ψ], and follows a
Beta(a, b) distribution; in the baseline parameterization, a = b = 1 corresponding
to a uniform distribution. I tried other values for a, b with different implications
for the shape of g(ψ), but the results are not sensitive to a change in the shape of
the ability distribution.
Country-Specific Parameters: There are three parameters which are country-
specific —the skill weight in the labor aggregator function µ, the general costs
of education C, and emigration rates pi—which are used to match the skilled-
unskilled labor ratio, and wage premiums observed in the data. In the first ex-
ercise, I interpret the skilled as those who have a tertiary education, and in the
second as those who have a secondary education. These have different implica-
tions for µ and C.
To obtain the weight on skilled labor in the labor aggregator function, I follow
the methodology outlined in Caselli and Coleman (2006). The ratio of skilled to
unskilled wages on the steady state can be written as:
w∗s
w∗u
=
µ
1− µ
(Lt,s
Lt,u
)η−1
.
Given data on the wage-premium, and the skilled-unskilled labor ratio, the
skill weights can be obtained from the above expression. For example, the coun-
tries in my dataset have an average tertiary educated skilled-unskilled labor ratio
of .037, and wage premium of about 5.3, which implies a µ of .4010.21I repeat the
same exercise with data for secondary educated workers in order to obtain their
skill weights. The results for µ for the countries in my dataset follow the pat-
tern of skill weights observed in Caselli and Coleman (2006) who find that poorer
countries use less-skilled labour absolutely more efficiently. This is reflected in
19Migration costs do differ across countries, but in this model where migration rates are exoge-
nous, it does not play a major role in the decision to obtain an education as long as it is not too high.
A model with endogenous migration rates will need different costs of emigration across countries.
20Fixing the parameter E is not crucial because what matter for the impact of the brain drain is
E − C, which is allowed to vary across countries. Moreover, most of the countries in the dataset
have very similar income levels, so assuming a fixed E should not be problematic.
21The model was solved using different values for η, this changes the values for µ but the results
are not very sensitive to these changes. I also cross-checked the data from Caselli and Coleman
with those in Docquier and Marfouk (2004) for the share of secondary and tertiary-educated work-
ers, and they closely correspond.
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the higher value of µ when skilled workers are interpreted as those who have
completed a secondary education.
As already mentioned, the migration rates for tertiary educated workers are
taken from Beine et al. (2007), who correct for age-of-emigration when computing
their estimates. Rates for secondary educated workers are taken from Docquier
and Marfouk (2004). General barrier to education C is chosen to match the propor-
tion of skilled workers in the economy. The results of the calibration, along with
the wages and skill premiums obtained from the model are in Table 2.8.
The average cost of a tertiary-education is .1093 which is well over 50% of the
endowments for young individuals. For a secondary education, the average cost
is about 40% of endowments at .08, with a bit of variation between countries. It
is difficult to comment on what these costs exactly translate to, but in Section 5 I
present some evidence on the existence of general barriers to education which are
not necessarily monetary in several developing countries. The evidence also offers
several interpretations for C.
2.4.3 Quantitative Results
The Effect of the Brain Drain on The Proportion of Tertiary Educated
Workers:
In this section, I solve the model for the steady state of the economies in my dataset
for various rates of skilled migration. This is in order to understand how big the
brain and drain effects are across different economies. From the dataset which is
available in 2.8, the average skilled-unskilled labor ratio varies across the coun-
tries with an average of about 3.7%, and an average wage premium of 5.3. The
earlier analysis suggests that with the low proportion of skilled workers, relative
to the skill premium, these economies will be cost-constrained on average. Thus,
the model will predict that increasing the rate of skilled emigration should have
no effect on the proportion of individuals obtaining an education, and a reduction
in the steady-state proportion of skilled workers.
This happens to be the case in the quantitative exercise: for tertiary educated
workers, there is virtually no brain effect for most countries. Poland is the only
country with a positive brain effect, and a brain gain at the tertiary-level. This
occurs because Poland has an unusually low skill premium for a country with its
skilled-unskilled labor ratio in the dataset. The skill premium for tertiary edu-
cated workers is 1.5 in Poland, and the second-lowest skill premium for secondary
educated workers in the dataset is Sri Lanka at 1.88 (Poland also has the lowest
skill-premium at the level of secondary-educated workers at 1.3).
The prominent effect of a brain drain on the steady-state proportion of tertiary
educated workers comes from the drain effect; it does not increase the proportion
of individuals getting an education, but reduces the skilled-unskilled labor ratio
as more skilled workers leave the economy. Only the skilled workers who are
left behind stand to benefit from increased emigration, as they become relatively
scarce, and experience an appreciation in their steady-state wages. I report the
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results for the countries with the lowest and highest skilled-unskilled labor ratios
respectively, as well as those for Poland, the full set of results are in Table 2.9.
The Brain Effect: Table 2.3 presents the result from a situation where there
is no emigration, to emigration rates as high as 20%. For each value of the rate
of skilled migration (pi), the table shows the steady-state proportion of the people
who got an education, the skilled-unskilled labor ratio (Ls/Lu), the skill premium
which is the home skilled-unskilled wage ratio, and the wages for skilled labor.
These are reported for the brain effect which does not account for changing prices,
and the final effect(from which the drain effect can be calculated). The results
for Botswana and the Philippines are typical of all other countries in the dataset
except for Poland. In most countries, there is no brain effect because they are
relatively cost-constrained; skill premiums are high enough so that almost every-
one who can afford to get an education is already doing so. Increasing the rate of
skilled emigration, and the skill premium does not affect the cost constraint.
Table 2.3: Brain and Drain Effects for Tertiary Educated (Select Countries)
Botswana; C=.1168
Brain Effect: Final Effect:
pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
0 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126
0.04 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0051 14.8602 0.3316 4.928
0.07 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0049 15.158 0.3312 5.0198
0.1 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0048 15.4719 0.3307 5.1165
0.15 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0045 16.0346 0.3299 5.2896
0.2 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0042 16.6538 0.3291 5.48
Philippines; C=.097; µ=.4113
Brain Effect: Final Effect:
pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
0 0.0922 0.1015 2.919 0.3534 1.0316 0.0922 0.1015 2.919 0.3534 1.0316
0.04 0.0923 0.1017 2.9163 0.3535 1.0309 0.0923 0.0977 2.9906 0.3515 1.0511
0.07 0.0924 0.1018 2.9147 0.3535 1.0305 0.0924 0.0947 3.0486 0.35 1.0669
0.1 0.0924 0.1018 2.9136 0.3536 1.0302 0.0925 0.0917 3.1105 0.3484 1.0837
0.15 0.0925 0.1019 2.9122 0.3536 1.0298 0.0925 0.0867 3.2223 0.3457 1.114
0.2 0.0925 0.1019 2.9114 0.3536 1.0296 0.0926 0.0816 3.3461 0.3429 1.1474
Poland; C=.10; µ=.2033
Brain Effect: Final Effect:
pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
0 0.0498 0.0524 1.6122 0.5882 0.9483 0.0498 0.0524 1.6122 0.5882 0.9483
0.04 0.0527 0.0557 1.5521 0.59 0.9157 0.0542 0.055 1.5643 0.5896 0.9223
0.07 0.0549 0.0581 1.5106 0.5913 0.8931 0.0575 0.0567 1.5341 0.5905 0.9059
0.1 0.0571 0.0606 1.4719 0.5925 0.8721 0.0608 0.0582 1.5095 0.5913 0.8925
0.15 0.0607 0.0646 1.414 0.5945 0.8406 0.0659 0.06 1.4817 0.5922 0.8774
0.2 0.0641 0.0685 1.364 0.5963 0.8133 0.0703 0.0605 1.473 0.5925 0.8727
The different impacts of the brain drain in Poland and the Philippines in Figure
2.4 present a nice illustration of the difference between a skill-premium and a cost
constrained economy. The calibrated general cost of education C in Poland (.1) is
similar to that in the Philippines (.097) (similar vertical intercepts), but the weight
on skilled workers in the production function µ is slightly more than half of that
in the Philippines (different horizontal intercepts). This is reflected in differences
in skill premium which is very low in Poland, even compared to the skill-premium
for secondary educated workers for other countries in the dataset. This disparity
in skill premiums results in Poland having slightly less than half the proportion
of skilled workers compared to the Philippines, and thus skill-constrained.
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Figure 2.4: The Brain Effect: Poland and The Philippines
Increasing the rate of skilled emigration increases the expected skill-premium
and moves Poland out to the new steady state (S.S*) as the economy can now sup-
port more educated workers. For the Philippines which is at the flat portion of its
transition function, increasing the skill-premium shifts the curve out to the right
as in Poland, but the steady state proportion of educated does not change. The
increased rate of skilled emigration does not address the fact that the marginal in-
dividual is cost-constrained (the flat portion does not move with emigration rates),
thus there is no brain effect.
This places Poland in a unique position amongst the set of countries in this
study. The brain effect alone leads to an increase of about 2-percentage points in
the steady-state skilled-unskilled labor ratio from .0498. This is a 40% rise in the
steady-state proportion of skilled workers. However, since there is no transition
in the model, there is no idea of how long it takes to converge to this new steady-
state.
The Drain Effect: The drain effect takes into account the impact of increased
migration on prices. The drain effect is the difference between the final effect and
the brain effect in the skilled-unskilled labor ratio. The increased drain on the
economy leads to a decrease in the proportion of skilled workers for all countries
except Poland where the brain effect outweighs the drain effect. In the Philippines,
an increase in the skilled migration rate from 4% to 20% leads to a drain effect
of about 2 percentage-points decrease in the skilled-unskilled labor ratio. Since
there is no brain effect, this is essentially a 2 percentage-point drop in the steady-
state skilled-unskilled labor ratio from .1016. Again, a 16 percentage-point rise in
the skilled-emigration rate is relatively large, most countries in the dataset have
skilled emigration rates well below 10%. The model predicts that for a country
like the Philippines, shutting down skilled migration from its current level of 10%
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will increase the steady-state skilled-unskilled labor ratio by 1 percentage-point,
from its current level of about .09.
In Poland, the brain effect leads to a 2.28 percentage-point rise in the skilled-
unskilled labor ratio from .056 when the emigration rate increases from 4% to
20%. The drain effect leads to a decrease in the steady-state skilled-unskilled labor
ratio of about .08 percentage-points over this range. The brain effect dominates
the drain effect, and Poland experiences a net gain in the proportion of skilled-
labor of about 2 percentage-points. Poland is the only country in the dataset with
a brain effect, and consequently, the only one where the brain effect dominates the
drain effect.
Overall, skilled emigration has a negative impact on the proportion of tertiary-
educated workers for countries in the dataset. This particular result is not espe-
cially new; Beine et al. (2008) find that most developing countries are net losers of
skilled labor due to the brain drain. The novel result in this analysis is that this
negative effect of the brain drain on low skill economies can be explained by high
general costs to acquiring an education. Returns to education in many developing
countries are not the problem, the problem is one of affordability, which increased
emigration rates do not address.
This is especially relevant given the recent debate as to whether increased
emigration rates can act as a substitute for education subsidies in Docquier et al.
(2008). As long as education subsidies are there to alleviate costs constraints in
developing countries, the analysis above suggests that increased emigration rates
can only complement but not act as a substitute to subsidies in an economy with
low skill levels, and high skill premiums. Next, I look at the secondary education
level where costs are lower to see whether a brain gain can result here.
The Effect of the Brain Drain on The Proportion of Secondary Educated
Workers:
In this section, the model is calibrated to match skilled-unskilled ratios and wage
premiums at the secondary education level. The main feature at the secondary
school level is that for many countries, there is a brain effect because the marginal
individual can afford to obtain a secondary education in the presence of increased
skilled migration rates. However, this brain effect is very modest, and is a lot
smaller than the drain effect which leads to a net loss in skilled workers. Again,
Poland is the only net-gainer due to its really low skill-premium relative to propor-
tion of skilled workers. Table 2.4 presents the results for Poland, the Philippines
and Botswana; the rest of the results are in Table 2.10.
The result in Botswana is representative of that of countries with the lowest
levels of secondary-educated workers (Kenya, Guatemala, Ghana), while the out-
come in the Philippines is representative of that in the rest of the dataset with the
exception of Poland. For the countries with the lowest levels of education, there is
no brain effect even at the secondary education level. The outcome for these coun-
tries is no different from that in the tertiary case where there is no brain effect,
and skilled emigration only lowers the steady-state skilled-unskilled labor ratio.
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Table 2.4: Brain and Drain Effects for Secondary Educated (Select Countries)
Botswana; C=.1120
Brain Effect: Final Effect:
pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
0 0.0278 0.0286 5.5893 0.3408 1.905 0.0278 0.0286 5.5893 0.3408 1.905
0.04 0.0278 0.0286 5.5891 0.3408 1.9049 0.0278 0.0275 5.7334 0.3396 1.9473
0.07 0.0278 0.0286 5.5889 0.3408 1.9049 0.0278 0.0266 5.8481 0.3387 1.981
0.1 0.0278 0.0286 5.5888 0.3408 1.9049 0.0278 0.0258 5.9692 0.3378 2.0164
0.15 0.0278 0.0286 5.5888 0.3408 1.9048 0.0278 0.0243 6.1862 0.3362 2.0799
0.2 0.0278 0.0286 5.5887 0.3408 1.9048 0.0278 0.0229 6.425 0.3346 2.1496
Philippines; C=.0376
Brain Effect: Final Effect:
pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
0 0.2693 0.3685 2.0174 0.3371 0.68 0.2693 0.3685 2.0174 0.3371 0.68
0.04 0.2703 0.3705 2.0108 0.3375 0.6787 0.2707 0.3564 2.0602 0.3341 0.6883
0.07 0.2709 0.3715 2.0071 0.3378 0.678 0.2714 0.3465 2.0968 0.3316 0.6953
0.1 0.2713 0.3724 2.0043 0.338 0.6775 0.2719 0.3361 2.137 0.329 0.703
0.15 0.2719 0.3734 2.0009 0.3383 0.6768 0.2724 0.3182 2.2113 0.3243 0.7172
0.2 0.2722 0.3741 1.9987 0.3384 0.6764 0.2726 0.2998 2.295 0.3194 0.7331
Poland; C=.0391
Brain Effect: Final Effect:
pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
0 0.1924 0.2383 1.3224 0.4706 0.6223 0.1924 0.2383 1.3224 0.4706 0.6223
0.04 0.2013 0.252 1.2769 0.4746 0.606 0.2057 0.2486 1.288 0.4736 0.61
0.07 0.2078 0.2623 1.2454 0.4775 0.5947 0.2153 0.2552 1.267 0.4755 0.6024
0.1 0.2141 0.2724 1.2163 0.4803 0.5842 0.2245 0.2606 1.2506 0.477 0.5965
0.15 0.2241 0.2888 1.1728 0.4847 0.5685 0.2384 0.2661 1.2344 0.4785 0.5907
0.2 0.2332 0.3041 1.1355 0.4887 0.5549 0.2497 0.2662 1.2339 0.4786 0.5905
For the Philippines and other countries in the dataset, an increase in the rate of
skilled emigration leads to a less than modest brain effect which levels off quickly
with further increases in the rate of skilled emigration (as the supply of those
who are able to afford an education runs out). Increasing the rate of migration
from 0% to 20%, increases the steady state skilled-unskilled labor ratio by less
than 1 percentage-point from an already high level of .3685. The force at work
here is that the cost constraint begins to get even more severe. The drain effect
is a lot stronger than the brain effect; more skilled workers are removed from the
economy than unskilled workers who become skilled so most countries experience
a net loss in steady-state skilled labor.
For each change in rate of skilled emigration, Poland experiences a strong brain
effect which outweighs the drain effect at low levels of migration. At higher lev-
els of emigration, the drain effect begins to outweigh the brain effect, and Poland
experiences a net-loss in steady-state skilled-unskilled labor ratio. Increasing the
rate of skilled migration from 0% to 4% for example, leads to a brain effect of a
1.4 percentage-point rise in the skilled-unskilled labor ratio from .2383. This out-
weighs the drain effect of less than .5 of a percentage-point decline in the skilled-
unskilled. Increasing the rate of migration from 4% to 7% leads to no change in
the steady-state skilled-unskilled labor ratio as both effects cancel out. Any fur-
ther increase in the rate of skilled migration leads to a net-loss for Poland as the
drain effect gets stronger(or the economy becomes more cost-constrained).
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2.5 Evidence of Barriers to Education
2.5.1 Interpretation of Steady-state Cost
Increased skilled emigration fails to encourage greater investment in education
in this model because the marginal individual is cost-constrained. This cost-
constraint is reflected in calibrated high general barriers to education C. The
high barrier to education for Botswana relative to Poland for example helps ex-
plain why less than 1% of its workforce is educated compared to Poland’s 6%, even
though it has a skill premium which is close to 10 times that of Poland. However,
this steady state relationship need not be conclusive evidence for high costs of ed-
ucation. For example, because the model is calibrated to steady state variables, it
cannot account for the possibility that the rate of education is rapidly increasing
in Botswana in response to a higher skill premium.
Available data does support the hypothesis that enrollment is indeed rapidly
increasing in several developing countries, but this increase is mostly due to rapid
population growth, and is not reflected in enrollment ratios (UNESCO, 2006). For
example, the report by UNESCO shows that from 1991-2004, enrollment in ter-
tiary education has increased by 7.2% on average in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
and 1.9% for North America and Western Europe. However, enrollment ratios,
which is the ratio of students in school relative to the school-age population, have
only increased from 3% to 5% for the countries of SSA in the same time frame,
compared to an increase from 52% to 71% for North America and Western Europe.
The underwhelming rise in enrollment ratios is attributed to the higher growth
rate of the tertiary-age population in SSA.22
Further data on tertiary school life expectancy (TSLE) between 1990-1993 and
2007-2009 presented in Table 2.5 shows that it is not the case that low-skilled,
high returns to education, countries are quickly catching up. TSLE is defined as
the number of years of tertiary education an individual who has completed sec-
ondary school can expect to receive. It provides some information on access to
tertiary education, and changes over time gives us an idea of how access has im-
proved with demand (UNESCO, 2006). The TSLE has increased from 1 year in
Poland in 1990 to an impressive 3.5 in 2007, reflecting the rise in tertiary en-
rollment rates in Central and Eastern Europe, even with lower estimates of the
returns to education in the 1990s. Given the more than 200% rise in TSLE in less
than two decades, the 40% increase in the proportion of skilled workers appears
quite reasonable. On the other hand, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, and
South and West Asia for example continue to have low TSLEs even with higher
measured returns. The slow or non-existent growth in TSLE over time, in many
regions of the world, is not indicative of a world where countries with low levels
of education and high returns to skill are catching up. The picture painted by
TSLEs supports an interpretation of C as representing existing barriers (costs) to
education.
22See Table 1 in UNESCO (2006) for more information.
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Table 2.5: TSLE and Returns to Education
Country TSLE(years) Return to Tertiary Education
1990-1993 2007-2009 (Annual, early 1990s)
Botswana 0.3 0.3 38.00
Chile 1.4 3.1 20.70
Colombia 0.7 1.9 21.70
Ecuador 1 2.2 12.7
El Salvador 0.8 1.3 9.5
Ghana 0.1 0.4 37
Guatemala 0.4 0.9 22.20
Honduras 0.4 1.1 25.90
Kenya 0.1 0.2 16**
Malaysia 0.4 2 34.50
Pakistan 0.1 0.3 31.20
Panama 1.1 2.2 21.00
Paraguay 0.4 2.1 13.70
Philippines 1.2 1.4 11.60
Poland 1 3.5 7**
Thailand 0.8 2.3 11.80
Tunisia 0.4 1.7 27.00
Region
Arab States 0.6 1 18.8
Central and Eastern Europe 1.6 2.6 N/A
Central Asia 1.5 1.3 N/A
East Asia and the Pacific 0.4 1 N/A
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.8 1.3 19.5
North America an Western Europe 2.6 3.3 11.6
South and West Asia 0.3 0.5 N/A
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 0.2 27.8
World 0.7 1.1 19
Sources: UNESCO (2012); UNESCO (2009) for school expectancy data.
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), and Hendricks (2004) for returns to education data.
**Rate of return here is the average for all schooling levels.
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2.5.2 Evidence from Tertiary Education Expenditure
Here, I present some evidence on significant barriers to tertiary education in de-
veloping countries which would limit the size of the brain effect. I begin with
the observation that the cost of tertiary education represents a high proportion
of income. Table 2.6 presents data on tertiary education expenditure-per-pupil,
at the tertiary education level, as a proportion of GDP (Expperpup tert in the
table) across regions and income groups. Across income groups, these range from
227.12% for low-income countries and close to 28% for high-income countries. Most
of the cross-regional estimates, with the exception of Eastern Europe/Former So-
viet Union and OECD countries, show that most countries spend over 50% of per-
capita GDP on tertiary education. These spending patterns correspond very well
with the calibrated cost of education.
Table 2.6: Tertiary education expenditure-per-pupil by region and income
Region Expperpup tert(%)
Low-income 227.12
Middle-income 68.2
High-income 27.95
Sub-Saharan Africa 2092.38
Middle East/North Africa 103.35
Latin America 57.2
South Asia 72.6
East Asia 76.7
East Europe/FSU 28.65
OECD 34.2
Source: Author’s calculations from Table 9 in Glewwe and Kremer (2006).
Table 2.7 presents data on total (public and private) expenditure-per-pupil as a
percentage of GDP (Expperpup in the table), at the tertiary and secondary levels
of education, when available for the 23 countries in my dataset (and including the
U.S. for comparison). Expenditure-per-pupil at the tertiary level is adjusted for
the fact that a significant proportion of expenditure on tertiary education is pri-
vately financed.23 For more than half of the countries for which data is available,
per-pupil expenditure on tertiary students exceeds 50% of GDP, which matches up
well with the endowment-cost (E/C) ratios obtained from the calibration. Tertiary
education expenditure is vastly underestimated in the sub-Sahara African coun-
tries (Botswana, Ghana and Kenya) where the tertiary education expenditure as
a percentage of GDP exceed 200%.
Cross-country data on the cost of higher education (tuition and other expenses)
available from the International Comparative Higher Education Finance Project
(ICHEFAP, 2009) confirm the information given by aggregate expenditure data.
23The adjustment multiplies public tertiary education expenditure-per-pupil as a percentage of
GDP, by the ratio of total tertiary education expenditure to public tertiary education expenditure
obtained from various tables in UNESCO (2012).
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Table 2.7: Expenditure-per-pupil at tertiary and secondary levels of education
Country Year Expperpup GDP(%) Expperpup Sec(%) Expperpup Tert(%) E/Ctert
Public Adjusted
Bolivia 2003 17.89 13.04 35.97 53.7
Botswana 2007 27.91 38.30 256.32 58.4
Chile* 2005 12.51 13.23 11.64 64.01 54.65
Colombia* 2005 14.42 14.46 19.41 30.33 55.9
Costa Rica 2004 18.69 16.98 44 0.5195
Dominican Rep. 2007 N/A. 4.07 N/A. N/A. 53.75
Ecuador 1995 N/A. 6.03 34 50.75
El Salvador 2005 8.55 9.17 15.06 45.18 56.05
Ghana 2005 22.84 33.22 204.88 57.75
Guatemala* 2007 10.14 5.92 18.95 51.67 56.6
Honduras 1995 N/A. N/A. 61.66 57.3
Kenya 2004 22.78 22.20 273.63 57.95
Malaysia 2004 20.73 20.59 69.35 57.5
Nicaragua 2005 N/A. 3.85 N/A. N/A. 52.75
Pakistan 2005 11.67 N/A. N/A. N/A. 57.15
Panama 2004 13.52 12.32 26.59 53.2
Paraguay* 2004 13.10 13.03 24.55 56.12 55.85
Peru* 2005 8.75 9.53 8.86 29.53 51.1
Philippines* 2005 8.89 8.82 11.10 23.20 48.25
Poland* 2005 22.70 22.17 21.43 28.57 50.05
Sri Lanka 1995 N/A. N/A. 64 58.1
Thailand 2004 18.26 16.09 23.86 52
Tunisia 2005 22.71 21.71 50.13 56
United States* 2005 20.89 22.79 23.07 69.21
Sources: UNESCO (2012); UNESCO (2009), and Task Force on Higher Education and Society (2002) for expenditure data.
*Adjusted for the fact that a significant proportion of expenditure on tertiary education(Expperpup Tert) is financed pri-
vately.
Take Ghana for example, the total of a year at a Ghanaian fee paying public uni-
versity is $4,636. Given a per-capita GDP of $1854, this implies that Ghana spends
250% of per-capita income on a typical tertiary educated student. Taken together,
these data imply that tertiary education is expensive, and costs easily exceed 50%
of per-capita GDP in many countries as found in the preceding calibration exer-
cise. However, they do not directly imply that there are high barriers to education
(cost constraints) which restrict access.
Evidence for high barriers to education come from the malfunctioning, and in
most cases unavailable student loan programs in most developing countries (Task
Force on Higher Education and Society, 2002). Since the mid-1980s, there has
been a shift in the financing of higher education from a fully public (tuition and
living expenses) model, to one in which costs are shared between the student and
the Government through tuition and user fees (cost-sharing). This change is due
to a combination of a rise in per-student cost, increased enrollment, and declining
or stagnant Government revenues (Johnstone and Marcucci, 2007).
A solution to the change from a public to a public-private model of higher ed-
ucation funding is the expansion of student loan programs, which aims to ensure
that students still have access to higher education even if they cannot afford the
up-front costs. Still many developing countries do not have the capacity, and well
developed financial markets to administer these programs. As Johnstone (2004)
and Ziderman (2002) find in their study of student loan programs, when functional
in many developing countries, they face substantial challenges in meeting student
2.6. CONCLUSION 33
needs as demand greatly exceeds supply. Most student loan programs in devel-
oping countries also find it difficult recovering previously disbursed loans, and
staying solvent. In many others, they just do not exist, and students are forced to
meet the up-front costs of education.
In sub-Saharan Africa for example, Burkina Faso has a means-tested student
loans program established in 1994, however the per-student amounts disbursed
are very small and there is little or no recovery to date (Johnstone, 2004). In
Kenya and Ghana, the student loans programs have failed due to low recovery
rates, and new programs are being set up which face similar challenges to that
in Burkina Faso. In the other African countries surveyed, with the exception of
South Africa surveyed, student loan programs do not exist. Coupled with poorly
functioning financial markets, this means that students have no access to loans at
reasonable rates with which to finance schooling (Task Force on Higher Education
and Society, 2002).
Problems with access to student loans are not limited to countries of sub-
Saharan Africa. The Philippines for example has a variety of student loan pro-
grams targeted at poor students in different institutions and regions. However,
the program only covers tuition expenses which according to data available from
ICHEFAP (2009), constitutes a little less than 50% of the annual cost of a tertiary
education in the Philippines. In addition to this, the program has very limited
coverage, covering less than 1% of all enrolled students (Ziderman, 2002), which
implies that most poor students do not have access to these loans.
The evidence presented here shows that higher education is expensive, and in
most developing countries, the cost exceeds 50% of per-capita GDP. Taken together
with evidence on low, and in many cases non-existent access to student loans (pub-
lic and private), this presents significant barriers to higher education. Significant
financial barriers to higher education remain in many developing countries, espe-
cially for the poorest. This implies that even though an increase in the probability
of emigration increases the benefits of a higher education, the presence of cost con-
straints means that there is unlikely to be an increase in the proportion of individ-
uals getting an education. While the evidence here focuses on financial barriers to
education, it is worth mentioning that there exists other barriers to access prior
to university age which are not discussed. This includes amongst other things,
the challenges facing primary education in many developing countries discussed
comprehensively in Glewwe and Kremer (2006).
2.6 Conclusion
I use an OLG model of education choice and skilled emigration to derive conditions
under which a low-skill economy can grow its skilled labor with an increase in
the brain drain. This occurs when on the steady state there are individuals in
the economy who can afford an education but are not doing so due to low skill
premiums, and the increase in the proportion of educated workers dominate the
increase in the rate of emigration. The model is calibrated to data on 23 low and
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middle-income countries in order to investigate the possibility of a net brain-gain
at both the secondary and tertiary levels of schooling.
For 22 out of the 23 countries in the dataset, at any rate of skilled emigration,
they experience a net decline in the steady-state proportion of skilled labor. A
combination of high costs of education and already high skill premiums imply that
increasing migration rates do not induce more people to obtain an education since
they cannot afford the up-front costs of education. The only exception is Poland
which has a unique combination of relatively low cost and low skill premiums,
which means that improved outside opportunities encourage a lot of people on
the margin to become skilled. Finally, I present some data on financial barriers
to education, and changes in tertiary education which support the quantitative
results of the model.
Additional cross-country data on skill premiums and skilled-unskilled labor
ratios are needed to see if the result here is generalizable; is it typical for most
countries, and are there other countries similar to Poland? If most developing
economies are unlike Poland, then reducing obstacles to education is a necessary
response to the brain drain.
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2.7 Other Tables and Figures
Table 2.8: Labor Ratios, Wage Premiums, Migration Rates, and Parameters
Tertiary-Educated Workers
Country Income(PPP $) Skill Premium Lu Ls Ls/Lu pi90 µ C
Bolivia 4953 2.70 125.00 6.00 0.0480 0.044 0.2881 0.1074
Botswana 3316 14.50 190.00 1.00 0.0053 0.016 0.3541 0.1168
Chile 9323 5.37 203.00 8.00 0.0394 0.0477 0.4171 0.1093
Colombia 9360 7.10 180.00 5.00 0.0278 0.0632 0.4307 0.1118
Costa Rica 9118 4.60 156.00 10.00 0.0641 0.0473 0.4524 0.1039
Dom. Rep. 7314 3.73 134.00 6.00 0.0448 0.1061 0.3469 0.1075
Ecuador 8388 5.22 171.00 13.00 0.0760 0.032 0.5095 0.1015
El Salvador 5548 3.89 136.00 3.00 0.0221 0.209 0.2647 0.1121
Ghana 1854 3.29 130.00 1.00 0.0077 0.3386 0.1361 0.1155
Guatemala 7431 8.05 151.00 3.00 0.0199 0.1229 0.4119 0.1132
Honduras 4597 11.75 217.00 3.00 0.0138 0.14 0.4480 0.1146
Kenya 1998 9.93 166.00 1.00 0.0060 0.3799 0.2880 0.1159
Malaysia 9472 3.73 169.00 2.00 0.0118 0.161 0.1875 0.1150
Nicaragua 4453 3.89 126.00 6.00 0.0476 0.1999 0.3677 0.1055
Pakistan 4552 3.89 120.00 2.00 0.0167 0.0498 0.2321 0.1143
Panama 7898 6.81 227.00 11.00 0.0485 0.1246 0.5064 0.1064
Paraguay 6015 5.00 170.00 5.00 0.0294 0.0241 0.3555 0.1117
Peru 8387 3.11 139.00 10.00 0.0719 0.0413 0.3743 0.1022
Philippines 4473 3.06 141.00 13.00 0.0922 0.0965 0.4113 0.0965
Poland 8439 1.50 119.00 7.00 0.0588 0.1129 0.2033 0.1001
Sri Lanka 5476 2.66 149.00 1.00 0.0066 0.2309 0.1048 0.1162
Thailand 5558 4.29 152.00 8.00 0.0656 0.0161 0.4393 0.1040
Tunisia 7696 3.06 122.00 3.00 0.0246 0.1294 0.2343 0.1120
Averages — 5.2665 156.2174 5.5652 0.0369 0.1188 0.4011 0.1093
Secondary-Educated Workers
Country Income(PPP $) Skill Premium Lu Ls Ls/Lu pi90 µ C
Bolivia 1.89 105.00 20.00 0.1905 0.019 0.4014 0.0748
Botswana 5.58 174.00 5.00 0.0287 0.001 0.3775 0.112
Chile 2.94 143.00 35.00 0.2448 0.019 0.5495 0.0647
Colombia 3.53 138.00 22.00 0.1594 0.039 0.5284 0.0828
Costa Rica 2.67 126.00 28.00 0.2222 0.075 0.5105 0.0667
Dom. Rep. 2.33 116.00 17.00 0.1466 0.236 0.4124 0.0772
Ecuador 2.89 126.00 39.00 0.3095 0.087 0.5813 0.0454
El Salvador 2.39 123.00 10.00 0.0813 0.385 0.3324 0.0901
Ghana 2.15 123.00 5.00 0.0407 0.009 0.2252 0.1086
Guatemala 3.82 133.00 11.00 0.0827 0.189 0.4458 0.0965
Honduras 4.87 152.00 21.00 0.1382 0.132 0.5857 0.0843
Kenya 4.38 159.00 4.00 0.0252 0.008 0.3050 0.1127
Malaysia 2.33 127.00 22.00 0.1732 0.011 0.4378 0.0804
Nicaragua 2.39 114.00 15.00 0.1316 0.239 0.4022 0.0813
Pakistan 2.39 107.00 9.00 0.0841 0.006 0.3371 0.0998
Panama 3.43 142.00 47.00 0.3310 0.096 0.6322 0.0396
Paraguay 2.82 141.00 19.00 0.1348 0.008 0.4463 0.0892
Peru 2.07 106.00 30.00 0.2830 0.026 0.4847 0.0549
Philippines 2.05 103.00 37.00 0.3592 0.031 0.5195 0.0376
Poland 1.30 98.00 24.00 0.2449 0.025 0.3505 0.0391
Sri Lanka 1.88 117.00 18.00 0.1538 0.015 0.3685 0.0829
Thailand 2.55 143.00 16.00 0.1119 0.015 0.3935 0.0938
Tunisia 2.05 104.00 14.00 0.1346 0.034 0.3692 0.0876
Averages 2.8130 126.9565 20.3478 0.1657 0.0741 0.4777 0.0799
Sources: Data on skill premiums and skilled-unskilled labour ratios come from Caselli and Coleman (2006). Data on
emigration rates in 1990(pi90) come from Beine et. al (2007) and Docquier and Marfouk(2004).
Note: C and µ are chosen to match proportion of skilled workers and skill premiums as explained in the text.
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Table 2.9: Brain and Drain Effects for Tertiary Educated Workers
For Tertiary Educated Brain Effect: For Tertiary Educated Drain Effect:
Country pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
Bolivia
0 0.0474 0.0498 2.6396 0.4676 1.2343 0.0474 0.0498 2.6396 0.4676 1.2343
0.04 0.0477 0.0501 2.6294 0.4678 1.2301 0.0478 0.0482 2.6935 0.4665 1.2566
0.07 0.0478 0.0502 2.6238 0.4679 1.2278 0.048 0.0469 2.7405 0.4656 1.276
0.1 0.048 0.0504 2.6195 0.468 1.226 0.0481 0.0455 2.7924 0.4646 1.2974
0.15 0.0481 0.0505 2.6144 0.4681 1.2239 0.0482 0.0431 2.8889 0.4629 1.3372
0.2 0.0482 0.0506 2.6111 0.4682 1.2226 0.0483 0.0406 2.9979 0.461 1.382
Botswana
0 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126
0.04 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0051 14.8602 0.3316 4.928
0.07 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0049 15.158 0.3312 5.0198
0.1 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0048 15.4719 0.3307 5.1165
0.15 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0045 16.0346 0.3299 5.2896
0.2 0.0053 0.0053 14.4859 0.3322 4.8126 0.0053 0.0042 16.6538 0.3291 5.48
Chile
0 0.0398 0.0414 5.2354 0.3098 1.622 0.0398 0.0414 5.2354 0.3098 1.622
0.04 0.0398 0.0414 5.2352 0.3098 1.622 0.0398 0.0397 5.3704 0.3084 1.6564
0.07 0.0398 0.0414 5.2351 0.3098 1.6219 0.0398 0.0385 5.4779 0.3074 1.6837
0.1 0.0398 0.0414 5.235 0.3098 1.6219 0.0398 0.0373 5.5912 0.3063 1.7124
0.15 0.0398 0.0414 5.2349 0.3098 1.6219 0.0398 0.0352 5.7945 0.3044 1.7639
0.2 0.0398 0.0414 5.2348 0.3098 1.6219 0.0398 0.0331 6.0182 0.3025 1.8204
Colombia
0 0.0288 0.0296 6.8263 0.2851 1.9461 0.0288 0.0296 6.8263 0.2851 1.9461
0.04 0.0288 0.0296 6.8262 0.2851 1.946 0.0288 0.0284 7.0026 0.2839 1.9878
0.07 0.0288 0.0296 6.8262 0.2851 1.946 0.0288 0.0275 7.1429 0.2829 2.021
0.1 0.0288 0.0296 6.8262 0.2851 1.946 0.0288 0.0266 7.2908 0.282 2.056
0.15 0.0288 0.0296 6.8262 0.2851 1.946 0.0288 0.0252 7.556 0.2804 2.1185
0.2 0.0288 0.0296 6.8262 0.2851 1.946 0.0288 0.0237 7.8477 0.2787 2.1871
Costa Rica
0 0.0631 0.0673 4.4606 0.293 1.3068 0.0631 0.0673 4.4606 0.293 1.3068
0.04 0.0631 0.0673 4.4603 0.293 1.3067 0.0631 0.0647 4.5754 0.2913 1.3326
0.07 0.0631 0.0673 4.4601 0.293 1.3066 0.0631 0.0626 4.6669 0.2899 1.3531
0.1 0.0631 0.0673 4.46 0.293 1.3066 0.0631 0.0606 4.7634 0.2886 1.3748
0.15 0.0631 0.0674 4.4598 0.293 1.3066 0.0631 0.0573 4.9365 0.2863 1.4135
0.2 0.0631 0.0674 4.4597 0.293 1.3066 0.0631 0.0539 5.127 0.284 1.4559
Dom. Rep
0 0.0476 0.05 3.4553 0.3945 1.363 0.0476 0.05 3.4553 0.3945 1.363
0.04 0.0476 0.05 3.4531 0.3945 1.3623 0.0477 0.048 3.5416 0.393 1.392
0.07 0.0477 0.0501 3.452 0.3945 1.3619 0.0477 0.0466 3.6112 0.3919 1.4154
0.1 0.0477 0.0501 3.4511 0.3945 1.3616 0.0477 0.0451 3.685 0.3908 1.4401
0.15 0.0477 0.0501 3.4501 0.3946 1.3613 0.0477 0.0426 3.818 0.3889 1.4847
0.2 0.0477 0.0501 3.4495 0.3946 1.3611 0.0477 0.0401 3.965 0.3868 1.5338
Ecuador
0 0.0728 0.0785 5.0959 0.247 1.2587 0.0728 0.0785 5.0959 0.247 1.2587
0.04 0.0728 0.0785 5.0958 0.247 1.2587 0.0728 0.0754 5.2275 0.2452 1.2819
0.07 0.0728 0.0785 5.0957 0.247 1.2587 0.0728 0.073 5.3321 0.2439 1.3003
0.1 0.0728 0.0785 5.0957 0.247 1.2587 0.0728 0.0707 5.4425 0.2425 1.3196
0.15 0.0728 0.0785 5.0956 0.247 1.2586 0.0728 0.0667 5.6404 0.2401 1.3542
0.2 0.0728 0.0785 5.0956 0.247 1.2586 0.0728 0.0628 5.8581 0.2376 1.3921
El Salvador
0 0.027 0.0277 3.3841 0.4819 1.6307 0.027 0.0277 3.3841 0.4819 1.6307
0.04 0.027 0.0278 3.3798 0.4819 1.6288 0.0271 0.0267 3.4655 0.4809 1.6666
0.07 0.0271 0.0278 3.3774 0.482 1.6278 0.0271 0.0259 3.5321 0.4801 1.6959
0.1 0.0271 0.0278 3.3757 0.482 1.627 0.0271 0.0251 3.6033 0.4793 1.7272
0.15 0.0271 0.0279 3.3736 0.482 1.6261 0.0271 0.0237 3.7324 0.4779 1.7839
0.2 0.0271 0.0279 3.3723 0.482 1.6255 0.0271 0.0223 3.8755 0.4765 1.8467
Ghana
0 0.0106 0.0107 2.6883 0.6685 1.7972 0.0106 0.0107 2.6883 0.6685 1.7972
0.04 0.0108 0.0109 2.6524 0.6688 1.7739 0.0109 0.0106 2.7066 0.6684 1.8091
0.07 0.0109 0.0111 2.631 0.6689 1.76 0.0111 0.0104 2.7329 0.6682 1.8262
0.1 0.0111 0.0112 2.6135 0.6691 1.7486 0.0112 0.0102 2.7688 0.668 1.8496
0.15 0.0112 0.0113 2.5919 0.6692 1.7346 0.0113 0.0098 2.8471 0.6675 1.9004
0.2 0.0113 0.0114 2.5774 0.6693 1.7252 0.0114 0.0092 2.9448 0.6669 1.9638
Guatemala
0 0.0223 0.0228 7.4326 0.2971 2.208 0.0223 0.0228 7.4326 0.2971 2.208
0.04 0.0223 0.0228 7.4325 0.2971 2.208 0.0223 0.0219 7.6246 0.296 2.2568
0.07 0.0223 0.0228 7.4325 0.2971 2.208 0.0223 0.0212 7.7774 0.2951 2.2955
0.1 0.0223 0.0228 7.4325 0.2971 2.208 0.0223 0.0206 7.9384 0.2943 2.3363
0.15 0.0223 0.0228 7.4325 0.2971 2.208 0.0223 0.0194 8.227 0.2928 2.4092
0.2 0.0223 0.0228 7.4324 0.2971 2.208 0.0223 0.0183 8.5447 0.2913 2.4894
Honduras
0 0.0158 0.016 10.7389 0.2518 2.7041 0.0158 0.016 10.7389 0.2518 2.7041
0.04 0.0158 0.016 10.7387 0.2518 2.704 0.0158 0.0154 11.0162 0.2509 2.7636
0.07 0.0158 0.016 10.7387 0.2518 2.704 0.0158 0.0149 11.237 0.2501 2.8109
0.1 0.0158 0.016 10.7387 0.2518 2.704 0.0158 0.0144 11.4697 0.2494 2.8607
0.15 0.0158 0.016 10.7387 0.2518 2.704 0.0158 0.0136 11.8868 0.2482 2.9499
0.2 0.0158 0.016 10.7387 0.2518 2.704 0.0158 0.0128 12.3458 0.2469 3.0478
Kenya
0 0.0095 0.0096 7.3922 0.4267 3.1546 0.0095 0.0096 7.3922 0.4267 3.1546
0.04 0.0095 0.0096 7.3919 0.4267 3.1545 0.0095 0.0092 7.583 0.426 3.2306
0.07 0.0095 0.0096 7.3919 0.4267 3.1545 0.0095 0.0089 7.7349 0.4255 3.2911
0.1 0.0095 0.0096 7.3919 0.4267 3.1545 0.0095 0.0086 7.8951 0.4249 3.3549
0.15 0.0095 0.0096 7.3919 0.4267 3.1545 0.0095 0.0081 8.182 0.424 3.4689
0.2 0.0095 0.0096 7.3917 0.4268 3.1544 0.0095 0.0077 8.4979 0.423 3.5945
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Brain and Drain Effects for Tertiary Educated Workers (Continued)
For Tertiary Educated Brain Effect: For Tertiary Educated Drain Effect:
Country pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
Malaysia
0 0.0136 0.0138 3.3538 0.584 1.9587 0.0136 0.0138 3.3538 0.584 1.9587
0.04 0.0137 0.0139 3.3448 0.5841 1.9537 0.0137 0.0133 3.4279 0.5835 2.0001
0.07 0.0137 0.0139 3.3399 0.5841 1.9509 0.0137 0.013 3.4904 0.583 2.035
0.1 0.0137 0.0139 3.336 0.5842 1.9488 0.0138 0.0126 3.5586 0.5825 2.0729
0.15 0.0138 0.014 3.3317 0.5842 1.9464 0.0138 0.0119 3.6838 0.5817 2.1427
0.2 0.0138 0.014 3.3289 0.5842 1.9448 0.0138 0.0112 3.8239 0.5808 2.2208
Nicaragua
0 0.056 0.0593 3.3981 0.3769 1.2806 0.056 0.0593 3.3981 0.3769 1.2806
0.04 0.0561 0.0594 3.3961 0.3769 1.28 0.0561 0.057 3.4831 0.3753 1.3073
0.07 0.0561 0.0594 3.395 0.3769 1.2797 0.0561 0.0553 3.5516 0.3741 1.3287
0.1 0.0561 0.0594 3.3942 0.3769 1.2794 0.0561 0.0535 3.6243 0.3729 1.3514
0.15 0.0561 0.0595 3.3933 0.377 1.2791 0.0562 0.0506 3.7552 0.3708 1.3923
0.2 0.0561 0.0595 3.3927 0.377 1.279 0.0562 0.0476 3.8998 0.3686 1.4373
Pakistan
0 0.0174 0.0177 3.7663 0.5187 1.9537 0.0174 0.0177 3.7663 0.5187 1.9537
0.04 0.0174 0.0177 3.7627 0.5187 1.9519 0.0174 0.017 3.8586 0.5179 1.9985
0.07 0.0174 0.0177 3.7608 0.5188 1.9509 0.0174 0.0165 3.9335 0.5173 2.0349
0.1 0.0174 0.0177 3.7592 0.5188 1.9502 0.0174 0.016 4.0134 0.5167 2.0737
0.15 0.0174 0.0177 3.7576 0.5188 1.9494 0.0174 0.0151 4.1578 0.5156 2.1438
0.2 0.0174 0.0177 3.7565 0.5188 1.9489 0.0174 0.0142 4.3175 0.5145 2.2213
Panama
0 0.0524 0.0553 6.2624 0.2354 1.4742 0.0524 0.0553 6.2624 0.2354 1.4742
0.04 0.0524 0.0553 6.2623 0.2354 1.4742 0.0524 0.0531 6.4241 0.2339 1.5025
0.07 0.0524 0.0553 6.2622 0.2354 1.4742 0.0524 0.0515 6.5528 0.2327 1.5249
0.1 0.0524 0.0553 6.2622 0.2354 1.4742 0.0524 0.0498 6.6884 0.2315 1.5485
0.15 0.0524 0.0553 6.2622 0.2354 1.4742 0.0524 0.047 6.9317 0.2295 1.5906
0.2 0.0524 0.0553 6.2622 0.2354 1.4742 0.0524 0.0443 7.1993 0.2274 1.6368
Paraguay
0 0.0294 0.0303 4.9098 0.3678 1.8058 0.0294 0.0303 4.9098 0.3678 1.8058
0.04 0.0294 0.0303 4.9094 0.3678 1.8056 0.0294 0.0291 5.0361 0.3666 1.8462
0.07 0.0294 0.0303 4.9091 0.3678 1.8055 0.0294 0.0282 5.1368 0.3657 1.8783
0.1 0.0294 0.0303 4.909 0.3678 1.8055 0.0294 0.0273 5.2429 0.3647 1.9122
0.15 0.0294 0.0303 4.9088 0.3678 1.8054 0.0294 0.0257 5.4334 0.3631 1.973
0.2 0.0294 0.0303 4.9087 0.3678 1.8054 0.0294 0.0242 5.6431 0.3615 2.0397
Peru
0 0.0696 0.0748 3.0247 0.3791 1.1466 0.0696 0.0748 3.0247 0.3791 1.1466
0.04 0.0697 0.0749 3.0216 0.3791 1.1456 0.0697 0.072 3.0985 0.3774 1.1694
0.07 0.0697 0.075 3.0199 0.3792 1.1451 0.0698 0.0698 3.1585 0.3761 1.1879
0.1 0.0698 0.075 3.0186 0.3792 1.1447 0.0698 0.0676 3.2225 0.3747 1.2076
0.15 0.0698 0.0751 3.0171 0.3793 1.1443 0.0699 0.0639 3.3383 0.3724 1.2432
0.2 0.0699 0.0751 3.0162 0.3793 1.144 0.0699 0.0601 3.4665 0.37 1.2825
Philippines
0 0.0922 0.1015 2.919 0.3534 1.0316 0.0922 0.1015 2.919 0.3534 1.0316
0.04 0.0923 0.1017 2.9163 0.3535 1.0309 0.0923 0.0977 2.9906 0.3515 1.0511
0.07 0.0924 0.1018 2.9147 0.3535 1.0305 0.0924 0.0947 3.0486 0.35 1.0669
0.1 0.0924 0.1018 2.9136 0.3536 1.0302 0.0925 0.0917 3.1105 0.3484 1.0837
0.15 0.0925 0.1019 2.9122 0.3536 1.0298 0.0925 0.0867 3.2223 0.3457 1.114
0.2 0.0925 0.1019 2.9114 0.3536 1.0296 0.0926 0.0816 3.3461 0.3429 1.1474
Poland
0 0.0498 0.0524 1.6122 0.5882 0.9483 0.0498 0.0524 1.6122 0.5882 0.9483
0.04 0.0527 0.0557 1.5521 0.59 0.9157 0.0542 0.055 1.5643 0.5896 0.9223
0.07 0.0549 0.0581 1.5106 0.5913 0.8931 0.0575 0.0567 1.5341 0.5905 0.9059
0.1 0.0571 0.0606 1.4719 0.5925 0.8721 0.0608 0.0582 1.5095 0.5913 0.8925
0.15 0.0607 0.0646 1.414 0.5945 0.8406 0.0659 0.06 1.4817 0.5922 0.8774
0.2 0.0641 0.0685 1.364 0.5963 0.8133 0.0703 0.0605 1.473 0.5925 0.8727
Sri Lanka
0 0.0072 0.0072 2.5539 0.7229 1.8462 0.0072 0.0072 2.5539 0.7229 1.8462
0.04 0.0074 0.0075 2.4967 0.7232 1.8056 0.0075 0.0073 2.537 0.723 1.8342
0.07 0.0076 0.0077 2.4602 0.7234 1.7796 0.0078 0.0073 2.538 0.723 1.8349
0.1 0.0078 0.0078 2.4289 0.7236 1.7574 0.008 0.0072 2.5507 0.7229 1.8439
0.15 0.008 0.008 2.3872 0.7238 1.7279 0.0082 0.007 2.5962 0.7227 1.8762
0.2 0.0081 0.0082 2.3571 0.724 1.7065 0.0083 0.0067 2.6684 0.7223 1.9275
Thailand
0 0.0626 0.0668 4.2506 0.3055 1.2986 0.0626 0.0668 4.2506 0.3055 1.2986
0.04 0.0626 0.0668 4.2502 0.3055 1.2985 0.0627 0.0642 4.3598 0.3038 1.3246
0.07 0.0627 0.0668 4.2499 0.3055 1.2984 0.0627 0.0622 4.4469 0.3025 1.3452
0.1 0.0627 0.0668 4.2498 0.3055 1.2984 0.0627 0.0602 4.5388 0.3012 1.367
0.15 0.0627 0.0669 4.2495 0.3055 1.2983 0.0627 0.0568 4.7037 0.2989 1.4059
0.2 0.0627 0.0669 4.2494 0.3055 1.2983 0.0627 0.0535 4.8852 0.2965 1.4486
Tunisia
0 0.0271 0.0278 2.8694 0.5255 1.5079 0.0271 0.0278 2.8694 0.5255 1.5079
0.04 0.0272 0.028 2.8583 0.5256 1.5025 0.0273 0.027 2.928 0.5247 1.5364
0.07 0.0273 0.0281 2.8521 0.5257 1.4995 0.0274 0.0262 2.979 0.5241 1.5612
0.1 0.0274 0.0282 2.8474 0.5258 1.4972 0.0275 0.0254 3.0354 0.5234 1.5886
0.15 0.0275 0.0283 2.8419 0.5259 1.4945 0.0276 0.0241 3.1404 0.5221 1.6396
0.2 0.0275 0.0283 2.8383 0.5259 1.4927 0.0276 0.0227 3.2589 0.5207 1.697
Averages
0 0.0401 0.0417 4.8767 0.3269 1.5943 0.0401 0.0417 4.8767 0.3269 1.5943
0.04 0.0401 0.0417 4.8764 0.3269 1.5943 0.0401 0.0401 5.0023 0.3255 1.6284
0.07 0.0401 0.0417 4.8762 0.3269 1.5942 0.0401 0.0388 5.1023 0.3245 1.6555
0.1 0.0401 0.0417 4.8761 0.3269 1.5942 0.0401 0.0376 5.2078 0.3234 1.6841
0.15 0.0401 0.0417 4.8759 0.3269 1.5941 0.0401 0.0355 5.3971 0.3215 1.7352
0.2 0.0401 0.0417 4.8758 0.3269 1.5941 0.0401 0.0334 5.6054 0.3196 1.7914
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Table 2.10: Brain and Drain Effects for Secondary Educated Workers
For Secondary Educated Brain Effect: For Secondary Educated Drain Effect:
Country pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
Bolivia
0 0.1612 0.1921 1.8799 0.4009 0.7537 0.1612 0.1921 1.8799 0.4009 0.7537
0.04 0.1632 0.195 1.8627 0.4019 0.7486 0.164 0.1883 1.9038 0.3996 0.7607
0.07 0.1644 0.1967 1.8526 0.4025 0.7457 0.1655 0.1844 1.9288 0.3982 0.7681
0.1 0.1653 0.1981 1.8445 0.403 0.7433 0.1665 0.1798 1.9592 0.3966 0.777
0.15 0.1665 0.1998 1.8346 0.4035 0.7403 0.1677 0.1712 2.0203 0.3935 0.7949
0.2 0.1673 0.2009 1.828 0.4039 0.7384 0.1683 0.1618 2.0928 0.3899 0.8161
Botswana
0 0.0278 0.0286 5.5893 0.3408 1.905 0.0278 0.0286 5.5893 0.3408 1.905
0.04 0.0278 0.0286 5.5891 0.3408 1.9049 0.0278 0.0275 5.7334 0.3396 1.9473
0.07 0.0278 0.0286 5.5889 0.3408 1.9049 0.0278 0.0266 5.8481 0.3387 1.981
0.1 0.0278 0.0286 5.5888 0.3408 1.9049 0.0278 0.0258 5.9692 0.3378 2.0164
0.15 0.0278 0.0286 5.5888 0.3408 1.9048 0.0278 0.0243 6.1862 0.3362 2.0799
0.2 0.0278 0.0286 5.5887 0.3408 1.9048 0.0278 0.0229 6.425 0.3346 2.1496
Chile
0 0.1996 0.2494 2.9061 0.2786 0.8098 0.1996 0.2494 2.9061 0.2786 0.8098
0.04 0.1997 0.2495 2.905 0.2787 0.8096 0.1997 0.2396 2.9796 0.2757 0.8216
0.07 0.1998 0.2496 2.9044 0.2787 0.8095 0.1998 0.2322 3.0386 0.2735 0.8311
0.1 0.1998 0.2497 2.9039 0.2787 0.8094 0.1998 0.2248 3.101 0.2712 0.8411
0.15 0.1998 0.2498 2.9033 0.2788 0.8093 0.1999 0.2124 3.2132 0.2673 0.859
0.2 0.1999 0.2498 2.903 0.2788 0.8093 0.1999 0.1999 3.337 0.2633 0.8786
Colombia
0 0.1423 0.1659 3.443 0.2696 0.9283 0.1423 0.1659 3.443 0.2696 0.9283
0.04 0.1423 0.1659 3.4423 0.2696 0.9282 0.1423 0.1593 3.531 0.2672 0.9434
0.07 0.1423 0.166 3.442 0.2697 0.9281 0.1424 0.1544 3.6014 0.2653 0.9554
0.1 0.1424 0.166 3.4417 0.2697 0.9281 0.1424 0.1494 3.6757 0.2634 0.9681
0.15 0.1424 0.166 3.4414 0.2697 0.9281 0.1424 0.1411 3.809 0.2601 0.9907
0.2 0.1424 0.166 3.4412 0.2697 0.928 0.1424 0.1328 3.956 0.2567 1.0155
Costa Rica
0 0.1931 0.2394 2.5487 0.3101 0.7904 0.1931 0.2394 2.5487 0.3101 0.7904
0.04 0.1934 0.2398 2.5461 0.3103 0.7899 0.1935 0.2303 2.6109 0.3073 0.8024
0.07 0.1935 0.24 2.5446 0.3103 0.7896 0.1937 0.2233 2.6614 0.3051 0.8121
0.1 0.1936 0.2401 2.5436 0.3104 0.7894 0.1938 0.2163 2.7153 0.3029 0.8224
0.15 0.1938 0.2403 2.5423 0.3104 0.7892 0.1939 0.2044 2.8129 0.299 0.8409
0.2 0.1938 0.2404 2.5415 0.3105 0.789 0.1939 0.1925 2.9208 0.2949 0.8614
Dom. Rep
0 0.1563 0.1853 2.0125 0.3871 0.779 0.1563 0.1853 2.0125 0.3871 0.779
0.04 0.1577 0.1872 1.9999 0.3878 0.7755 0.1582 0.1804 2.0465 0.3853 0.7886
0.07 0.1584 0.1883 1.9927 0.3881 0.7734 0.1591 0.176 2.0783 0.3837 0.7975
0.1 0.1591 0.1891 1.987 0.3884 0.7718 0.1598 0.1712 2.1148 0.382 0.8078
0.15 0.1598 0.1902 1.9802 0.3888 0.7699 0.1605 0.1625 2.1849 0.3787 0.8274
0.2 0.1603 0.1909 1.9757 0.389 0.7686 0.1608 0.1533 2.2656 0.3751 0.8499
Ecuador
0 0.2529 0.3384 2.733 0.2753 0.7524 0.2529 0.3384 2.733 0.2753 0.7524
0.04 0.253 0.3387 2.7318 0.2753 0.7522 0.253 0.3252 2.802 0.272 0.7622
0.07 0.2531 0.3388 2.7312 0.2754 0.7521 0.2531 0.3152 2.8573 0.2695 0.7701
0.1 0.2531 0.3389 2.7306 0.2754 0.752 0.2532 0.3051 2.9159 0.2669 0.7783
0.15 0.2532 0.339 2.7301 0.2754 0.7519 0.2532 0.2883 3.0213 0.2625 0.7932
0.2 0.2532 0.3391 2.7297 0.2754 0.7519 0.2533 0.2713 3.1377 0.258 0.8095
El Salvador
0 0.1077 0.1207 1.867 0.45 0.8401 0.1077 0.1207 1.867 0.45 0.8401
0.04 0.1099 0.1234 1.8409 0.4512 0.8305 0.1108 0.1196 1.8776 0.4495 0.844
0.07 0.1112 0.1252 1.8251 0.4519 0.8247 0.1125 0.1179 1.8942 0.4488 0.8501
0.1 0.1124 0.1266 1.812 0.4525 0.8199 0.1139 0.1156 1.9175 0.4478 0.8587
0.15 0.1138 0.1285 1.7956 0.4533 0.8138 0.1153 0.1108 1.9698 0.4456 0.8778
0.2 0.1149 0.1298 1.7842 0.4538 0.8097 0.1161 0.1051 2.036 0.443 0.902
Ghana
0 0.0391 0.0407 2.1502 0.5487 1.1797 0.0391 0.0407 2.1502 0.5487 1.1797
0.04 0.0401 0.0417 2.1169 0.5493 1.1629 0.0404 0.0405 2.1578 0.5485 1.1836
0.07 0.0407 0.0424 2.0965 0.5498 1.1526 0.0412 0.04 2.174 0.5482 1.1917
0.1 0.0412 0.0429 2.0797 0.5501 1.1441 0.0418 0.0393 2.1986 0.5477 1.2041
0.15 0.0418 0.0436 2.0584 0.5506 1.1333 0.0425 0.0377 2.2558 0.5466 1.233
0.2 0.0423 0.0441 2.0437 0.5509 1.1259 0.0428 0.0358 2.3303 0.5452 1.2704
Guatemala
0 0.0924 0.1019 3.3534 0.3186 1.0683 0.0924 0.1019 3.3534 0.3186 1.0683
0.04 0.0925 0.1019 3.3522 0.3186 1.068 0.0925 0.0979 3.4384 0.3166 1.0885
0.07 0.0925 0.102 3.3515 0.3186 1.0679 0.0925 0.0948 3.5065 0.315 1.1046
0.1 0.0925 0.102 3.351 0.3186 1.0678 0.0926 0.0918 3.5785 0.3134 1.1216
0.15 0.0926 0.102 3.3505 0.3187 1.0676 0.0926 0.0867 3.7081 0.3107 1.1521
0.2 0.0926 0.102 3.3501 0.3187 1.0675 0.0926 0.0816 3.851 0.3079 1.1857
Honduras
0 0.1372 0.1591 4.4603 0.2197 0.9797 0.1372 0.1591 4.4603 0.2197 0.9797
0.04 0.1372 0.1591 4.4602 0.2197 0.9797 0.1372 0.1527 4.5754 0.2174 0.9945
0.07 0.1372 0.1591 4.4601 0.2197 0.9797 0.1372 0.1479 4.667 0.2156 1.0062
0.1 0.1372 0.1591 4.46 0.2197 0.9797 0.1372 0.1432 4.7635 0.2138 1.0185
0.15 0.1372 0.1591 4.46 0.2197 0.9797 0.1373 0.1352 4.9367 0.2108 1.0404
0.2 0.1373 0.1591 4.4599 0.2197 0.9797 0.1373 0.1273 5.1273 0.2076 1.0644
Kenya
0 0.0247 0.0253 4.3702 0.4252 1.8582 0.0247 0.0253 4.3702 0.4252 1.8582
0.04 0.0247 0.0253 4.3692 0.4252 1.8578 0.0247 0.0243 4.4817 0.4241 1.9009
0.07 0.0247 0.0253 4.3686 0.4252 1.8576 0.0247 0.0235 4.5708 0.4233 1.9349
0.1 0.0247 0.0253 4.3682 0.4252 1.8574 0.0247 0.0228 4.665 0.4225 1.9709
0.15 0.0247 0.0253 4.3677 0.4252 1.8572 0.0247 0.0215 4.8343 0.4211 2.0355
0.2 0.0247 0.0253 4.3675 0.4252 1.8571 0.0247 0.0203 5.0207 0.4196 2.1066
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Brain and Drain Effects for Secondary Educated Workers (Continued)
For Tertiary Educated Brain Effect: For Tertiary Educated Drain Effect:
Country pi % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage % Educated Ls/Lu Skill Premium Unskilled Wage Skilled Wage
Malaysia
0 0.1488 0.1748 2.3164 0.3574 0.828 0.1488 0.1748 2.3164 0.3574 0.828
0.04 0.1494 0.1756 2.3103 0.3577 0.8264 0.1496 0.1688 2.3676 0.3552 0.841
0.07 0.1497 0.176 2.3069 0.3579 0.8255 0.1499 0.164 2.4108 0.3534 0.8519
0.1 0.1499 0.1763 2.3042 0.358 0.8249 0.1502 0.159 2.4577 0.3515 0.8638
0.15 0.1502 0.1767 2.3011 0.3581 0.8241 0.1504 0.1505 2.5441 0.3481 0.8856
0.2 0.1503 0.1769 2.2991 0.3582 0.8236 0.1505 0.1418 2.6407 0.3445 0.9098
Nicaragua
0 0.1432 0.1672 2.0579 0.3911 0.8048 0.1432 0.1672 2.0579 0.3911 0.8048
0.04 0.1444 0.1688 2.0456 0.3917 0.8012 0.1449 0.1627 2.0935 0.3894 0.8151
0.07 0.1451 0.1697 2.0386 0.392 0.7991 0.1457 0.1586 2.1265 0.3878 0.8247
0.1 0.1456 0.1705 2.033 0.3923 0.7975 0.1463 0.1542 2.1642 0.3861 0.8356
0.15 0.1463 0.1714 2.0264 0.3926 0.7956 0.1469 0.1464 2.2363 0.383 0.8564
0.2 0.1467 0.172 2.022 0.3928 0.7943 0.1472 0.1381 2.3191 0.3796 0.8803
Pakistan
0 0.0779 0.0845 2.3828 0.4273 1.0181 0.0779 0.0845 2.3828 0.4273 1.0181
0.04 0.0784 0.0851 2.3721 0.4276 1.0143 0.0786 0.0819 2.4293 0.4259 1.0346
0.07 0.0787 0.0855 2.3661 0.4278 1.0121 0.079 0.0798 2.4704 0.4247 1.0492
0.1 0.079 0.0857 2.3614 0.4279 1.0105 0.0792 0.0774 2.5163 0.4234 1.0655
0.15 0.0792 0.0861 2.3559 0.4281 1.0085 0.0795 0.0734 2.6024 0.4211 1.0959
0.2 0.0794 0.0863 2.3524 0.4282 1.0072 0.0796 0.0692 2.7001 0.4187 1.1304
Panama
0 0.2679 0.366 3.2213 0.2396 0.772 0.2679 0.366 3.2213 0.2396 0.772
0.04 0.268 0.3661 3.2209 0.2397 0.7719 0.268 0.3514 3.3039 0.2364 0.781
0.07 0.268 0.3661 3.2206 0.2397 0.7719 0.268 0.3405 3.3699 0.2339 0.7882
0.1 0.268 0.3661 3.2205 0.2397 0.7719 0.268 0.3295 3.4394 0.2314 0.7958
0.15 0.268 0.3662 3.2202 0.2397 0.7719 0.268 0.3113 3.5643 0.2271 0.8093
0.2 0.268 0.3662 3.2201 0.2397 0.7718 0.2681 0.293 3.7019 0.2226 0.824
Paraguay
0 0.1196 0.1359 2.8059 0.3337 0.9363 0.1196 0.1359 2.8059 0.3337 0.9363
0.04 0.1198 0.1361 2.8032 0.3338 0.9357 0.1198 0.1307 2.8747 0.3315 0.953
0.07 0.1199 0.1362 2.8018 0.3338 0.9354 0.1199 0.1268 2.9305 0.3298 0.9664
0.1 0.1199 0.1363 2.8007 0.3339 0.9351 0.12 0.1227 2.99 0.328 0.9807
0.15 0.12 0.1364 2.7995 0.3339 0.9348 0.1201 0.116 3.0976 0.3249 1.0064
0.2 0.1201 0.1364 2.7987 0.3339 0.9346 0.1201 0.1092 3.2165 0.3217 1.0348
Peru
0 0.2241 0.2888 2.0437 0.3485 0.7122 0.2241 0.2888 2.0437 0.3485 0.7122
0.04 0.2252 0.2906 2.0361 0.349 0.7105 0.2256 0.2796 2.0856 0.3459 0.7214
0.07 0.2257 0.2916 2.0318 0.3492 0.7096 0.2263 0.272 2.122 0.3437 0.7293
0.1 0.2262 0.2923 2.0284 0.3495 0.7088 0.2268 0.264 2.1621 0.3413 0.738
0.15 0.2268 0.2933 2.0244 0.3497 0.708 0.2273 0.25 2.2368 0.3372 0.7542
0.2 0.2271 0.2939 2.0218 0.3499 0.7074 0.2275 0.2356 2.3211 0.3328 0.7724
Philippines
0 0.2693 0.3685 2.0174 0.3371 0.68 0.2693 0.3685 2.0174 0.3371 0.68
0.04 0.2703 0.3705 2.0108 0.3375 0.6787 0.2707 0.3564 2.0602 0.3341 0.6883
0.07 0.2709 0.3715 2.0071 0.3378 0.678 0.2714 0.3465 2.0968 0.3316 0.6953
0.1 0.2713 0.3724 2.0043 0.338 0.6775 0.2719 0.3361 2.137 0.329 0.703
0.15 0.2719 0.3734 2.0009 0.3383 0.6768 0.2724 0.3182 2.2113 0.3243 0.7172
0.2 0.2722 0.3741 1.9987 0.3384 0.6764 0.2726 0.2998 2.295 0.3194 0.7331
Poland
0 0.1924 0.2383 1.3224 0.4706 0.6223 0.1924 0.2383 1.3224 0.4706 0.6223
0.04 0.2013 0.252 1.2769 0.4746 0.606 0.2057 0.2486 1.288 0.4736 0.61
0.07 0.2078 0.2623 1.2454 0.4775 0.5947 0.2153 0.2552 1.267 0.4755 0.6024
0.1 0.2141 0.2724 1.2163 0.4803 0.5842 0.2245 0.2606 1.2506 0.477 0.5965
0.15 0.2241 0.2888 1.1728 0.4847 0.5685 0.2384 0.2661 1.2344 0.4785 0.5907
0.2 0.2332 0.3041 1.1355 0.4887 0.5549 0.2497 0.2662 1.2339 0.4786 0.5905
Sri Lanka
0 0.1338 0.1545 1.8745 0.4226 0.7922 0.1338 0.1545 1.8745 0.4226 0.7922
0.04 0.1359 0.1573 1.8535 0.4237 0.7853 0.1368 0.1521 1.8927 0.4217 0.7982
0.07 0.1372 0.159 1.841 0.4243 0.7812 0.1384 0.1494 1.9143 0.4206 0.8052
0.1 0.1383 0.1605 1.8309 0.4249 0.7779 0.1396 0.146 1.9418 0.4193 0.8142
0.15 0.1396 0.1622 1.8183 0.4255 0.7738 0.1409 0.1394 1.9994 0.4166 0.833
0.2 0.1405 0.1635 1.8098 0.426 0.771 0.1415 0.1319 2.0694 0.4135 0.8558
Thailand
0 0.1019 0.1134 2.5286 0.3781 0.956 0.1019 0.1134 2.5286 0.3781 0.956
0.04 0.1022 0.1138 2.5229 0.3783 0.9543 0.1023 0.1094 2.5858 0.3762 0.9728
0.07 0.1024 0.1141 2.5197 0.3784 0.9533 0.1025 0.1063 2.6337 0.3747 0.9868
0.1 0.1025 0.1142 2.5172 0.3784 0.9526 0.1027 0.103 2.6855 0.3731 1.002
0.15 0.1027 0.1144 2.5144 0.3785 0.9518 0.1028 0.0974 2.7805 0.3703 1.0297
0.2 0.1028 0.1146 2.5126 0.3786 0.9513 0.1029 0.0918 2.8864 0.3674 1.0605
Tunisia
0 0.1206 0.1372 2.026 0.4149 0.8406 0.1206 0.1372 2.026 0.4149 0.8406
0.04 0.122 0.1389 2.01 0.4156 0.8354 0.1225 0.134 2.0555 0.4136 0.8502
0.07 0.1228 0.1399 2.0007 0.416 0.8324 0.1235 0.131 2.0848 0.4123 0.8596
0.1 0.1234 0.1408 1.9934 0.4164 0.83 0.1242 0.1276 2.1194 0.4109 0.8708
0.15 0.1242 0.1418 1.9844 0.4168 0.8271 0.1249 0.1213 2.1875 0.4082 0.8928
0.2 0.1247 0.1425 1.9786 0.4171 0.8252 0.1253 0.1146 2.2671 0.4051 0.9185
Averages
0 0.1515 0.1785 2.6853 0.3201 0.8596 0.1515 0.1785 2.6853 0.3201 0.8596
0.04 0.1517 0.1788 2.6827 0.3202 0.859 0.1517 0.1717 2.751 0.3176 0.8738
0.07 0.1518 0.1789 2.6813 0.3203 0.8587 0.1519 0.1665 2.8044 0.3157 0.8853
0.1 0.1518 0.179 2.6802 0.3203 0.8585 0.1519 0.1612 2.8613 0.3137 0.8975
0.15 0.1519 0.1792 2.679 0.3204 0.8582 0.152 0.1524 2.9642 0.3102 0.9196
0.2 0.152 0.1792 2.6782 0.3204 0.8581 0.1521 0.1435 3.078 0.3066 0.9438
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Chapter 3
Education Policy And Rate of
Return Estimates
3.1 Introduction
Standard cross-country estimates of the social return to education, shown in Fig-
ure 3.1, appear to show that social returns to basic education are greater than
social returnsm to higher levels of education.1 The standard social rate of re-
turn estimates (ROREs), summarised in Figure 3.1, are often viewed as “...a di-
agnostic tool with which to start the process of setting priorities and considering
alternative ways of achieving objectives” ((World Bank, 1995), pg. 94). The esti-
mates prompted a shift of focus to basic levels of education, often at the expense
of higher education. The World Bank in its “Priorities and Strategies for Educa-
tion” concludes: “Consequently, basic education should usually be given priority
for public spending on education in those countries that have yet to achieve near-
universal enrollment in basic education” (World Bank (1995), pg. 56; see Section
5 in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2007)).
In this paper, I measure externalities to higher education which arise because
productivity depends on the proportion of higher educated workers, and higher ed-
ucated workers are an input in the production of human capital for basic educated
workers. The effects of higher educated workers—better teachers, improved basic
healthcare delivery, and technological advances—are dynamic, and have spillovers
beyond that to the direct consumer. This paper quantifies these effects from aggre-
gate data, and computes their implications for the social ROR to higher education.
I find that when these external effects are taken into account, the true social
return to higher education is, on average, two times as large as standard social
ROREs (which do not account for any externalities). Contrary to the conclusion
of the World Bank education policy paper cited above, standard ROREs cannot be
used as a guide for education policy.2 I also find that, for countries with lower
1Standard social ROREs are obtained by adjusting private wage returns to education (from
Mincer regressions) for public education subsidies, with no adjustments made for externalities to
education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2007).
2For an earlier criticism of formulating policy based on rate of return estimates, see Bennell
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Figure 3.1: Standard Estimates of Social Returns
Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004)
proportions of higher educated workers, the standard ROREs systematically un-
derestimate social returns to higher education. In fact, larger standard social
ROREs to basic education, compared to education at higher levels, is consistent
with optimal education policy when these externalities are taken into account.
The paper begins by presenting a macroeconomic model in which the propor-
tion of higher educated workers is an input in the production of basic skills (human
capital effect), and the productivity of basic and uneducated workers also depends
on the proportion of higher educated workers in the economy (productivity effect).
Quantifying the productivity and human capital effects of higher educated work-
ers is challenging, because cross-country wages will differ due to differences in
productivity, as well as human capital.
The methodological contribution of this paper is describing how the productiv-
ity and human capital effects could be separately identified. The human capital
effect of higher educated workers is identified from information on differences in
returns to education by country of origin, for immigrants in the U.S. The use of in-
formation on returns to education for immigrants in a particular country controls
for the productivity effect. As Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) and Schoellman (2012)
show, differences in the returns to education for immigrants in the U.S. reflect
(1996) which questions the plausibility of the estimates. There are several reasons why they may
not reflect the true private return to education (such as unionization, government job guarantees,
urban/rural divisions). The approach here is to assume that the ROREs are accurate reflections of
the wage-benefit to education, and show they are still not reliable for education policy.
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differences in home country quality of education. To capture the human capital
effect, I regress the average rate of return (ROR) to education for an immigrant
from a given country, relative to a U.S. native in the year 2000, on relative differ-
ences in the 1980 proportion of higher educated workers. The results show that
controlling for other determinants of education quality, including teacher salaries,
individuals from countries with larger proportions of higher educated workers in
1980 have greater returns to education in the U.S. The parameter estimate from
this exercise is used to calculate the size of the human capital effect.
I use estimates of cross-country agricultural productivity gaps (APGs), from
Gollin et al. (2011), to quantify the productivity effect. The authors carefully es-
timate cross-country APGs accounting for quality and quantity of human capital,
which controls for human capital effects. The use of within-country sectoral pro-
ductivity gaps controls for aggregate factors that may influence productivity in
all sectors (including investments in education). This strategy captures a produc-
tivity externality because it reflects changes in productivity beyond those in the
non-agricultural sector, where most higher educated workers are employed. I find
that APGs, adjusted for human capital, decrease with the proportion of higher
educated workers. The estimate of the elasticity of the APG to the proportion of
higher educated workers is used to calculate the size of the productivity effect.
Results from calculations of social RORs reveal that the difference between true
(accounting for human capital and productivity effects) social returns to higher
education and standard ROREs are as large as 10-20 percentage points, depending
on the country. The model also replicates the finding that standard social ROREs
to basic education are greater than those for higher education. However, it does
not follow that funds should be reallocated from higher to basic education, because
the measured externalities are large. As Figure 3.5 shows, for most of the 33
developing countries in my dataset, the social return to higher education is larger
compared to basic education.
Furthermore, I find that education policy which relies on standard ROREs as a
guide, encourages greater focus on basic education in countries where the human
capital and productivity effects are larger—when optimal education policy will
imply greater investments in higher education. This is because the gap between
true and standard estimates of social RORs to higher education is decreasing in
the proportion of the higher educated, as a result of decreasing human capital and
productivity effects.3 This implies that the difference in standard social ROREs for
basic and higher education is larger in countries with lower proportions of higher
educated workers (and larger externalities), which is confirmed in the data. Ed-
ucation policy based on standard social ROREs inadvertently leads to systematic
underinvestment in higher education.
The conclusion that public focus should be shifted to basic education, based on
standard ROREs, is incorrect and could lead to unintended consequences. I show
3For more advanced economies such as the U.S., with large proportions of higher educated work-
ers, the productivity and human capital effects are very small (consistent with findings in (Ciccone
and Peri, 2006; Acemoglu and Angrist, 1999)).
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that these external effects are also important for the profitability of current expan-
sions in basic education. This is because higher educated workers are important
for the quality of basic education, as well as the productivity of basic educated
workers. A reallocation of funding to basic education to equate standard ROREs
in the framework, leads to significant reductions in the quantity of human capital
obtained by basic educated workers, and lowers the private return to basic educa-
tion. The biggest impact, however, is on the wage level of basic and uneducated
workers. In some cases, lower productivity means that the wage of basic educated
workers falls by over 40%.
There is some evidence that a rapid expansion in basic education, at the ex-
pense of higher education, may not have been the best policy for basic educated
workers. Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (2003) report that
the rapid expansion of basic education in several developing countries, has led to
lower education quality. The low quality of basic education in developing coun-
tries, where many students complete basic education with less than basic skills,
can be found in Glewwe and Kremer (2006). In a study on the returns to the Uni-
versal Primary Education program in Nigeria, Uwaifo-Oyelere (2010) finds the
average return to the program to be just 2.8%; which is very low compared to pre-
vious estimates of the returns to education in Nigeria. The author attributes the
result to stagnant demand for education—the productivity effect.
The primary assumption in this paper is that the productivity and human cap-
ital effects are not fully accounted for by the wages of higher educated workers.
I focus on these effects, because as I explain below using several examples, they
are likely to be important in developing countries with low proportions of higher
educated workers.
A positive relationship between returns to basic education and the proportion
of higher educated workers can arise because teachers are are an input in the pro-
duction of basic education. In evaluating the impact of higher teacher quality in
the U.S., Hanushek (2011) finds that a teacher one standard deviation above mean
effectiveness, in a class size of 20 pupils, generates an annual marginal gain of
over $400,000 in present value of future student earnings. It is unlikely these fu-
ture wage gains from improved teacher quality are completely reflected in teacher
wages. This is for reasons related to credit constrained pupils or difficulties in
establishing enforceable contracts between teachers and pupils.
Problems with teacher quality are significantly worse in the context of devel-
oping countries, suggesting a potential for higher gains in earnings from quality
improvements. For example, on average, only about 69 percent of primary school
teachers are trained in developing countries, compared to 90% in the OECD. A sur-
vey of education systems in developing countries, by Glewwe and Kremer (2006),
concludes that many developing countries have too few teachers to accommodate
the rapid expansion in primary school enrollment. Developing countries also have
the highest pupil-teacher ratios, the lowest measures of teacher effectiveness, and
worse student outcomes compared to peers in other countries. This means there
are significant gains from training more teachers, and increasing the human cap-
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ital obtained from a basic education.4
Higher educated workers can also affect the return to basic education if they
perform other services which enable basic educated workers to get more out of
their time in school. For example, Miguel and Kremer (2004) find that deworm-
ing improved health and school participation among untreated children at schools
in close proximity to those who were treated. They also find that two-thirds of
the social effect of deworming comes through reduced rates of transmission, and
increased attendance for untreated children. The wages of nurses who deliver
deworming and other public health services are unlikely to reflect these positive
externalities on schooling outcomes, because a majority of the benefits accrue to
untreated students.
Better health leads to greater human capital for future adults, as well in-
creased productivity for current workers. Several studies find that the main eco-
nomic burden of communicable diseases in developing countries, such as malaria
or cholera, come from time spent caring for the ill (see Onwujekwe et al. (2000) for
a study in Eastern Nigeria, and Konradsen et al. (1997) for a study in Sri Lanka).
A nurse’s services in a malaria-prone village not only benefits a sick child, but also
allows the child’s parents to spend more time at work. If the prevention external-
ities from deworming exist for other communicable diseases, then the nurse’s ser-
vices also benefit other parents in the community who do not have to take time off
work to care for sick children. These external benefits to productivity are unlikely
to be fully reflected in the nurse’s current wage. This channel is very important in
the context of developing countries where there still exists a wide scope for human
capital and productivity gains by improving public health services.
Higher educated workers can also affect the productivity of the basic educated
workers through other channels unlikely to be fully reflected in current wages.
Beyond the role of higher educated workers as factors of production, they are also
important for technology adoption and diffusion, as found in several cross-country
studies. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) finds that within a given
sector, productivity gaps across countries decrease with the proportion of skilled
workers. Technical change not only increases the productivity of higher educated
workers in a given sector, there is also an increase in the productivity of all other
workers in that sector. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009) also show that a greater
share of secondary educated workers is positively related to faster sectoral produc-
tivity growth (technological progress) for all workers, especially in human-capital
intensive sectors. Caselli and Wilson (2004) finds that the amount of technology
embodied in imported machineries is positively related to skill levels. Firm-level
studies studies such as Schultz (1975), Doms et al. (1997), and Dunne and Schmitz
Jr (1995), find that plants with more skilled workers use more advanced technolo-
gies.
Rapid technological progress is linked to increases in returns to education as
4Also see a recent study of 351 rural schools in Guinea-Bissau by Boone et al. (2013). In all
schools, the authors could not find a single instance where numeracy and literacy were adequate
for age, and they also document significant teacher (and quality) shortfalls.
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more educated farmers are better equipped to experiment with new technologies
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996). These activities also have important spillover ef-
fects on the productivity of other farmers in an adopter’s social network (see Fos-
ter and Rosenzweig (1995) for hybrid corn in India, Conley and Udry (2010) for
pineapple in Ghana). It is unlikely that these network effects are fully captured
in the wage of an adopting farmer, and even less so for wages of higher educated
workers partly responsible for technical progress.
This study is important for countries of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia
where education attainment remains low relative to other regions of the world. At
the heart of these problems is how to allocate limited education funds. As I dis-
cussed earlier, the larger standard social ROREs to basic relative to higher levels
of education was taken to imply that relatively more public resources needed to be
allocated to basic education (Bennell, 1996). This paper calls attention to the im-
portance of looking beyond standard ROREs in the formulation of education policy,
especially in countries with low proportions of higher educated workers. Indeed,
what is needed is a balance between the pool of higher and basic educated workers.
This would ensure that basic educated workers leave school with sufficient human
capital, and are able to employ their human capital in a productive environment.
This paper does not speak directly to what the optimal allocation may be, or how
it can be achieved. This question is left for future research.
In the next section, a quantifiable model of the interaction between the ROR
to basic education and the proportion of higher educated workers is presented.
The model also delivers the insight that wage-based estimates of private rates
of return are not useful for education policy. The third section explains how the
parameters governing the human capital and productivity effects are estimated.
Section 4 quantifies the size of the divergence between social and private RORs,
and evaluates how changes in the proportion of higher educated workers can im-
pact returns to basic education. The final section concludes.
3.2 Model of Education Funding
3.2.1 General Assumptions
It is assumed that all direct costs of education are publicly financed. This as-
sumption can be justified in the context of the poorer developing countries where
over 70% of direct education costs are government financed (Glewwe and Kremer,
2006). Education is financed from a fixed budget G which is allocated to basic
education denoted by level 1, or higher education denoted by level 2. Since all
individuals are assumed to be alike, individuals are randomly selected to attend
school.
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3.2.2 Production Technology
Output Y is produced using a constant returns to scale production function which
depends only on human capital. The production function is given by:
Y = A0(N0 +N1h1) + AN2h2.
Where Ni represents the number of individuals who have completed level i of
education, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and i = 0 represents those who did not attend school. The
terms h1 and h2 are the amounts of human capital available to basic and higher
educated workers respectively.
The term A represents the total factor productivity (TFP) of individuals in the
“modern” sector, which is taken as given. The production function indicates that
higher education is needed in order to participate in the modern sector. The TFP of
individuals in the “traditional” sector—those who have achieved basic or have no
education— depends on the proportion of higher educated workers in the economy:
A0 = Af(σ2). (3.1)
Equation (3.1) above reflects the idea that the TFP of workers with a basic
education depends on the pool of higher educated workers for reasons already
outlined in the introduction. Here, σ2 is the proportion of higher educated work-
ers, and f() is a function relating the proportion of higher educated to the TFP of
basic educated workers. The specification of the production function without com-
plementarities in production ensures that private ROREs from wage regressions
reflect the private marginal benefit of education.
Assumption 1: f(σ2) is increasing, concave, twice continuously differentiable
with respect to σ2, f(0) > 0, and f(1) = 1.
The assumption above implies that the TFP of basic educated workers in-
creases with the proportion of higher educated workers at a decreasing rate, but
the productivity of the traditional sector never goes above that of the modern sec-
tor.5 The assumption that f(0) is positive ensures that output in the traditional
sector is not zero in the absence of higher educated workers.
3.2.3 Human Capital Production
The human capital of a higher educated worker is taken as exogenous to the pro-
portion of higher educated workers. The focus is on the impact of higher educated
workers on the the human capital of the basic educated, and the human capital
production of basic educated workers is given by the function:
h1 = σ
β1
2 exp{θs}. (3.2)
5This can be justified in the context of developing countries by the observation that productivity
in agriculture is consistently lower than that in non-agriculture, and non-agricultural workers are
more educated than agricultural workers (Gollin et al., 2011; Restuccia et al., 2008).
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Assumption 2: h1 is increasing and concave with respect to σ2 (β1 lies between
zero and 1).
The proportion of higher educated workers in the population (σ2) can be inter-
preted as a measure of the quality of education. Bils and Klenow (2000) suggest
that the formulation for h1 above is an appropriate way to incorporate Mincerian
estimates of the returns to education into a macroeconomic model. The formu-
lation here differs from theirs in that they assume that current human capital
depends on the average human capital of the preceding generation.6 In equation
(3.2), s stands for the length of time required to complete a basic education, which
ranges from 5− 9 years.
From assumption 2, the quantity of human capital is increasing in the propor-
tion of higher educated workers. Notice that if β1 = 0, the proportion of higher
educated workers does not matter for the human capital obtained through a basic
education. In this case, the production function parameter, θ, can be calibrated to
match widely available estimates on the returns to schooling. It costs g1 units of
the consumption good to educate a basic educated worker, and g2 units to educate
a higher educated worker who is already basic educated.7
3.2.4 The Social Planner Problem
Individuals consume their wages which is earned by inelastically supplying their
human capital in the labor market, and as already mentioned are identical with
respect to ability and the opportunity cost of going to public school. Individuals
who are schooled can either have basic schooling only, or proceed to higher edu-
cation. Recall that the question of interest is whether it is always profitable to
reallocate education resources from higher to basic education based on standard
estimates of the returns to education.
Given a fixed education budget G, the social planner problem (SPP) is given by:
maxN1,N2Y = A0(N0 +N1h1) + AN2h2
s.t. A0 = Af(σ2)
h1 = σ
β1
2 exp{θs}
G = g1N1 + (g1 + g2)N2 (3.3)
N0 = N − (N1 +N2) (3.4)
6This difference is partly a reflection of different research questions. Their paper interprets
the average human capital of the preceding generation as a measure of teacher quality, whereas
the interest here is on teacher quality, as well as other services (such as health care) provided by
higher educated workers. The average human capital of the preceding generation may be a good
measure of teacher quality, but not access to health services for example.
7It is important to note that the model presented here is vague on timing. The human capital
effect is dynamic, while the productivity effect is contemporaneous and dynamic. This timing is
taken seriously in the quantitative exercise which follows, but the static model allows for greater
clarity in explaining some of the results.
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Ni ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Assumption 3:
i) The quantity of human capital increases with the level of schooling: h2 >
h1 > 1.
ii) The cost of higher education is sufficiently greater than that for basic educa-
tion: g2 > g1h1 at all levels of σ2.
The first part of Assumption 3 above ensures that the human capital available
to individuals is increasing with their level of education, an assumption which will
be disciplined by observed evidence on private returns to education. The problem
amounts to picking the number of basic and higher educated workers to maxi-
mize output and satisfy the resource constraint, while taking into account the fact
that the productivity and human capital of basic educated workers depend on the
proportion of higher educated workers.
The first-order conditions reveal that in an interior solution, the optimal pro-
portion of higher educated workers, σ∗2, equates the net social marginal benefit
(SMB) for higher education to the net social marginal benefit for basic education:
h2 − f ∗
g2 + g1
+
f ′∗
g2 + g1
[1 + σ∗1(h
∗
1 − 1)− σ∗2] +
f ∗(h′∗1 σ
∗
1)
g2 + g1
=
f ∗(h∗1 − 1)
g1
. (3.5)
An asterisk (∗) above a variable indicates that it is a function of the the optimal
proportion of higher educated workers in the population, and a prime (′) is the
first derivative of the variable with respect to N2. Let σ∗1 represent the optimal
proportion of workers in the economy who only have a basic education, which can
be derived by rearranging (3.3):
σ∗1 =
G
Ng1
− (1 + g2/g1)(σ∗2). (3.6)
Expression (3.6) illustrates the trade-off between basic and higher education in
the model: If there is no higher education, the term G/Ng1 denotes the maximum
proportion of workers who can be basic educated. The expression tells U.S. that
for every basic educated worker who goes on to acquire higher education, there
are potentially g2/g1 > 1 workers who have to remain uneducated.
The exercise here can be interpreted as examining whether it is justifiable, at
prevailing standard estimates of the social returns to basic and higher education,
to have one more higher educated worker over g2/g1 basic educated workers. The
analysis in Section 4 show that, with reasonable values for g2/g1 > 1, the human
capital and productivity effects are large enough to justify prevailing levels of in-
vestment in higher education as optimal.
In general, the outcome of the model depends on the shape of the functions
f and h1, as well as the relative sizes of N , G, g1 and g2. As long as the social
marginal benefit (left-hand side of (3.5)) to higher education outweighs the net
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SMB to basic education when σ2 = 0, it will beneficial to have some higher edu-
cated workers. For the analysis in the next section, it is assumed that parameters
are such that the model yields an interior solution with a mix of higher and basic
educated workers which satisfy eqs. (3.5) and (3.6).
3.2.5 Qualitative Results
Rate of Return Analysis Using Wages: Consider the wages which will result
from the profit maximization problem of a perfectly competitive firm in this model
that takes σ∗2 as given:
w0 = Af(σ
∗
2) w1 = Af(σ
∗
2)h
∗
1 w2 = Ah2.
Private returns to different levels of education are ideally derived using age-
earning profiles to back out internal rates of return. Due to data limitations, an
extended Mincer earnings function is commonly used. Years of schooling are con-
verted into dummy variables for each educational level, with controls included for
other independent variables.
As Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2007) show, the extended earnings function
method can be approximated by the “shortcut” method, using conditional (on ob-
servables) mean wages for different educational levels. For example, the shortcut
method estimates the ROR to basic education as: (w1 − w0)/w0. This is the condi-
tional mean wage gain for a basic educated worker, divided by foregone earnings.
Applying the shortcut method to wages from the decentralized firm problem,
the model counterpart to private ROREs (rp) to basic and higher education respec-
tively are given by:
rp1 = h
∗
1 − 1, and rp2 =
h2 − f ∗h∗1
f ∗h∗1
. (3.7)
The standard social return to education is estimated by accounting for the re-
source costs of basic and higher education g1 and g2 respectively as part of the
opportunity cost. For basic and higher educated workers, the model counterpart
to standard estimates of the social return to education are given by:
rs1 =
Af ∗(h∗1 − 1)
Af ∗ + g1
, and rs2 =
A(h2 − f ∗h∗1)
Af ∗h∗1 + g2
. (3.8)
To be consistent with the pre-existing literature, the expressions in (3.7) will
be referred to as standard private rate of return estimates (ROREs), and those in
(3.8) as the standard social (ROREs). Notice that standard social ROREs do not
account for any external benefits to basic or higher education, which is important
for the analysis that follow.
Remark The first order condition in (3.5) can be written in terms of the marginal
wage benefit of basic and higher education weighted by their respective costs. At
an interior solution, it must be that:
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Γ∗ =
Af(h∗1 − 1)
g1
− A(h2 − f
∗h∗1)
g2
(3.9)
Where
Γ∗ ≡ Af
′∗
g2
[1 + σ∗1(h
∗
1 − 1)− σ∗2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity Effect
+
Af ∗h′∗σ∗1
g2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Human Capital Effect
The expression in (3.9) is obtained by rearranging the first order condition in
(3.5). The term “Γ∗” is the marginal external benefit of higher educated workers
(not reflected in wages of the higher educated) on the traditional sector. It consists
of two additive terms: The first is the effect of higher educated workers on the TFP
of all workers in the traditional sector (the productivity effect), and the second is
the impact on the human capital of basic educated workers (the human capital
effect).
Both effects raise the value of a basic educated worker relative to a higher
educated, and an uneducated worker. The productivity and human capital effects
raise the value of a basic educated worker relative to a higher educated worker,
and the human capital effect raises the value of a basic educated worker relative
to an uneducated worker.
The condition in (3.9) implies that Γ∗ is equal to the difference between the
wage benefit of basic and higher education, weighted by their respective costs.
This difference in cost-adjusted wage benefits is non-negative since by Assump-
tions 1 and 2, Γ∗ is non-negative. Equation (3.9) is convenient for expressing
the relationship between standard social ROREs to basic and higher education.
The result below summarizes the relationship between Γ∗ and the standard social
ROREs:
Result 3 If Assumptions 1,2, and 3 hold, then:
1. Γ∗ is an upper bound on the difference between standard estimates of the so-
cial return to basic and higher education in (3.8).
2. At the optimal level of σ∗2, the estimated social returns to higher education is
not guaranteed to be as large as that for basic education.
Proof See appendix A.
The second part of Result 3 implies that as long as Γ∗ is positive, the standard
social RORE to basic education will be greater than those higher education i.e.
rs1 ≥ rs2. If Assumption 1 and 2 hold (Γ∗ is positive), then optimality does not
imply that standard social ROREs for basic and higher education should be equal.
A significant contribution of this paper is demonstrating that Γ∗ is positive and
quantitatively large.
The intuition behind the result is simple: estimates of the social return to
education which come from individual wages do not account for the fact that higher
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educated workers have some impact on the productivity and human capital of the
basic educated. Standard ROREs underestimate the true social return to higher
education. Note that it is not the case that one can justify every situation where
rs1 ≥ rs2 as optimal. Result 3 also shows that the gap between standard ROREs for
basic and higher education should be no greater than Γ∗.
Next, I analyze how the value of Γ∗ changes with σ∗2, and conditions under
which one can expect the social returns to basic and higher education to diverge:
Result 4 If Assumptions 1,2, and 3 hold, and the TFP of workers in the tradi-
tional sector is not too responsive to changes in the proportion of skilled workers,
specifically if f ′/f < (1 + g2/g1)/2, then Γ is decreasing in the proportion of skilled
workers. This implies that the gap between standard social ROREs for basic and
higher education is decreasing in the optimal proportion of skilled workers, all else
equal.
Proof See appendix A.
To see why this is true, notice that as the proportion of higher educated workers
increases, there are opposing forces on the impact of the marginal higher educated
workers in the traditional sector. The impact of the marginal higher educated
worker, Γ, decreases because the productivity and human capital effects are get-
ting smaller from concavity assumptions. Additionally, the proportion of workers
who only have a basic education is getting smaller, which decreases the human
capital effect. On the other hand, an increase in the TFP of basic and uneducated
workers remaining in the traditional sector will tend to increase the value of Γ.
As long as the relative increase in TFP (f ′/f ) is not large enough to outweigh the
reduction in output due to a decrease in basic educated workers (g2/g1), Γ will be
decreasing.
Is the sufficient condition in Result 4 likely to satisfied? Assume higher edu-
cation only costs 3 times as much as basic education, which is a very conservative
estimate for developing countries (See ). The condition says that for a 1 percentage
point increase in the proportion of higher educated workers, the TFP of basic and
uneducated workers should increase by no more than 2%. Using data from U.S.
cities, Moretti (2004) finds that a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion
of college graduates raises wages by no more than 2% (this includes any human
capital and productivity effects).8 This is taken as evidence that the condition is
likely to be satisfied, and even more so when the cost of higher education relative
to that of basic education is a lot larger than 3, as is the case in many developing
countries (See Table 3.6 for data from UNESCO (2012), and Table 9 in (Glewwe
and Kremer, 2006)).
Result 4 is important because it points out that we should expect to see larger
gaps between standard social ROREs for basic education and higher education, in
economies where the proportion of skilled workers is relatively low. This is because
8Bils and Klenow (2000) also find an elasticity of productivity with respect to the stock of human
capital of .77 which is consistent with the condition for Result 4.
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the impact of higher educated workers on the traditional sector is larger for this
group of countries. The result also suggests that the effects being discussed here
should be small for countries with large proportions of higher educated workers,
which is confirmed by the quantitative exercise.
The set of countries which are being advised to reallocate funding from higher
to basic education due to relatively low standard social ROREs to higher edu-
cation, are the same set of countries where the human capital and productivity
effects are larger. Such an education policy which ignores the human capital and
productivity effects will be counterproductive.
Impact of Shifting Education Funding:
Result 5 If Assumptions 1,2, and 3 hold, and the the economy is at the optimal
proportion of higher educated workers with Γ∗ > 0, shifting education funding in
order to equate standard social ROREs for higher and basic education leads to a
lower return to basic education, and also lowers the TFP in the traditional sector.
Proof If Assumptions 1,2, and 3 hold, from Result 3, we know that at the optimal
proportion of higher educated workers, social ROREs for basic education will be
greater than those to higher education. Equating social ROREs implies that there
must be an increase the proportion of basic educated workers, and a reduction in
the number of higher educated workers. The reduction in the proportion of higher
educated workers lowers TFP in the traditional sector by Assumption 1, as well
as the human capital of basic educated workers by Assumption 2. Consequently,
there is an increase the return to a higher education because of the lower produc-
tivity and human capital of basic educated workers. There is also a decrease in
the return to a basic eduction because of lower human capital.
Result 5 speaks to the potential impact of policies such as UNESCO’s Educa-
tion for All (EFA) initiative which recommend a focus on basic education, often
at the expense of higher education. The prominent economic rationale for these
policies are larger social ROREs for basic education. Such policies undoubtedly
benefit uneducated workers who obtain basic education. For workers who would
have obtained a basic education anyway, and those who are now unable to obtain
a higher education, the policy makes them worse off.
More important, Result 5 implies that the return to policies such as EFA will be
lower than expected if higher educated is neglected. Indeed there is some evidence
that expansions in basic education have not been as profitable as one would have
hoped in light of the large social ROREs. Uwaifo-Oyelere (2010) for example, using
evidence from the Universal Primary Education program in Nigeria, finds that the
returns to education are much lower (just 2.8%) than those previously reported in
the literature. The result above points out that such low rates of return to a rapid
expansion in basic education is to be expected if the quantity of human capital
(quality of education) declines due to a decline in the proportion of higher educated
workers.
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The evidence on decreased returns to education may be a reflection of a de-
cline in marginal ability, or an increase in the supply of skills under conditions
of stagnant demand, as opposed to lower quality of education. However, quality
declines are also documented in other direct measures documented in UNESCO’s
EFA global monitoring report (UNESCO, 2004). Other evidence indicating that
basic educated workers, in many developing countries, graduate with lower than
expected levels of human capital such as poor literacy and numeracy skills, can be
found in the survey by Glewwe and Kremer (2006).
The productivity effect impacts the value of basic educated workers relative to
higher education workers (it increases the returns to higher education). Lowering
the productivity effect, leads to a reduction in the level of wages earned by basic
educated workers. This may be important in explaining productivity differences
across countries in a world with technical change directed towards skilled workers
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009). Having a low
proportion of skilled workers means that countries are unable to access current
technologies, or adopt them for their own uses.
In summary, in a model with human capital and productivity effects, wage-
based estimates of social rates of return to basic and higher education are not
necessarily equal at the optimal proportion of higher educated workers, unless
the proportion of higher educated are sufficiently large. Looking at wage-based
social ROREs across countries will present a distorted picture on the optimal allo-
cation of education resources. For countries with a small proportion of higher edu-
cated workers, the gap between estimated social returns should be larger because
Γ∗ is larger, and the gap should decrease as the proportion of higher educated
workers increases. Policies aimed at equalizing social ROREs will lead to worse
than expected outcomes for basic educated workers. These policies lower the hu-
man capital and productivity of basic educated workers. The importance of these
predictions however, depends on the size of the human capital and productivity
effects, a question which is addressed in the next two sections.
3.3 Estimating Parameters of the Model and Cali-
bration
In this section, I describe how the parameters of the model for the human capital
production function, and the relationship between productivity and the proportion
of higher educated workers are estimated. All other parameters are chosen so the
model matches features of the data on private returns to education, proportion of
educated workers in each education category, and GDP per capita. The key object
to be quantified is the term Γ:
Γ ≡ Af
′
g2
[1 + σ1(h1 − 1)− σ2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity Effect
+
Afh′σ1
g2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Human Capital Effect
.
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In order to quantify Γ, parameters of the basic human capital production func-
tion h1, as well as the function relating the TFP of basic educated workers to the
proportion of higher educated workers, f are required.
3.3.1 Higher Educated Workers and Human Capital Produc-
tion:
The human capital production function of basic educated workers in (3.2) is given
by:
h1 = σ
β1
2 exp{θs}.
The parameter of interest here is β1 which determines the impact of higher edu-
cated workers on the human capital of basic educated workers. From Assumption
2, the null hypothesis is that β1 is strictly positive, and less than 1(concavity).
Identifying β1 from wages requires that the productivity effect is held constant
as the proportion of higher educated workers changes. This is challenging be-
cause a change in the proportion of higher educated workers is reflected in wages
through changes in productivity, as well as changes in the quality of human cap-
ital. To solve this problem, I exploit observed differences in returns to education,
when human capital is employed in a location different from where it was ob-
tained. We can identify β1 using information on the rate of return to education for
immigrants in the U.S., relative to U.S. natives.
Prediction 1 Consider two basic educated individuals living in the U.S.. These
individuals only differ based on the location where education was acquired; one
from country i and the other from the U.S., which have different proportions of
higher educated workers. Any differences in the gross rate of return to education
are related to differences in home-country quality of education:
ln(Ri/RU.S.) = β1(lnσ2,i − lnσ2,U.S.).
The expression above can be obtained by plugging (3.2) into the expression
for private return to basic education in (3.7). The model predicts that any dif-
ferences in wages and rates of return to education, for two individuals who are
observably identical except for their country of education, must be due to differ-
ences in human capital (proportion of higher educated workers).9 The proportion
of higher educated workers in the model, σ2, represents the quality of basic edu-
cation. This strategy identifies the effect of the proportion of higher educated on
human capital because it picks up variations in wages that is due to the quality of
9A similar result in the context of a different model where individuals choose their years of
schooling can be found in Schoellman (2012). The paper uses these estimates of returns to educa-
tion by country of origin to correct for human capital differences in a growth accounting exercise.
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education(proportion of higher educated workers and other home country), while
leaving the productivity and other aggregate effects on wages fixed.10
To implement the idea, I run the regression below:
lnRj,2000 = lnRU.S. + βlnσ2{j,1980} + η′(Ωj,1980) + i. (3.10)
I use data from Schoellman (2012) for estimates of the average returns to educa-
tion for immigrants to the U.S. in the 2000, 1990, and 1980 censuses by country
of origin. These estimates are especially suited to this application because they
control for observables, such as years of schooling, age, licensed/non-licensed occu-
pation, English capability, and year of entry into the U.S.
There are other variables which could influence the quality of education, as
suggested by Table 4 in Hanushek and Kimko (2000), and Table 3 in Bratsberg
and Terrell (2002). The baseline regression uses returns to education in the U.S.
by country of origin in year the 2000. These are regressed on the proportion of
higher educated workers, the proportion of basic educated workers, the pupil-
teacher ratio, and real government education expenditure per-pupil in 1980, which
are contained in Ω.
Data on the proportion of educated workers (aged 25+) at the basic and higher
education levels are taken from the updated Barro-Lee dataset (Barro and Lee,
2010). For the regressions, I define higher educated workers as those who have
completed a secondary education.11 All other measures of education quality are
taken from the dataset described in Barro and Lee (1996). The year 1980 is cho-
sen to reflect prevailing schooling conditions when immigrants in the 2000 census
acquired their basic education.12 Regional dummies for sub-Saharan Africa, the
OECD, Latin America, and East Asia are also included to control for any regional
fixed effects. Table 3.8 contains the list of countries used in the estimation, as well
as important variable definitions.
Figure 3.2 plots estimates of education quality taken from Hanushek and
Kimko (2000) obtained from standardized test scores (PISA and TIMSS) in a va-
riety of countries, against the proportion of higher educated workers in 1980. It
provides support for the hypothesis that the proportion of higher educated work-
ers is related to schooling quality. The correlation is .47, but the proportion of
primary educated (which includes everybody with primary education and above)
10See the aforementioned paper by Schoellman (2012) for more detail on why these returns iden-
tify differences in quality of education. The paper demonstrates that after controlling for selection,
as well as language effects, these differences still persist. Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) using a
smaller sample of countries from the 1980 and 1990 censuses, also show that differences in re-
turns to education by country of origin are strongly related to different measures of education
quality, but their measures of quality do not include the proportion of higher educated workers.
11I also run the regression using proportion of individuals who have completed tertiary educa-
tion, or those who have at least attained tertiary education as the definition of higher educated.
These change the precision, but not the magnitude of the estimate.
12Values from 1975 and 1985 are used to test for the sensitivity of the results to the chosen year
of 1980. The results do not change significantly using these alternative measures. Results using
the year 1980 are reported here since they also coincide with the 20 year time lags for quality
measures used in Bratsberg and Terrell (2002).
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is also correlated with schooling quality and proportion of higher educated, with
coefficients of .67 and .74 respectively. This indicates that it is important to con-
trol for the proportion of primary educated as a measure of education quality in
the regression.
Figure 3.2: Quality of Education, Returns to Education, Higher Educated
Education Quality and Higher Ed. Relative Returns and Prop of Higher Ed.
The second part of Figure 3.2 plots estimates of the relationship between aver-
age returns to education of an immigrant from a given country relative to a U.S.
native (the measure of human capital quality used here), and the 1980 propor-
tion of higher educated workers. These estimates are presented in Table 3.1, and
they show that the proportion of higher educated workers is positively related to
quality of education, and differences in returns to education for immigrants in the
U.S. The second column of Table 3.1 presents the baseline estimate of β1 at .013.
It indicates that a 1% rise in the 1980 proportion of higher educated workers in
an immigrant’s home country, increases the returns to education of the immigrant
relative to a U.S. native by 1.3%.
The third column of Table 3.1 confirms that the proportion of basic educated
alone is also strongly correlated with relative returns, but in columns 4-6 which
control for the proportion of higher educated workers, this effect disappears. This
is taken as evidence that these differences in returns are not a result of basic ed-
ucation per se, but specifically a result of higher educated workers. This is not
especially surprising, because as may be seen in Figure 3.3, there is a very weak
relationship between the home-country 1980 proportion of basic educated, and re-
turns for immigrants in the U.S. The estimate of β1—positive and less than one—is
also consistent with Assumption 2 which states that the human capital production
function is concave and increasing in the proportion of higher educated. Including
controls for the pupil-teacher ratio (P-T ratio) and expenditure-per-pupil (Exp), at
the primary and secondary levels of education, do not significantly alter the es-
timate of β1. The P-T ratio at the primary education level is not significant, and
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Table 3.1: Relative Returns to Education and Higher Educated Workers
Dependent Variable is Log-Returns to Education in U.S. for year 2000
T-statistics in parentheses
H-K Quality 0.036*** 0.034***
(3.30) (2.73)
Higher-Educated(1980) 0.013*** 0.012** 0.011** 0.012** 0.011*
(3.28) (2.58) (2.53) (2.23) (1.84)
Basic-Educated(1980) 0.009*** 0.001 -0.014 0.006 0.008
(2.73) (0.19) (-1.58) (0.80) (1.08)
Pri P-T Ratio(1980) 0.018 0.01
(1.32) (0.73)
Sec P-T Ratio(1980) -0.029** -0.008
(-2.60) (-0.74)
Exp-pri(1980) -0.009
(-0.99)
Exp-sec(1980) 0.023***
(2.83)
EAP 0.002 0.004
(0.21) (0.45)
LAC -0.021** -0.027***
(-2.44) (-3.29)
MENA 0 -0.013
(-0.01) (-1.27)
SA 0.003 -0.025*
(0.19) (-1.82)
SSA 0.013 -0.016
(1.03) (-1.19)
Constant 0.070*** 0.087*** 0.060*** 0.086*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.094***
(24.93) (12.08) (19.79) (8.64) (11.02) (9.59) (9.53)
R2 0.189 0.159 0.05 0.159 0.304 0.334 0.534
Number of Countries 71 91 92 91 71 82 64
Note: Proportion of higher educated workers refers to all workers who have completed secondary education
***Significant at the 1% level **Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 10% level
has the wrong sign compared to that in Bratsberg and Terrell (2002). When the
same regression is performed without the proportion of higher educated workers,
the P-T ratio becomes significant and has the correct negative sign (compare Ta-
ble 3.1 with Table 3 in Bratsberg-Terrell). I interpret this as evidence that some
of the impact of higher educated workers come through teachers, as well as other
services such as public health provided to pupils.
Lastly, the effect of higher educated workers remain significant even after con-
trolling for education expenditure. This provides some support for the assumption
that teacher salaries alone do not fully capture the effects of differences in educa-
tion quality. I use β1 = .013 in the next section to compute the the human capital
effect.
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3.3.2 Elasticity of Basic Educated TFP to Higher Educated
Workers:
I follow the endogenous growth literature (Romer (1986); Lucas (1988)) and repre-
sent the function f as:
f(σ2) = σ
α
2 .
13
The traditional and modern sectors in the model are interpreted as the agri-
cultural and non-agricultural sectors respectively. This interpretation is based on
a couple of stylized facts on developing countries which are consistent with the
structure of the model presented earlier. First, there are important productivity
differences between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Within a typi-
cal developing country, productivity in agriculture which employs over 70% of the
workforce is significantly lower than that in the non-agricultural sector (Restuccia
et al. (2008); Gollin et al. (2011)). This implies that the ratio of labor productivity
in the non-agricultural to agricultural sector is greater than 1.
Secondly, cross-country differences in agricultural productivity are far greater
than differences in aggregate productivity (Restuccia et al., 2008). In a world with
high-skill directed technical change where productivity differences decline with a
sector’s proportion of skilled workers as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), lower
productivity in agriculture relative to the aggregate will imply that it employs a
larger proportion of low-skilled workers.
Estimates of human capital differences across sectors confirm that average
years of schooling and quality of education are lower in the agricultural sector
(Gollin et al., 2011; Vollrath, 2009). Gollin et al. (2011) for example, find that
average years of schooling in the non-agricultural sector is about twice as large
as that in the agricultural sector, with the ratio rising to 2.8 in the countries of
sub-Saharan Africa.
The agricultural productivity gap (APG) is defined as the ratio of effective hu-
man capital productivity in the non-agricultural to the agricultural sector. In this
model, the APG is given by:
σ−α2 . (3.11)
Assumption 1 will imply that α is strictly positive and less than one, so that the
TFP of workers in the traditional sector is an increasing, and concave function of
the proportion of higher educated workers. This leads to the conjecture below:
Prediction 2 Controlling for effective human capital, the agricultural productiv-
ity gap across countries is decreasing with the proportion of higher educated work-
ers.
For data on effective human capital adjusted APGs, I make use of the estimates
provided in Gollin et al. (2011). The authors estimate APGs for a set of 97 devel-
13One important difference is that most of the literature uses the average stock of human capital
instead of the proportion of higher educated workers. The formulation here attempts to capture
the effect of human capital on productivity that comes through higher educated workers.
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oping countries using value added and employment data from the Food and Agri-
culture Organization(FAO). The raw APGs are obtained by taking a ratio of value
added per worker in the non-agricultural to agricultural sector. They then adjust
the raw gaps for hours worked, average years of schooling, and quality of educa-
tion using information from representative surveys and censuses. Adjustments
reduce the average productivity gap by about 50%, but large gaps still remain.
I use these adjusted APGs, which control for factors influencing aggregate pro-
ductivity in both the modern and traditional sectors, to estimate α. Figure 3.4
plots the raw and adjusted APGs as a function of the proportion of higher edu-
cated workers in 1995. I only include countries for which the proportion of higher
educated workers are also provided in the Barro-Lee dataset which yields a total
of 55 countries (see Table 3.9 for list of countries). The adjusted APGs are nega-
tively correlated with the proportion of higher educated workers, which provides
some support for Conjecture 2. The correlation coefficient excluding the outliers,
Burkina Faso and Madagascar, is -.32 which is significant at the 1% level. In con-
trast, the APG is not significantly correlated with the proportion of workers who
have completed basic (primary) education, nor the average year of schooling. The
correlation coefficients are -.12 and -.11 respectively.
The identifying assumption behind this exercise is that adjusting for differ-
ences in human capital, the only reason why the APG differs between countries
is due to differences in proportion of higher educated workers (reflected in techno-
logical adoption and improved health services for example). All other aggregate
factors, such as bad governance or institutions, that may influence productivity
and education incentives should leave the current APG unchanged as they affect
all sectors. The adoption of technologies, or improved public health services, could
also increase productivity in the modern sector. Using the APG deals with this as
well because it only captures increases in traditional sector TFP beyond those in
the modern sector. This is exactly the productivity effect—increases in TFP due
to more higher educated workers reflected in basic and uneducated wages, which
are not reflected on the wages of higher educated workers.
The elasticity of traditional sector TFP to higher educated workers is estimated
from the equation below:
ln(APGi) = α0 − αlnσ2{i,2000} + ψControlsi,2000 + i.
The controls are motivated by other determinants the APG dicussed in the liter-
ature. Evidence from Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Vollrath (2009) show that
agriculture is relatively more physical-capital intensive for countries with a higher
proportion of higher educated workers. This calls for controls for physical capital
to be included in the regression above, which is taken from estimates of physical
capital in agriculture in FAOSTAT (2012). I use the stock of machineries as the
measure of capital stock, as it appears to be most relevant to level of education,
and also adjust for the number of agricultural workers.
The concern above notwithstanding, if the greater adoption of physical capital
in the agricultural sector is due a greater proportion of trained (higher educated)
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Figure 3.3: Relative Return in U.S. and Proportion of Basic Educated
Figure 3.4: Raw and Adjusted APGs, and Proportion of Higher Educated
Raw APG and Prop of Higher Ed. Adjusted APG and Prop of Higher Ed.
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workers as technicians for example, controlling for physical capital stocks may
underestimate their impact on the agricultural sector. There may also be con-
cerns regarding country fixed effects such as geography or climate which make
some countries more productive in agriculture. For this reason, I include regional
fixed effects in the regressions. I also control for arable land per capita, and the
population growth rate using data from FAO.
Results from the regression are shown in Table 3.2. Column 1 is a regression
of the log-adjusted APGs on log of the proportion of higher educated workers in
1995, which yields a baseline estimate of α = .138.14 The regression confirms
that the proportion of higher educated workers is negatively related to the APGs,
adjusted for effective human capital, as depicted in Figure 3.4.15 Controlling for
the proportion of workers who have at least a basic education does not change the
estimate in column 2.
Table 3.2: Adjusted APGs and Proportion of Higher Educated Workers
Dependent Variable is Log-Adjusted APG
T-statistics in parentheses
Higher-Educated(1995) -0.138** -0.138** -0.117 -0.132 -0.166*
(-2.20) (-2.16) (-1.53) (-1.34) (-1.93)
Basic-Educated(1995) 0.017 0.036 -0.053 -0.135
(0.11) (0.25) (-0.40) (-1.00)
Arable Land Per Worker 0.007 -0.07 -0.234***
(0.14) (-1.10) (-2.93)
Pop. Growth 0.051 0.048 0.051
(1.13) (1.19) (1.48)
Machinery Per Worker 0.172***
(2.74)
EAP -0.668** -0.377
(-2.58) (-1.39)
LAC -0.461** -0.212
(-2.67) (-1.14)
MENA -1.104*** -0.920**
(-3.29) (-2.59)
SA -0.560* -0.226
(-1.99) (-0.75)
SSA -0.408 0.004
(-1.55) (0.01)
Constant 0.363** 0.381* 0.079 0.407 0.188
(2.35) (1.76) (0.19) (1.08) (0.54)
R2 0.086 0.086 0.11 0.351 0.433
Number of Countries 55 55 55 55 55
***Significant at the 1% level **Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 10% level
Note: Proportion of higher educated workers refers to all workers who have completed secondary education
Column 5 includes the full set of controls for population growth, machinery,
and arable land per capita. The estimates show that a faster population growth
14I consider 1995 a suitable year as it reflects prevailing conditions when a majority of these
APGs were collected(1995-2005). I also used the proportion of higher educated workers in 1990,
2000, and 2005. But the estimates do not change significantly, the point estimate for α goes from
.138 to .13 if I use the year 2000, and .122 if I use the year 2005.
15Interestingly, using the APGs which are not adjusted for human capital yields a larger estimate
for α. I conjecture that this is because it captures the productivity effect, as well as the effect of
higher educated workers on human capital.
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increases the APG, and that having more arable land per agricultural worker re-
duces the APG, as one would expect. Countries with more arable land will be
more productive in the agricultural sector regardless of the proportion of higher
educated workers. This means that there is a level component in the productivity
of the traditional relative to the modern sector which is not explicitly accounted
for in the specification for f(σ2), but will be reflected in a higher aggregate TFP
(A).
A concern with the identifying assumption here is that the proportion of higher
educated workers may be endogenously determined along with the agricultural
productivity gap. In the models of Schultz (1975) and Lagakos and Waugh (2011),
given low aggregate productivity and a subsistence requirement, individuals who
are not particularly good at agriculture may be forced into agricultural work which
does not require a higher education. This reduces productivity in agriculture rel-
ative to non-agriculture (increasing the APG), and also leads to fewer higher ed-
ucated workers. So an increase in aggregate productivity will directly reduce the
APG by ensuring fewer workers are needed to meet the subsistence requirement,
and also increase the proportion of higher educated workers creating a spurious
negative correlation.
First, it is not clear that increasing agricultural productivity will immediately
result in more education, and more workers leaving the sector. An evaluation of
the Millennium Villages Project (MVP) in Kenya found that an increase in agri-
cultural productivity, which enables individuals meet subsistence requirements,
actually decreases participation in the non-agricultural sector. Wanjala and Mura-
dian (2011) find that a 70% increase in agricultural productivity for MVP villages
decreases participation in profitable non-farm employment, as opposed to mov-
ing individuals out of agriculture as subsistence requirements are now being met.
There are factors keeping individuals in agriculture, but subsistence requirements
do not tell the full story.
Also imagine that in the short term, individuals have acquired human capital
specific to the agricultural sector, which discourages movements out of that sector,
even with increases in productivity alleviating subsistence needs. An increase in
agricultural productivity today will be reflected in more education for the future
generation (but not today’s farmers). Under the framework described above, and
supported by evidence from the MVP in Kenya, there is no endogeneity problem
regressing current APGs on current, or past proportion of higher educated work-
ers.
Secondly, it could be that aggregate productivity is low because the proportion
of higher educated workers is low as in models of directed technical change and
technological adoption (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001)). This leads to the correla-
tion between APG, aggregate productivity, and the proportion of higher education
as predicted by models, such as the Lagakos-Waugh model of subsistence require-
ments for example. If this is the case, there is no endogeneity problem and the
identification strategy remains valid.
It is probably not the case that all cross-country agricultural productivity dif-
ferences are due to lack of technological adoption or a shortage of health services
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provided by higher educated workers. There may be some bias arising out of sub-
sistence requirements. To address these concerns, I also restrict the sample to
countries with per-capita incomes above $1000 where subsistence requirements
are less likely to be important compared to constraints on technological adoption,
and doing so does not change the result.
3.3.3 Calibrating the Other Parameters
Parameters left to be calibrated are: the human capital of basic and higher ed-
ucated workers, h1 and h2, costs of basic and higher education, g1 and g2, and
aggregate productivity A, which are all country-specific. Given β1 and α, I choose
parameters so the model matches estimates of private returns to education, the
proportions of basic and higher educated workers, and GDP per capita. The model
is calibrated to data from 1990. When 1990 data is not available, I use the earliest
available data in the 10 year window, 1985-1995. The year 1990 is chosen be-
cause a majority of the rate of return estimates (ROREs), in Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos (2004), were obtained around that time period.
To calibrate the human capital of basic-educated workers, I pick parameters so
the model matches the private ROR to basic education. The private return to edu-
cation in the model is given in (3.7): rp1 = h1 − 1 = [σ2β1exp{θs}]− 1. Given β1 from
the previous section, as well as σ2 (the proportion of higher educated workers) in
the data, exp{θs} is chosen so the model matches private ROREs in Psacharopou-
los and Patrinos (2004). The human capital of higher educated workers, h2, is also
chosen to match the private ROR to higher education. Given h1, α, and σ2, the
solution for h2 solves: rp2 = [(h2/fh1)]− 1 = [h2/(σα2 h1)]− 1, for each country.
In order to get ROREs in the model consistent with standard annualized
ROREs, I need to take a stand on the length of a basic education. I follow
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2007), and assume only 3 years of foregone earn-
ings for basic educated workers. So I multiply the ROREs from Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos (2004) by a factor of 3, in order to get the private return to basic
education.16 For higher educated workers, I assume 7 years of foregone earning, 3
years for upper secondary school and 4 years for tertiary education.
Given h1, h2, and σα2 , I set the relative cost of higher to basic education, g2/g1,
equal to public expenditure on higher relative to basic education, from UNESCO
(2012). If data on relative expenditures are not available for 1990, I use the av-
erage from 1985 to 1990. If no data is available for those years, then I use the
regional average for the country’s region, as classified by UNESCO. Then, us-
ing data on G/N , aggregate expenditure on education per student from UNESCO
(2012), g1 is chosen to match the proportion of basic educated workers in 1990 from
(3.6), and ensures that the the budget constraint holds.
The parameter, A, which is important for computing estimates of social returns
16On average, it takes 6 years to complete basic education. But most basic educated pupils are
not going to be working at those ages, so assuming 6 years of foregone earnings understates the
return to a basic education.
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to education from (3.8), is chosen so that output-per-capita in the model matches
data on real GDP-per-worker (PPP, constant $) from The World Bank (2012). Table
3.3 summarizes parameter values, for all countries which will be used in the anal-
ysis (these are countries for which I have estimates of private returns to basic and
higher education from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), developed countries
are excluded.). The full list of parameters are contained in Table 3.6.
Table 3.3: Summary of Parameters
h1 h2 g2/g1 g1 g2 Af
Mean 1.75 2.92 19.43 1194.56 12125.21 7299.34
Median 1.54 2.47 6.57 633.72 4183.96 6464.29
Min 1.06 1.53 1.11 26.02 874.15 734.46
Max 3.97 9.50 198.50 17763.02 199312.46 20801.07
Standard dev 0.72 1.56 39.35 3017.39 34185.56 5173.30
Number of Countries: 34
α = .138 and β1=.013 for all countries.
Average estimates of the human capital of basic educated workers, h1, reflect
the private returns to basic education for this group of countries, at 75% (25%
annualized). Note that these estimates of human capital are only comparable
within countries.17 This is not a problem for my analysis, however, because I only
compare returns within countries.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Productivity Effects, Human Capital Effects, and So-
cial ROREs
In this section, I compute, for all countries in my dataset, the social returns to
higher and basic education implied by the model (which I call the true social ROR),
and standard social ROREs which come from wages. In computing social returns,
I stick closely to the methodology in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2007); benefits
divided by social costs (foregone earnings, and the total public cost of education
for 7 years).18 The only difference here is that I also include benefits from the
productivity and human capital effects.
17For example, a higher educated worker in Botswana has h2 = 9.5, compared to one in Brazil
with h2 = 4.32. But this does not mean that a higher educated worker in Botswana has twice as
much human capital compared to a Brazilian. Instead, my measure of human capital says that
a higher educated worker has 9.5 times as much human capital compared to a basic educated
worker, in Botswana.
18The conclusion is not very sensitive to the number of years chosen (4-10 years have been tried),
because parameters are chosen to match private returns to education. More years of foregone earn-
ings for higher educated workers would be reflected in higher human capital for higher educated
workers, h2.
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The true social ROR to higher education is calculated as:
rsocial2 ≡
External Effects︷ ︸︸ ︷
Af ′[1 + σ1(h1 − 1)− σ2]
7(Afh1 + g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Returns from Productivity Effect
+
Afh′σ1
7(Afh1 + g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Returns from Human Capital Effect
+
A(h2 − f ∗h∗1)
7(Afh1 + g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Standard social ROR
.
(3.12)
The social ROR to higher education consists of three parts. The first is the pro-
ductivity effect, divided by the social opportunity cost of one more higher educated
worker; the output of a basic educated worker, Afh1, and the direct cost of higher
education, g2, for seven years of higher education. The second is the human capi-
tal effect, also divided by the social opportunity cost of a higher educated worker.
The third part is just the standard RORE of social returns to higher education,
using information from wages and direct social cost of higher education as in (3.8).
Social returns to basic education is calculated using the expression given in (3.8),
as it is assumed there are no external returns to basic education.19
Social returns to higher and basic education, from the model, are plotted in
Figure 3.5 (and are also contained in Table 3.7). It illustrates the basic result
of this paper: the productivity and human capital effects are greater than the
difference between standard ROREs to basic and higher education. From Figure
3.5 we see that the standard pattern in Figure 3.1 is reversed; for most countries,
the social return to higher eduction is now larger than that for basic education.
The median difference between social returns to higher and basic education
is about 5.3 percentage points, compared to a difference of -4 percentage points
in standard estimates from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), and -9 percent-
age points in standard estimates from the model. The median external effect of
about 13-percentage points is large enough to more than account for the difference
between standard estimates of social returns to higher and basic education.
The calculation assumes there are no externalities to basic education. This is
contrary to what has been discussed in the literature on education in developing
countries, which emphasizes externalities to basic education, for social and eco-
nomic reasons (see McMahon (2004) and Mertaugh et al. (2009), for examples).
Given the large social externalities to higher education found here, how large do
externalities to basic education have to be to overturn the above result?
Evidence on externalities to basic education in developing countries is scarce,
but looking at estimates from growth studies, estimates of the external returns
to education (at all levels) lie between 14-16% (Mertaugh et al., 2009). These fig-
ures are just as large as the external returns to higher education obtained here.
To overturn these returns, most the returns to education in growth studies have
to be strictly due to basic education. However, we know this is not the case, be-
cause there are many countries who have achieved universal education without
subsequent significant economic growth.
19As the results will show, the social return to basic education would have to be unreasonably
large to overturn the results.
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Figure 3.5: Social Returns to Basic and Higher Education
Table 3.7 also shows that returns from the productivity effect predominate. Re-
turns arising from the human capital effect is below 1-percentage point for most
countries in the dataset, and do not contribute significantly to the social ROR for
higher education. The human capital effect is large for the marginal higher edu-
cated worker (it is on average 13% of basic educated wages), but returns are small
because this pales in comparison to foregone wages and the costs of higher educa-
tion. However, this does not mean that the human capital effect is unimportant,
it could have important implications for the private return to basic education.
Section 4.3 discusses possible impacts of ignoring these external effects, but first
I examine how standard ROREs systematically underestimate social ROREs to
higher education.
3.4.2 Underestimation of Social Returns to Higher Educa-
tion
Next, I explore the quantitative significance of Result 4, which predicts that the
human capital and productivity effects are decreasing in the proportion of higher
educated workers.
The prediction from Result 4 does hold, and the difference between standard
and social returns (the external effect) declines with the proportion of higher ed-
ucated workers, as shown in Figure 3.6. Including all countries, the correlation
coefficient is -.81. The result does not hold precisely because “all things are not
equal,” and the relative cost of higher education (g2/g1) tends to decrease with the
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proportion of higher educated workers. This means that we expect to see larger
human capital and productivity effects in countries with smaller proportions of
higher educated workers. Indeed, if I calculate the external effects using U.S. pro-
portion of higher educated workers, and costs of education, these effects are quite
small, at just 3%.
Figure 3.6: External Effects and Proportion of Higher Educated
What does this mean for the gap between standard ROREs for basic and higher
education across countries? Figure 3.7 shows how standard estimates of the gap
between social returns for basic and higher education are related to the propor-
tion of higher educated workers, and the external effects. A smaller proportion
of higher educated workers (larger external effects), imply larger gaps between
standard social ROREs to basic and higher education. For example, in Venezuela
(VEN), the return due to the external effects is about 23 percentage points, and
standard estimates place the social return to basic education 15 percentage points
higher than that to higher education. In Argentina (ARG) on the other hand, stan-
dard estimates of the gap between social returns to higher education and basic
education is close to zero, and the return due to external effects is only 8%.
Thus, standard social ROREs systematically overstate the gap between the so-
cial return to basic and higher education. In countries where the proportion of
higher educated workers are smaller, external effects are larger, and standard es-
timates of the gap between social returns to basic and higher education are larger.
The size of the difference between standard social ROREs is not random, they de-
crease with the proportion of skilled workers. The conclusion often reached based
on standard estimates of social RORs (reallocation of funding from higher to ba-
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Figure 3.7: Standard Social ROR Gaps and Proportion of Higher Educated
sic education) is not supported here. Countries where standard social returns to
higher education are significantly lower than basic education, who appear to be
over-investing in higher education, are those where external effects are larger.
The patterns in Figures 6 and 7 also imply that these external effects and gaps
are unimportant for countries with large proportions of higher educated work-
ers. Estimates of social returns to higher and basic education available for a few
OECD countries in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) support this implication.
They find standard social ROREs of 8.5% to basic and higher education. External
effects, as measured here, are small, indicating that standard social ROREs may
serve as a useful tool for education policy in that context. For developing countries
with a smaller proportion of higher educated workers, however, these standard
ROREs are not reliable.
3.4.3 Model Fit and Optimal Policy
In this section, I show that the simple model presented here provides a good fit to
standard social ROREs, and then use it to compute the optimal education policy
(proportion of higher educated workers) which is compared to the data.
The difference between social returns to basic and higher education does not
disappear because the model systematically overesates standard social returns to
higher education, or underestimates social returns to basic education. Figure 3.8
and Table 3.4 show the model does a good job of matching standard estimates of
social returns to both basic and higher education. Estimates of standard returns
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Figure 3.8: Matching Standard Social ROREs
Standard Social Returns to Higher Ed. Social Returns to Basic Education
to education from the model, which do not account for external effects fit well
with those from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). Most of the estimates in
Figure 3.8 cluster around the 45-degree line, with a zero mean difference between
standard ROREs for higher education in the data and model (see Table 3.4).
If anything, social returns to basic education do tend to be overestimated by
the model, but this difference is not statistically significant. As the second part of
Figure 3.8 shows, most of the estimates are not significantly different from those
estimated from standard data, but outliers such as Papua New Guinea, Venezuela,
as well as Botswana, Liberia, and the Dominican Republic noted earlier tend to
skew the average. In all, the model matches social returns to education when
external effects are not taken into account, and the larger social return for higher
education is due to large productivity and human capital effects.
Just as seen in standard estimates, the model also predicts that standard
ROREs for basic education will be larger than those for higher education. But
based on this pattern alone, we cannot immediately conclude there is an over-
investment in higher education. This is because the productivity and human cap-
ital effects are large enough to account for the differences in standard ROREs.
Ignoring these externalities may lead to a misleading picture of social RORs.
Further, for most countries, the optimal proportion of higher educated workers
computed from the model, taking the external effects into account, matches the
observed proportion of higher educated workers very well. The computed optimal
proportion of higher educated workers is plotted against the observed proportion
of higher educated workers in Figure 3.9. Most countries in the picture lie along
the 45-degree line, and for these countries, we cannot conclude that there is an
over-investment in higher education, even when there are large gaps in standard
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Table 3.4: Standard Social ROREs: Model v. Data
Country Higher Basic
Model Data Model Data
Argentina 0.113 0.076 0.097 0.084
Bolivia 0.148 0.130 0.179 0.130
Botswana 0.176 0.150 0.894 0.420
Brazil 0.211 0.214 0.331 0.356
Chile 0.184 0.140 0.093 0.081
China 0.062 0.113 0.168 0.144
Colombia 0.176 0.140 0.255 0.200
Costa Rica 0.096 0.090 0.114 0.112
Cyprus 0.051 0.076 0.137 0.077
Dominican Rep. 0.146 0.670
Ecuador 0.102 0.099 0.158 0.147
El Salvador 0.089 0.080 0.172 0.164
Ghana 0.176 0.165 0.215 0.180
Guatemala 0.183 0.312
Honduras 0.176 0.189 0.187 0.182
India 0.116 0.024
Lesotho 0.019 0.102 0.104 0.107
Liberia 0.061 0.080 0.956 0.410
Malawi 0.039 0.115 0.137 0.147
Mexico 0.107 0.111 0.171 0.118
Nepal 0.071 0.091 0.154 0.157
Pakistan 0.151 0.075
Panama 0.171 0.053
Papua New Guinea 0.077 0.084 0.278 0.128
Paraguay 0.117 0.108 0.232 0.203
Peru 0.347 0.123
Philippines 0.104 0.105 0.172 0.133
Thailand 0.084 0.122
Turkey 0.140 0.085 0.018
Uruguay 0.113 0.103 0.257 0.216
Venezuela 0.093 0.062 0.352 0.234
Viet Nam 0.075 0.062 0.107 0.135
Yemen 0.059 0.240 0.032 0.020
Zimbabwe 0.017 0.043 0.164 0.112
Mean 0.119 0.113 0.223 0.169
Median 0.110 0.103 0.166 0.146
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Figure 3.9: Optimal versus Observed Proportions of Higher Educated (1990)
estimates of the social ROR. This is precisely because the productivity and human
capital effects are large enough to rationalize observed choices as optimal.20
3.4.4 Impact of Reallocating Funding on Basic Educated
What is the impact of policies which, based on standard ROREs and ignoring any
external effects of higher educated workers, call for a shift of resources towards
basic education? First, I solve the model for the implied proportion of higher ed-
ucated workers with, and without accounting for external effects. This involves
solving for the optimal proportion of higher educated workers by setting the left-
hand side of (3.9) to zero, given the parameters in Table 3.6. I then compute the
implied private return to basic education (effect of excluding the human capital
effect), as well as the wage level of basic educated workers (effect of excluding all
effects).
The first two columns of Table 3.5 show the proportion of higher educated work-
ers with, and without, external effects. Education policy which does not account
for these external effects potentially misses a significant portion of the social re-
20Notice that if anything, a lot of countries, such as Chile, are under-investing in higher educa-
tion. But this could also be a result of how the relative cost of higher to basic education is computed
using public expenditures. It is well known that a majority of the costs of higher education in many
countries is privately financed (UNESCO, 2006). So the relative cost of higher education from an
individual’s perspective may be underestimated, and that could explain the significantly lower
observed proportion of higher educated workers observed in Chile, for example.
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turn to higher education, and will underfund higher education. For example, in
Argentina about 12% of workers have attained higher education, but ignoring ex-
ternal effects, the model predicts that only 1% of workers should have been higher
educated, given observed standard returns. The same pattern holds for all coun-
tries in the dataset; ignoring external effects leads to a lower optimal proportion
of higher educated workers (and a higher proportion of basic educated).
Table 3.5: Impact of Ignoring External Effects
Country Proportion of Higher Educated Private Returns to Basic Edu. Wage Level
No External External No External External No External External
Argentina 0.0091 0.12 0.0674 0.1010 12617 16528
Bolivia 0.0047 0.108 0.1557 0.2000 5069 6592
Botswana 0.0001 0.038 0.8531 0.9900 9880 11540
Brazil 0.0005 0.059 0.2900 0.3660 9968 14367
Chile 0.0095 0.115 0.0647 0.0970 12180 15821
China 0.0000 0.02 0.1800 N/A 1753
Colombia 0.0016 0.082 0.2181 0.2770 11261 15423
Costa Rica 0.0075 0.121 0.0852 0.1220 11256 14890
Cyprus 0.0144 0.17 0.1203 0.1540 21970 27031
Dominican Rep. 0.0011 0.072 0.7604 0.8510 7425 7263
Ecuador 0.0070 0.127 0.1310 0.1710 10939 14099
El Salvador 0.0007 0.064 0.1263 0.1890 6062 9680
Ghana 0.0000 0.025 0.2450 N/A 2020
Guatemala 0.0000 0.028 0.3380 N/A 8778
Honduras 0.0001 0.036 0.1256 0.2080 3665 6998
India 0.0107 0.044 0.0087 0.0260 2748 3274
Lesotho 0.0000 0.004 0.1550 N/A 1036
Liberia 0.0000 0.018 0.9900 N/A 1042
Malawi 0.0000 0.004 0.1570 N/A 1311
Mexico 0.0015 0.078 0.1339 0.1890 4912 7049
Nepal 0.0002 0.042 0.0935 0.1660 939 1721
Pakistan 0.0004 0.025 0.0315 0.0840 3326 5520
Panama 0.0247 0.138 0.0354 0.0570 12223 14764
Papua New Guinea 0.0000 0.007 0.3720 N/A 3684
Paraguay 0.0010 0.075 0.1745 0.2370 6018 8982
Peru 0.0244 0.154 0.1072 0.1320 8955 10277
Philippines 0.0218 0.187 0.1529 0.1830 5071 5816
Singapore 0.0000 0.03 0.2220 N/A 43471
Thailand 0.0004 0.049 0.0950 0.1600 3912 6675
Turkey 0.0454 0.109 0.0083 0.0190 19238 21380
Uruguay 0.0022 0.099 0.2209 0.2780 9952 13370
Venezuela 0.0052 0.118 0.3129 0.3630 19974 22830
Viet Nam 0.0001 0.026 0.0365 0.1080 901 1792
Yemen 0.0000 0.004 0.1000 N/A 8705
Formulating education policy based on standard ROREs will lead one to con-
clude that there is significant over-investment in higher education. For some coun-
tries where the gap between standard ROREs to basic and higher education is rel-
atively large, the model without externalities predicts that public resources should
not be allocated to higher education (see Ghana, Guatemala, or Lesotho). This is
consistent with the conclusion reached by the World Bank (1995) in its educa-
tion strategy document. As discussed in the introduction, the document concludes
that public resources need to be focused on basic education, with higher educa-
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tion moving towards self-financing. Here we see that this conclusion is only valid
when external effects are small. As discussed earlier in this section, these external
effects are large.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3.5 compute implied private returns to
basic education, using the proportion of higher educated workers with, and with-
out. external effects. Since basic and uneducated workers work in the same sector,
this only captures the impact of the human capital effect (impact of higher edu-
cated workers on the human capital of the basic educated). Ignoring countries
for which the predicted proportion of higher educated workers is zero, there is a
significant reduction in private returns to basic education in response to an ex-
pansion in basic education. In Honduras for example, the private return to basic
education falls from 20% to 12% , and in Nepal it falls from 16.6% to 9.4% follow-
ing an expansion in basic education.21 Notice that the decline in returns is as a
result of a decline in quality, and not a result of an increase in the relative supply
of basic educated workers.
This is consistent with the finding in Uwaifo-Oyelere (2010) that the average
rate of return to basic education is only 2.8%, following the expansion of Nigeria’s
universal basic education program; this is a lot lower than the average 11.7%
RORE for sub-Saharan Africa countries. The framework here suggests that a
decline in returns to basic education, which follows an expansion at the expense
of higher education, is partly due to a resultant decline in the quality of basic
schooling. Although the human capital effect does not contribute significantly
to social ROREs, it still speaks to the impact of higher educated workers on the
return and attractiveness of basic education.
The last two columns of Table 3.5 show how the wage level of basic educated
workers change with a decline in higher educated workers. There is a decline
in the wage level of basic educated (and uneducated) workers in response to the
expansion in basic education. Note that this decline is not due to diminishing
marginal returns, or increasing abundance of basic educated workers, as the ef-
fective marginal product basic educated workers is assumed to be constant. It
is caused by a decline in the productivity of the “traditional” sector, as well as a
decline in the human capital of basic educated workers.
The size of the decline in wage levels varies based on the size of the external
effects. Take Brazil where external effects are large (17 percentage points from
Table 3.7), the wage of basic educated workers will be 30% lower than it would
have been if education policy (and the proportion of higher educated workers),
was set taking external effects into account. In the Philippines where these ef-
fects are smaller, the wage of basic educated workers is only about 13% lower if
education policy is set based on standard ROREs. Overall, wage levels for basic
educated workers are over 15% lower for most countries, as a result of declines in
productivity and quality of human capital.
21Excluding countries with no higher educated workers is necessary because the human capital
production function in (3.2) does not admit zero higher educated workers. This would imply that
obtaining a basic education destroys an individual’s human capital.
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3.5 Conclusion
Standard estimates of the social rate of return (R0R) to education, which are larger
for basic compared to higher education, have been used to justify the focus of public
resources on basic education, which is often at the expense of higher levels of edu-
cation. In this paper, I have argued that these standard social ROR estimates are
not reliable for education policy. There are quantitatively important externalities
to higher levels of education, which are related to their impacts on productivity
and future human capital.
I quantify these effects in a cross-section of developing countries. I find that
the social ROR to higher education is about 10-40 percentage points larger than
standard estimates indicate, as a result of the human capital and productivity ef-
fects. Furthermore, for a majority of the countries, the productivity and human
capital effects are large enough to rationalize observed proportions of higher edu-
cated workers as optimal. I also show that the less educated a country is—lower
proportions of higher workers, the larger the external effects of higher education,
and the larger the difference between standard estimates of the social ROR to ba-
sic and higher education. Lastly, an expansion in basic education at the expense
of higher education, based on standard social ROR estimates, potentially leads to
some unexpected consequences for basic educated workers. There are lower re-
turns to a basic education, because of a decline in the quality of basic schooling.
Furthermore, there is a significant decline in the productivity of basic educated
workers. This decline in productivity exceeds 30% of the wage for basic unedu-
cated workers, for most countries in the dataset.
Papua New Guinea (PNG) provides a good case study: We see from Figure
3.7, that for PNG, the difference between standard estimates of the social ROR
to basic and higher education is greater than 20 percentage points. Based on
this, we may be tempted to conclude that there is significant over-investment in
higher education. However, looking at Figure 3.6, we see that external returns
from the productivity and human capital effects of higher educated workers in
PNG is greater than 50%. Figure 3.9 confirms that the external returns are large
enough to rationalize the observed proportion of higher educated workers in PNG
as optimal, even with large differences in standard social ROREs.
Standard ROR estimates are therefore unsuitable for education policy because
they do not account for the human capital and productivity effects. This study does
claim that the social return to higher education is larger than that for basic edu-
cation; I do not investigate the possibility of externalities to basic education. Basic
education is important, but there has to be a balance between basic and higher
levels of education. This is because higher educated workers are an input into ba-
sic education, and in a world where technical change is increasingly skill-biased,
higher educated workers are also important for productivity. What is this balance,
and how can it be achieved, especially for countries yet to achieve universal basic
education coverage? This question is left for future research.
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3.6 Other Tables and Figures
Table 3.6: Calibration Results
Country h1 h2 g2/g1 g1 g2 A
Argentina 1.30 2.02 10.08 533.99 5382.59 13070.88
Bolivia 1.60 2.79 3.89 557.16 2680.68 4826.40
Botswana 3.97 9.50 42.96 659.05 12298.09 6149.17
Brazil 2.10 4.32 6.57 1046.50 6945.04 9788.02
Chile 1.29 2.39 3.40 574.74 3531.83 12162.24
China 1.54 1.90 30.93 103.88 2491.92 1455.50
Colombia 1.83 3.33 4.93 924.94 5061.40 10787.99
Costa Rica 1.37 1.98 6.64 817.66 5499.61 11649.00
Cyprus 1.46 1.62 1.11 2622.76 6284.69 20801.07
Dominican Rep. 3.55 5.95 4.3 1153.60 4129.09 4279.81
Ecuador 1.51 2.19 4.3 891.85 4183.96 10555.13
El Salvador 1.57 1.83 1.19 799.63 2629.38 8306.11
Ghana 1.74 3.86 13.7 219.53 3247.17 1568.18
Guatemala 2.01 3.23 5.17 595.49 4159.60 7148.32
Honduras 1.62 2.97 6.82 642.85 5775.06 5743.23
India 1.08 1.63 6.55 285.41 3637.18 3061.90
Lesotho 1.47 2.54 52.72 472.18 31559.16 955.72
Liberia 3.97 5.16 198.5 26.02 1729.52 734.46
Malawi 1.47 3.06 108.21 183.14 18424.67 1220.78
Mexico 1.57 2.36 7.06 727.57 4981.89 7048.82
Nepal 1.50 1.83 13.718 118.62 1436.73 1549.14
Pakistan 1.25 2.47 10.65 633.72 9968.06 5026.33
Panama 1.17 2.24 3.68 851.18 5536.47 11674.69
Papua New Guinea 2.12 2.90 12.5 1053.95 20463.84 3125.32
Paraguay 1.71 2.39 12.40 158.80 1369.30 6913.20
Peru 1.40 4.16 2.97 464.88 2320.34 6464.29
Philippines 1.55 2.26 2.70 271.12 874.15 4149.52
Thailand 1.48 1.83 1.92 1847.43 7657.00 5973.34
Turkey 1.06 1.69 3.84 812.15 6581.92 18905.95
Uruguay 1.83 2.57 2.98 763.14 2911.13 9278.22
Venezuela 2.09 2.80 11.96 516.32 3577.53 16440.36
Viet Nam 1.39 1.53 3.12 328.37 3490.32 1556.02
Yemen 1.30 3.12 5.3 17763.02 199312.46 8509.18
Zimbabwe 1.50 1.37 198.5 20.94 1967.43 1428.12
Number of Countries: 34
α = .138 and β1=.013 for all countries.
Calibration is as explained in Section 3.3 of the text.
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Table 3.7: Social Returns to Higher and Basic Education(Model)
Country Higher Education Basic Education
Prod. Effect Ret H.C. Effect Ret Total External Social ROR Social ROR
Argentina 0.096 0.007 0.102 0.216 0.097
Bolivia 0.096 0.005 0.101 0.249 0.179
Botswana 0.129 0.009 0.138 0.314 0.894
Brazil 0.155 0.009 0.164 0.375 0.331
Chile 0.118 0.008 0.126 0.310 0.093
China 0.313 0.018 0.331 0.393 0.168
Colombia 0.130 0.008 0.138 0.314 0.255
Costa Rica 0.092 0.006 0.098 0.195 0.114
Cyprus 0.077 0.006 0.083 0.134 0.137
Dominican Rep. 0.090 0.005 0.095 0.242 0.670
Ecuador 0.090 0.006 0.096 0.198 0.158
El Salvador 0.185 0.006 0.192 0.280 0.172
Ghana 0.263 0.014 0.277 0.452 0.215
Guatemala 0.325 0.011 0.336 0.519 0.312
Honduras 0.249 0.010 0.259 0.435 0.187
India 0.245 0.008 0.253 0.369 0.024
Lesotho 0.187 0.005 0.192 0.211 0.104
Liberia 0.148 0.007 0.155 0.216 0.956
Malawi 0.284 0.007 0.291 0.329 0.137
Mexico 0.120 0.006 0.127 0.234 0.171
Nepal 0.180 0.004 0.184 0.255 0.154
Pakistan 0.295 0.007 0.302 0.453 0.075
Panama 0.089 0.005 0.094 0.265 0.053
Papua New Guinea 0.522 0.018 0.540 0.617 0.278
Paraguay 0.150 0.008 0.158 0.276 0.232
Peru 0.075 0.004 0.078 0.425 0.123
Philippines 0.063 0.004 0.067 0.171 0.172
Thailand 0.188 0.004 0.193 0.277 0.122
Turkey 0.128 0.006 0.134 0.275 0.018
Uruguay 0.126 0.009 0.135 0.248 0.257
Venezuela 0.075 0.003 0.078 0.171 0.352
Viet Nam 0.400 0.020 0.420 0.495 0.107
Yemen 0.376 0.001 0.377 0.436 0.032
Zimbabwe 0.099 0.005 0.103 0.121 0.164
Note: Social returns to higher and basic education calculated as described in (3.12) and (3.8) respectively.
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Table 3.8: Countries in Human Capital Regression
Europe and North America East Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
AdEc EAP LAC SSA
Netherlands Myanmar Brazil Sierra Leone
Japan Hong Kong, China Jamaica Gabon
Iceland Philippines Uruguay Rwanda
Denmark Singapore Costa Rica Burundi
New Zealand Fiji Paraguay Sudan
Switzerland Thailand Trinidad and Tobago Mauritius
Italy Papua New Guinea Dominican Republic Niger
Portugal China Chile Benin
Sweden Korea, Rep. Argentina Uganda
Belgium Malaysia Guyana Swaziland
Australia Indonesia Peru Mozambique
Ireland Taiwan Cuba Lesotho
United Kingdom Tonga Barbados Central African Republic
Canada Venezuela, RB Gambia, The
Greece Middle East and North Africa Guatemala Congo, Rep.
Austria MENA El Salvador Cameroon
Norway Egypt, Arab Rep. Bolivia Malawi
France Jordan Ecuador Cote d’Ivoire
Luxembourg Yemen, Rep. Panama Kenya
Spain Malta Nicaragua Zambia
Germany Syrian Arab Republic Mexico Congo, Dem. Rep.
Finland Bahrain Haiti Botswana
United States Morocco Honduras Mali
Albania Algeria Colombia South Africa
Hungary Iraq Senegal
Bulgaria Saudi Arabia South Asia Liberia
Poland Tunisia SAs Zimbabwe
Romania Kuwait Nepal Tanzania
Russian Federation United Arab Emirates Pakistan Mauritania
Turkey Israel Afghanistan
Cyprus India
Iran, Islamic Rep. Sri Lanka
Bangladesh
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Table 3.9: Countries in APG Regression
Europe and North America East Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa
AdEc EAP LAC SSA
Italy Vietnam Ecuador Ghana
Canada Tonga Guatemala Liberia
Turkey Fiji Costa Rica Sierra Leone
Switzerland Malaysia Panama Cote d’Ivoire
Spain Philippines Jamaica Swaziland
Greece Cambodia Peru Kenya
Portugal Indonesia Mexico Lesotho
Ireland Venezuela Zimbabwe
United States South Asia Dominican Republic Uganda
Albania SAs Bolivia Tanzania
Romania Bangladesh Chile Rwanda
Latvia Nepal Argentina Malawi
Armenia Pakistan Brazil Botswana
Sri Lanka Zambia
Middle East and North Africa South Africa
MENA Ghana
Syrian Arab Republic Liberia
Iraq
Jordan
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Chapter 4
Appropriate Technology and
Income Differences
4.1 Introduction
An important problem in development economics, and economic growth, is un-
derstanding how economies use available factors of production. The traditional
view is that low-income countries generally use available factors unproductively
compared to richer countries. Recent research has found significant productiv-
ity differences within low-income countries; some sectors are relatively produc-
tive and others very unproductive. Examples include productivity differences
between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (Restuccia et al., 2008; Gollin
et al., 2011), differences in productivity by sectoral skill-intensity (Acemoglu and
Zilibotti, 2001; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009), and sectoral differences in pro-
ductivity based on tradability of the final good (Herrendorf and Valentinyi, 2012).
Thus, compared to high-income countries, low-income countries are not unproduc-
tive at everything.
Looking across factors of production, Caselli and Coleman (2006) find that in
comparison to high-income countries, low-income countries use unskilled workers
relatively more productively than the skilled. In fact, they find that that low-
income countries use unskilled workers absolutely more productively than richer
countries under their preferred set of parameters. However, the methodology in
Caselli and Coleman (2006) cannot distinguish the hypothesis that skilled workers
in low-income countries are less productive because they have less embodied hu-
man capital, from the hypothesis that skilled workers are less productive because
low-income countries adopt technologies that are complementary with unskilled
workers.1
1They acknowledge this possibility and use information on the elasticity of human capital to
measures of schooling inputs to argue that human capital quality differences are small, and can
only explain a small fraction of the differences in physical productivities. However, recent studies
using different data to back out human capital quality, have found considerable cross-country dif-
ferences in the quality of skilled labour. In many cases, differences in the quality of skilled labour
are as large as differences in the quantity of skilled labour (Schoellman, 2012; Erosa et al., 2010;
85
86 CHAPTER 4. APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY AND INCOME DIFFERENCES
I first extend the methodology in Caselli and Coleman (2006), and dissect cross-
country differences in the productivity of skilled workers (relative to the unskilled)
into differences in the amount of human capital embodied in skilled workers, and
differences in production techniques or what I call physical productivities. For
example, are doctors in the U.S. more productive than doctors in Liberia because
they are generally better trained (larger embodied human capital), or because they
have access to better equipment such as MRI machines (larger physical productiv-
ities), or both? This is an important distinction because the source of the higher
productivity of skilled workers has different policy implications. If doctors in high-
income countries are primarily more productive because they are better trained,
this would imply important differences in the quality of doctors across countries.
On the other hand, if doctors are more productive in high-income countries be-
cause of access to better medical equipment, it would imply significant barriers to
technology adoption.
I use estimates of skill premiums for immigrants from different countries liv-
ing in the U.S. and estimates of skill premiums across countries, to separate differ-
ences in embodied human capital from differences in physical productivities. As
all skilled workers in the U.S. work with the same technologies, any differences
in skill premiums by country of origin must be due to differences in embodied hu-
man capital. Then, differences in skill premiums for immigrants in the U.S. and
those left behind in their home countries must be due to differences in physical
productivities (production techniques).
I find that (compared to richer countries) skilled workers in low-income coun-
tries have significantly less embodied human capital. Further, the physical pro-
ductivity of skilled workers are also higher in high-income countries, implying
that they are used more productively relative to unskilled workers. This result
holds for various plausible parameterizations of the production function. Com-
pared to the productivity of skilled workers relative to the unskilled in Caselli and
Coleman, controlling for embodied human capital implies that differences in the
physical productivity of skilled workers are now smaller (differences in production
techniques are now smaller). However, large differences in physical productivities
still remain because differences in embodied human capital are comparatively not
very large. For example, the ratio of embodied human capital in Ghanaian skilled
workers relative to their American counterparts is about 3.6, which is small com-
pared to the 50-fold difference in the physical productivity of skilled relative to
unskilled workers.
I then go further and ask: are skilled workers relatively unproductive in
Ghana, because Ghanaian firms appropriately choose technologies which make
abundant unskilled workers more productive? I argue that the estimates imply
that this is unlikely: In Ghana for example, the estimates imply that skilled work-
ers are 50 times less physically productive compared to unskilled workers, and in
Venezuela they are 100 times less productive. However, the data shows that there
are just as many skilled and unskilled workers in Ghana and Venezuela. It is
Manuelli and Seshadri, 2005).
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unlikely that unskilled workers being 50 times as physically productive as skilled
workers is appropriate, given that skilled workers are just as numerous, possess
more human capital, and are substitutable with unskilled workers. In fact, Ghana
could increase GDP per capita by a factor of 2.5 simply by using the mix of skilled-
unskilled physical productivities used by Ecuador or Greece, for example, leaving
all else the same.
To formally investigate, I compare the estimated relative physical productivity
of skilled workers to what they would be if technologies were chosen by profit-
maximizing firms in each country, following models of appropriate technology. I
assume a specific form for the technology frontier and check to see if estimated
choices of technology are consistent with appropriate technologies chosen by firms
facing that frontier. The shape of the technology frontier is assumed to be the same
across countries, but the height of the frontier, or number of available technologies,
is allowed to vary by country.2
For most of the 49 countries in the dataset, the estimated physical produc-
tivities of skilled workers are significantly lower than what is optimal. This
is true under various definitions of skilled-unskilled labour, and values of the
skilled-unskilled labour elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, the distance be-
tween estimated and optimal physical productivity of skilled workers is decreas-
ing with GDP-per-capita. For richer countries such as South Korea, Japan, Israel,
the Netherlands, and Australia, we cannot reject that they use skilled and un-
skilled workers appropriately. For other countries, such as Thailand, China, In-
dia, Venezuela, Ghana, and Kenya, the estimated physical productivity of skilled
workers is four times less that what is appropriate.
This finding differs from regular notions of appropriate technology which argue
that poor countries use technologies that are appropriate for a high skilled work-
force, but inappropriate for their relatively unskilled workforce. The result here
is in fact the opposite; controlling for the human capital embodied in skilled work-
ers, low-income countries tend to use technologies which make skilled workers
very unproductive, and unskilled workers too productive. This suggests signifi-
cant income gains by adopting more technologies that make skilled workers more
productive, and unskilled workers less productive.
To get a sense of potential income gains from using more appropriate and skill-
complementary technologies, I compare income-per-capita with estimated phys-
ical productivities to income per-capita under the optimal physical productivity
of skilled workers. Note that in this exercise, all factors of production are held
constant, and only the relative productivity of skilled and unskilled workers are
changing. Under the preferred set of parameters, the average country in the data
2Caselli and Coleman (2006) estimate the technology frontier assuming that firms in every
country choose technologies appropriately. Note that the finding that the estimated mix of skilled-
unskilled physical productivities are inappropriate is independent of the exact shape of the world
technology frontier. This is because a lot of countries could increase output by using the estimated
mix of skilled-unskilled physical productivity of other countries in the data. This implies that there
is a possible mix of technologies which would increase income in many low-income countries, by
making skilled workers more productive relative to the unskilled.
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increases its income-per-capita by a factor of 2 from using its appropriate technol-
ogy, and increasing the relative physical productivity of skilled workers.
There is some variation in income gains from adopting appropriate technolo-
gies, depending on a country’s income relative to the U.S. Countries in the low-
est income quartile experience a seven-fold increase in income, because they are
farthest away from their optimal mix of skilled-unskilled physical productivities.
More than 50% of all countries in the dataset could increase incomes by a factor of
4 from adopting the appropriate mix of skilled-unskilled worker complementary
technologies. Countries in the top income quartile only experience a 23% increase
in income by adopting their appropriate technologies, and most of the gains are
driven by France and Greece. This is in contrast to Caselli and Coleman (2006)
who find large income losses in low-income countries from the adoption of produc-
tion techniques used by richer countries.
These results could be interpreted as the result of significant barriers to tech-
nology adoption, in a world in which new technologies are complementary with
skilled workers.3 As traditional technologies are complementary with unskilled
workers, the adoption of newer skilled-complementary technologies are readily
blocked by vested interests, rendering skilled workers relatively less productive
than they could be.4 A report by McKinsey (2001) documents the prevalent non-
adoption of more productive technologies in many Indian sectors. A recent exam-
ple is the resistance to Walmart’s entry into the Indian retail market by small-
scale retailers (see the Bloomberg news report by Pradhan and MacAskill (2011)).
Other plausible interpretations are that these are a result of government poli-
cies leading to the misallocation of skilled workers to unproductive sectors. Exam-
ples include government job guarantees (Assaad, 1997), or policies which encour-
age skilled workers to remain on small-scale farms (Adamopoulos and Restuccia,
2013). The inefficient use of skilled workers could also be a result of financial fric-
tions which prevent a firm from investing in newer technologies (Buera and Shin,
2010; Banerjee and Duflo, 2004). Furthermore, the lack of a supporting infras-
tructure could deter the adoption of the latest technologies. For example, given
that most skill-complementary technologies are energy intensive, the inadequate
energy production in low-income countries may be a deterrent to importing more
skill-complementary technologies.5
This paper is closely related to other studies of the implications of appropriate
technology for productivity differences. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) assume that
all countries use technologies appropriate for high-income countries, and find that
the use of these advanced technologies that are inappropriate for the relatively
less-skilled workforce in developing countries, could account for cross-country dif-
ferences in aggregate productivity. On the other hand, Caselli and Coleman (2006)
3See Acemoglu (2002), Berman et al. (1998), and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), for evidence
that recent technologies have been skilled biased.
4For examples of how vested interests can block the adoption of new technologies, see Bridgman
et al. (2007) and Bellettini and Ottaviano (2005).
5The United States produces about 13,000 kWh per person, while Ghana barely produces 300
kWh per person (The World Bank, 2012).
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assume that all countries are choosing technologies appropriately, and back out
the world technology frontier. They find significant income losses if low-skilled
countries are forced to use technologies which are appropriate for the U.S. Also,
since countries are choosing technologies appropriately, the only significant pro-
ductivity gains come from accessing the world technology frontier, or increasing
the height of the frontier. Here, I find that leaving the height of the frontier fixed,
there are significant income gains from increasing the productivity of skilled work-
ers relative to the unskilled.6
This ties the results directly into the literature on barriers to technology adop-
tion, as in Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999), and its implications for productivity
differences in a world with skill-biased technical change (see summary in Violante
(2008)). It is also related to the literature on the misallocation of factors across dif-
ferent sectors of the economy, summarized in Banerjee and Duflo (2005). Skilled
workers may be used relatively unproductively because they are stuck in sectors
where their skills are not being utilized. Finally, the results also have some impli-
cations for the question of why increases in years of schooling have not translated
to growth in GDP (see Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)). Most studies in this
area emphasize the role of low and declining schooling quality. While schooling
quality is indeed important, this study also suggests a role for increasing the rel-
ative physical productivity of skilled workers.
In the next section, I present the model which is used to estimate the relative
productivities of skilled and unskilled workers, and explain why it is important to
control for the human capital embodied in skilled workers. Section 3 outlines the
quantitative framework, and construction of data. Section 4 presents the results,
followed by a discussion of the results and assumptions in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Exogenous Technology
Consider an economy, j, with a representative firm which produces output, yj,
according to the constant returns to scale production function:
yj = k
α
j [(A
s
jhjL
s
j)
η + (AujL
u
j )
η]
1−α
η . (4.1)
The per-capita stock of physical capital is given by kj, and the capital share of
output is given by α. The variable Lsj is the stock of skilled labour in n-years of
schooling equivalents, where n is the number of years it takes to become skilled,
and it is taken to be the same across countries. However, the quantity of human
capital embodied in a skilled worker who has completed n-years of schooling is
6In fact, using the U.S. mix of technologies would increase incomes for most low-income coun-
tries compared to their estimated physical productivities. However, assuming all countries use
the U.S. mix of technologies would imply unrealistically high returns to education in developing
countries.
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given by hj, and is allowed to vary across countries. Thus, hj would capture dif-
ferences in the quality of schooling across countries. The variable Luj is the stock
of unskilled labour in no-schooling equivalents, and it is assumed that individu-
als with no schooling are the same across countries with embodied human capital
normalized to 1.
The parameters Auj , Asj and hj, all determine labour productivity, but they do so
in different ways. The parameters Auj and Asj are defined as the physical produc-
tivities of unskilled and skilled workers respectively. These parameters depend
on the production technology and are not embodied in workers. For example, con-
sider a skilled teacher who has to grade multiple-choice grade exams, which could
be done manually or using scanning technology. Having the exams scanned and
graded by a machine would increase the productivity of the skilled teacher grading
the exams, which would imply a higher Asj. For the same teacher, with the same
skill level and embodied human capital hj, grading the exams manually would
make her less productive and this lowers the value of Asj. However, suppose the
teacher is unskilled and is unable to use the scanning technology, then grading
the exams manually would increase his productivity, Auj , relative to scanning the
exams.
From the example above, we can see that physical productivities of skilled and
unskilled workers are endogenously chosen by firms. Suppose the exam grading
firm has a lot of unskilled teachers, it might be optimal to have less scanning
machines, Asj, relative to pencils for the manual grading of exams, Auj .7 Thus, the
optimal ratio of Asj relative to Auj would depend on the proportion of skilled and
unskilled workers available to the firm, as in models of induced innovation and
appropriate technology (Kennedy, 1964; Acemoglu, 2002; Caselli and Coleman,
2006).
The quantity of human capital embodied in a skilled worker, hj ≥ 1, also in-
creases his relative productivity. While it could be endogenous to a firm through
firm training programs, it is taken to be exogenous and mostly determined by
schooling quality. The crucial difference between skilled worker physical pro-
ductivity, Asj and, embodied human capital, hj, is that hj moves with the worker.
Thus, if a skilled worker in the U.S. is more productive compared to one in Ghana
because he has obtained more human capital for the same years of schooling (a
higher hj), then relative to the Ghanaian, the American skilled worker would be
more productive regardless of location. As already mentioned, the human capital
embodied in an unskilled worker is normalized to 1 and is assumed to be the same
across countries.
Further, note from the production function that all workers within a given skill
category are perfect substitutes, but could have different efficiency units depend-
ing on years of schooling. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and un-
7This example suggests that the production technology is embodied in physical capital, and
while this intuition is maintained throughout the paper, it strictly does not have to be the case.
Production technology may respond to different legal institutions, and problems with contract en-
forcement may induce firms to adopt different production techniques which could have implications
for worker productivity (see Nunn (2007) for example).
4.2. MODEL 91
skilled workers is given by 1/(1 − η). When η < 0, skilled and unskilled workers
are complements, and when 0 < η ≤ 1, they are substitutes. The production func-
tion is Cobb-Douglas when η = 0, with degree of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labour equal to 1.
Taking prices as given, and fixing the firm’s choice of technologies Auj and Asj ,
the firm chooses efficiency units of skilled and unskilled labour Lsjhj and Luj , and
capital, kj, in order to maximize profits. From the firm’s first order conditions, we
find that the ratio of prices for skilled and unskilled labour is given by:
wsj
wuj
=
[Asj
Auj
]η[Lsjhj
Luj
]η−1
. (4.2)
Caselli and Coleman (2006) describe a methodology for backing out Asj/Auj , from
a variant of (4.2) when hj = 1, using estimates of the skill premium and the propor-
tion of skilled and unskilled workers. However, with the more general specification
given here, Asj/Auj cannot be separately identified from hj > 1 using the method-
ology described in Caselli and Coleman (2006). This is because we do not observe
the skill prices wsj/wuj above, instead we observe :
ωj ≡
wsjhj
wuj
=
[Asj
Auj
]η[
hj
]η[Lsj
Luj
]η−1
. (4.3)
Where ωj is the ratio of wages for a skilled worker relative to an observation-
ally equivalent unskilled worker. The skill premium contains information on skill
prices, wsj/wuj , as well as embodied human capital, hj . From (4.3), we see that
differences in the skill premium across countries could be due to differences in the
physical productivity of skilled relative to unskilled workers (
[
Asj
Auj
]
), differences in
human capital embodied in skilled workers (hj), and differences in the endowment
of skilled labour (Lsj/Luj ). Using only information on skill endowments and the skill
premium, differences in relative physical productivity cannot be separated from
differences in the quality of skilled labour.
In their paper, Caselli and Coleman (2006) find that the cross-country produc-
tivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, Asjhj/Auj , increases with in-
come. They interpret this result as implying that high-income countries adopt rel-
atively more skill-complementary technologies. However, from (4.3), one could also
conclude that physical productivities are the same across countries, but skilled
workers in high-income countries have more embodied human capital, because of
a better schooling quality in rich countries (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Erosa
et al., 2010; Schoellman, 2012). For example, Bowlus and Robinson (2012) ex-
amine changes in the U.S. college-wage premium across time, and find that the
increase in the wage premium is driven by changes in the quality of skilled labour,
with very little changes in relative skill price (physical productivity) of a college ed-
ucated worker. Thus, differences in the human capital embodied in skilled workers
across countries could account for some of the differences in the relative produc-
tivity of skilled labour found by Caselli and Coleman (2006).
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In this paper, I present a methodology for studying differences in relative phys-
ical productivities and embodied human capital across countries. In addition to
(4.3), which expresses the skill premium for a native of country j in country j,
we can also express the skill premium for immigrants from country j, living in
country i as:
ωji ≡
wj,si hj
wj,ui
=
[Asi
Aui
]η[
hj
]η[Lsi
Lui
]η−1
. (4.4)
The key difference between (4.3) and (4.4) is that the skill premium would
differ, depending on the immigrant’s country of origin, as a result of differences in
embodied human capital, hj. Bratsberg and Terrell (2002) and Schoellman (2012)
show that returns to schooling for immigrants in the U.S. differ based on country
origin, and that these differences are due to differences in quality of schooling in
the immigrant’s home country. The framework presented here further illustrates
why differences in the skill premium (returns to schooling) for immigrants contain
information on embodied human capital. Since the relative physical productivity,
and supply, of skilled workers is the same for all individuals, any differences in the
skilled wage premium, by country of origin, must be due to differences in embodied
human capital, hi. An estimate of the human capital embodied in an immigrant
from country j, relative to a native of country i, can be obtained from ωji /ωii.
Then we can infer the size of differences in physical productivities, from (4.3)
which gives the skill premium for natives of country j, who live in country j. From
(4.4) to (4.3), we see that using data on skilled worker endowments, estimates
of the skill premium for immigrants from country j living in country i, and the
skill premium for natives of country j living in country j, we can solve for relative
physical productivities: A
s
j
Auj
/
Asi
Aui
.
We can obtain estimates of the physical productivity of skilled relative to un-
skilled workers and embodied human capital, all relative to a base country, using
the methodology described above. However, for development accounting purposes,
I also need to derive the absolute levels of relative physical productivities and
embodied human capital. I derive these by endogenizing the choices of physical
productivity of skilled and unskilled labour chosen by firms. This puts more struc-
ture on the model above and allows me to explicitly solve for Asj/Auj and hj.
4.2.2 Endogenous Technology
In this section, I endogenize the physical productivities of skilled and unskilled
workers. This is motivated by the literature on induced technical change, which
mostly aims to explain why technical change has been skill-biased in the U.S. and
other developed nations. The key evidence for the skill-bias of technical change is
a non-decreasing skill-premium despite rapid increases in the number of skilled
workers.8 The main theoretical result from this literature is that under fairly gen-
eral conditions, which I elaborate upon below, innovation would be biased towards
8See Acemoglu (2002); Berman et al. (1998) for prominent examples.
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the more abundant factor. Thus, in the absence of free labour flows, technologies
should be biased towards skilled labour in skill-abundant countries, and vice versa
in skill-scarce countries.
There is ample empirical evidence that firms change production techniques
in response to changes in factor endowments. In a study of U.S. manufacturing
plants, Lewis (2011) finds that plants in areas with higher rates of (less-skilled)
immigration adopted significantly less machines per unit output, despite all firms
having similar initial adoption plans. Blum (2010) studies a sample of 27 devel-
oping and developed countries, and finds that countries absorb changes in factor
endowments by changing production techniques, but not the mix of products. The
more abundant factor simply gets used more intensively in all sectors of the econ-
omy.9 Caselli and Wilson (2004) find significant differences in the composition of
imported machines across countries. Importantly, they find that these differences
are strongly related to differences in the availability of other complementary fac-
tors within the country. For example, skill-abundant countries import machines
that have greater R&D content, and are complementary with skilled labour.
At this point, it is useful to reparameterize (4.1), and rewrite it as:
yj = A
1−α
j k
α
j [(µjL
s
jhj)
η + ((1− µj)Luj )η]
1−α
η . (4.5)
Where, in comparison to (4.1), Asj = Ajµj, Auj = Aj(1 − µj), and Asj/Auj =
µj/(1 − µj). The form of the production function in (4.5) emphasizes our inter-
est in the physical productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers,
Asj/A
u
j = µj/(1−µj), and not the levels of Asj and Auj . Following the result in Caselli
and Wilson (2004) discussed above, one can think of µj in (4.5) as the fraction of
machines which are complementary with skilled workers. All else the same, the
greater availability of machines complementary with skilled workers relative to
unskilled workers (higher µj) means a relatively more productive skilled work-
force. The model which I present below studies the problem of firms choosing the
proportion of machines to allocate to skilled and unskilled labour, which would
have implications for relative physical productivities.
The Firms’ Problem
I follow Caselli and Coleman (2006) and study an economy with many perfectly
competitive firms, each producing output using the production function in (4.5):
yj = A
1−α
j k
α
j [(µjL
s
jhj)
η + ((1− µj)Luj )η]
1−α
η .
9This also shows that unlike what some trade models with specialization might suggest, differ-
ences in sectoral composition across countries are not important determinants of skilled-unskilled
worker productivity differences. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) using cross-country
data from UNIDO, show that skilled-unskilled worker productivity differences are large, even
within narrowly defined sectors. Further, using census data, Hendricks (2010) shows that the large
cross-country differences in the employment of skilled workers are primarily driven by within-
sector variations in skilled employment, as opposed to the variation in sectors, across countries.
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In addition to hiring efficiency units of labour, and renting capital, firms also
choose the relative physical productivity of skilled labour (proportion of machines
devoted to skilled labour), µj, to maximize profits. As µj is the proportion of ma-
chines complementary with skilled labour, it is restricted to be between 0 and 1.
The firm faces a tradeoff between the physical productivity of skilled workers and
that of unskilled workers. Increasing µj increases the physical productivity (and
relative wage) of skilled workers, but simultaneously decreases the physical pro-
ductivity of unskilled workers. The problem above abstracts from how A, which is
the absolute number of machines used by skilled and unskilled labour (the height
of the technology frontier), is determined.
For concreteness, one can think of a firm involved in filing documents. It could
store these documents electronically, on a computer, or print and store them in
physical folders. Skilled workers are able to store files using both media, but
are relatively more productive using computers because unskilled workers are not
computer literate. In choosing its production technology, the firm faces a tradeoff
between the physical productivities of its skilled and unskilled workers, and the
optimal ratio of physical and electronic storage systems the firm would employ de-
pends on the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers. The firm might find
it optimal to store most of the files physically if it has relatively more unskilled
workers, because using computers would render its unskilled workers unproduc-
tive. On the other hand, it might store most files electronically if it has access to
relatively more skilled workers. As we would see below, the relative supply (and
wage) of skilled workers, and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled workers, would play a role in determining µj.
As is well known, it is not important whether technical change arises out of
improvements in the quality of machines, or expanding the variety of machines
and products, so I abstract from the exact form of technical change (see page 5
in Acemoglu (2002), and the citations therein). There remains the question of
how the number of machines for skilled and unskilled labour are produced and
financed. The framework above abstracts from these considerations. Acemoglu
(2002) presents a more detailed framework in which firms demand machines
which are supplied by technology monopolists. In the analysis below, I outline con-
ditions under which the result regarding the determinants of the relative physical
productivities of (number of machines complementary with) skilled and unskilled
workers are the same as in that more detailed model.
Finally, I assume that factors of production are inelastically supplied. This
is consistent with my goal of understanding the relative physical productivities
of skilled and unskilled workers, and general features of the production function
across countries, at a particular point in time. The problem of how relative physi-
cal productivities and the supply of skilled and unskilled workers evolve is left for
future research.
The economy is at an equilibrium if all firms maximize profit and the markets
for skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital, clear. Caselli and Coleman (2006)
show that if 1 > η
1−η , an equilibrium always exists with the following features: The
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equilibrium is symmetric, in the sense that all firms choose the same proportion of
machines complementary to skilled workers (same relative physical productivity
of skilled workers), µj, and the same factor ratios, Lsjhj/kj and Luj /kj. Otherwise,
the equilibrium is asymmetric, with some firms using only skilled labour with
µj = 1 , and others using only unskilled labour with µj = 0.10
A formal proof of the statement above is omitted because it is a specific form
of Proposition 1 in Caselli and Coleman (2006), specialized to the model presented
here in which firms face a linear technology frontier. The equilibrium has the
features described above because in general, the production function could exhibit
increasing returns to scale since firms choose the technology and inputs.
When 1 > η
1−η , the equilibrium is symmetric because it ensures that firms’
production functions do not exhibit increasing returns. Thus, all firms use some
quantities of skilled and unskilled labour in equilibrium. Intuitively, η governs
the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour, which is given
by 1
1−η . Hence, the condition for a symmetric equilibrium, 1 >
η
1−η , says that if
the elasticity of substitution is not too large, each firm would want to use a mix
of skilled and unskilled labour— so the equilibrium must be symmetric since all
firms are identical.11
The symmetric equilibrium with all firms employing a mix of skilled and un-
skilled labour is the empirically relevant case. The condition for a symmetric equi-
librium is always satisfied when the elasticity of substitution is less than 2, or
η < 1/2.12 Available evidence shows that the elasticity of substitution for skilled
and unskilled labour lies between 1 and 2, which places η between 0 and 1/2. Cic-
cone and Peri (2005) use exogenous changes in child labour and compulsory school-
ing laws across U.S. states, between 1950-1990, as instruments for changes in the
supply of skilled labour. They find that the elasticity of substitution lies between
1.2 and 2, with a preferred estimate of 1.5. Autor et al. (1998) also argue that the
elasticity of substitution is unlikely to lie outside of the [1, 2] range.
Choice of Appropriate Technology
The rest of the analyses focus on a symmetric equilibrium, with η < 1/2 or elastic-
ity of substitution less than 2. From the first order condition for firms in country j,
and differentiating with respect to µj, we find that the choice of relative physical
productivities and appropriate technology is determined by the relative supply of
skilled and unskilled workers:
10Note that the condition 1 > η1−η is the same as η < 1/2, and is the same as requiring that the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is less than 2.
11This can be seen more clearly when η < 0, skilled and unskilled labour are complements, and
the condition that 1 > η1−η is always satisfied. In this case, a firm must use a combination of skilled
and unskilled labour, and the equilibrium has to be symmetric.
12This condition shows up again below in the context of the slope of the relative (inverse) demand
for skilled labour.
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µj
1− µj =
[Lsjhj
Luj
]η/1−η
. (4.6)
For convenience, I also reproduce (4.3) which gives the skilled wage premium
in country j that comes from the first order conditions for skilled and unskilled
labour:
ωj ≡
wsjhj
wuj
=
[ µj
1− µj
]η[
hj
]η[Lsj
Luj
]η−1
. (4.3)
Equation (4.6) characterizes the appropriate choice of technologies, and optimal
physical productivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. When the
factors are substitutes (η > 0), choice of technologies will make the more abundant
factor more productive. In the earlier example using skilled and unskilled teach-
ers, (4.6) implies that if skilled and unskilled teachers are substitutes in grading
exams, then the more skilled teachers we have, the more firms use scanned exams
which make skilled teachers more productive. The reverse would be the case when
both types of labour are complements.
The intuition for the result above is similar to that in models of directed tech-
nical change and induced innovation (Acemoglu, 2002). To see this, I combine (4.3)
and (4.6) to get:
µj
1− µj =
wsjL
s
jhj
wuLuj
. (4.7)
Equation (4.7), which is also the income share of skilled workers relative to
unskilled workers, shows that that the fraction of machines complementary with
skilled workers is higher when the relative price of skilled workers rises, or their
relative supply rises.13 The ratio, wj
wu
is the “price effect,” which increases the sup-
ply of machines complementary to the relatively more expensive factor. The second
ratio, L
s
jhj
Luj
, is the “market-size effect,” which increases the supply of machines for
the relatively more abundant factor. From (4.3), we know that an increase in the
relative supply of skilled workers decreases the relative price of skilled workers;
so the price and market-size effects work in opposite directions.
In (4.6), the market-size effect dominates the price effect when skilled and un-
skilled workers are substitutes, because a greater availability of skilled workers
means that the firm is able to economize on the more expensive unskilled work-
ers by increasing the productivity (and employment) of skilled workers. When the
factors are complements, the choice of technologies will lead to more machines
complementary with the less abundant factor. This is because the firm cannot
easily substitute towards the relatively more abundant factor, and has to increase
the productivity of the more expensive (and scarce) factor.
The expression for the choice of appropriate technology in (4.6) is not particular
to the model presented here. It is equivalent to those in the induced innovation
13Also see Kennedy (1964), who argues that innovations will be induced towards the factor with
the higher share of total costs.
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models of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Acemoglu (2002), when a dollar spent
on R&D for unskilled labour complementary machines produces the same num-
ber of machines as a dollar of R&D spent on skilled complementary machines.14
The model presented here also assumes there is limited state dependence so that
the cost of R&D in skilled complementary machines does not vary with previous
discoveries of such machines. The evidence on this issue is scant; on one hand, it
could be that as a result of externalities, the greater the number of researchers
working on producing skilled complementary machines, the greater the probabil-
ity of success. On the other hand, others may argue that with a lot of skilled
complementary machines, it becomes increasingly more difficult to produce an ad-
ditional variety. In the absence of strong evidence on either side, the approach here
effectively assumes that the marginal cost of producing both types of machines are
equal.
Next, consider the general effect of the relative supply of skilled labour on the
skilled wage premium, which is obtained by substituting (4.6) into (4.3):
ωj ≡
wsjhj
wuj
=
[
hj
] η
1−η
[Lsj
Luj
] 2η−1
1−η
. (4.8)
From (4.8), we see that as long as η < 1/2, and holding the quality of hu-
man capital fixed, the relative demand for skilled labour is downward sloping.
Recall that this is the same condition which guarantees the existence of a sym-
metric equilibrium. Even with firms choosing inputs and production techniques,
the model is consistent with cross-country estimates showing the skill premium
decreases with the proportion of skilled workers.
Next, I explain how equations (4.3) and (4.4), combined with (4.6), can be used
to solve for embodied human capital, and the relative physical productivity of
skilled workers across countries.
4.3 Quantitative Framework
Using equations (4.3) and (4.4), combined with (4.6), I can solve for the physical
productivity of skilled relative to unskilled workers for all countries for which
there are estimates of returns to education, and estimates of returns to education
for its immigrants in the U.S. The U.S. is used as the base country because of
available estimates of the returns to education for immigrants to the U.S.
From the expression for the wage premium in (4.8), the average quality of
skilled workers in the U.S., h¯U.S. (the average for natives and immigrants), can
be derived using the average skilled premium, and the proportion of skilled and
unskilled workers:15
14See to equation (21) in Acemoglu (2002). The reader may also compare the expression for the
wage premium to that in equation (22) of the aforementioned paper.
15In practice, the estimate of the average human capital in the U.S. is not different from the aver-
age human capital of an American native. This is because estimates of the average skill premium
in the U.S. are not significantly different from estimates of the skill premium for American born
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ω¯U.S. ≡ w
s
U.S.h¯U.S.
wuU.S.
=
[
h¯U.S.
] η
1−η
[LsU.S.
LuU.S.
] 2η−1
1−η
. (4.9)
Next, I assume that firms in the U.S. choose their mix of physical productivities
according to (4.6):
µU.S.
1− µU.S. =
[LsU.S.h¯U.S.
LuU.S.
]η/1−η
. (4.10)
Thus, firms in the U.S. choose technologies, appropriately, to match the propor-
tion of skilled workers, where h¯U.S. is the average quality of skilled workers in the
U.S. (natives and immigrants combined). There are three primary reasons why it
is plausible that the U.S. chooses its technologies appropriately. The status of the
U.S. as the richest large country makes it plausible that firms in the U.S. choose
technologies appropriately. If technological choices were inappropriate in the U.S.,
the country should not have been as successful as it has been.16 Further, the tra-
ditional role of the U.S. as the world’s technology leader suggests that new tech-
nologies are being developed to match the needs of American firms as the primary
market for these technologies. Lastly, in the absence of any models, one would
intuitively assume that close to 100% of the technologies in the U.S. are comple-
mentary to skilled workers because the U.S. has very few unskilled workers. The
estimate of µU.S. I find using (4.10) is .99 which matches this simple intuition.
In comparison to related studies, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) assume that
firms in the U.S. choose technologies optimally, and all other countries are forced
to use the technology appropriate for the U.S. They motivate this assumption by
appealing to property rights and patent enforcement problems which deter the
development and adoption of technologies appropriate for low-income developing
countries, but not not high-income countries.17
Caselli and Coleman (2006) explain their finding that the relative productivity
of skilled workers is higher in rich countries, by appealing to the idea that (all)
countries choose their technologies appropriately. The authors then use a general
form of (4.6) to estimate the world technology frontier. The framework here as-
sumes that the technological choice of the U.S. is appropriate without placing a
restriction on the choice for other countries.
Given the physical productivity of skilled to unskilled workers in the U.S. from
(4.10) above, I can solve for the human capital embodied in skilled workers for all
other countries. These can be obtained from (4.4), which gives the expression for
the skill premium of foreign-born and foreign-educated workers in the U.S.18 The
individuals; probably a result of the fact that immigrants only constituted about 1 in 10 of the U.S.
labour force in 1990.
16I am grateful to a member of the audience at a talk I gave on this paper for pointing this out.
17As a preview to the results, it is worth noting that the estimates show that there are other high-
income countries choosing technologies appropriately (Canada, Australia and Japan, for example).
18The estimate of embodied human capital would be upward biased if only the most able skilled
workers get to emigrate. In Section 4.5.3, I show that such selection patterns do not affect the
main results of the paper.
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physical productivities of skilled relative to unskilled workers (choice of technolo-
gies) can be obtained from (4.3), which is the skill premium for individuals from
country j living in their countries of birth.
The strategy boils down to assuming that the U.S. is choosing its technology
appropriately, according to the model of appropriate technology described earlier.
I then solve for embodied human capital and physical productivity of skilled work-
ers for all other countries. These estimates are constructed to be consistent with
the skill premium for immigrants in the U.S. and natives in their home countries.
Data Construction
In order to solve for the relative physical productivity and human capital embodied
in skilled workers (µj and hj) using the steps described above, I need estimates of
the skill premium in the U.S., skill premiums for immigrants in the U.S., the skill
premium in country j, and the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers. For
ease of comparison, I try to be consistent with Caselli and Coleman (2006) when
constructing all variables.
The skill premium for a country with estimated annual return to education,
β, and years of schooling required to become skilled, n, is given by: exp(βn). Es-
timates of β used in constructing skill premiums for immigrants in the U.S. are
taken from estimates of the returns to schooling, by country of origin, published in
Schoellman (2012). The skill premium for all other countries are constructed us-
ing estimates of the returns to schooling published in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2004). I use estimates of the returns to schooling for immigrants from the 1990
U.S. census in order to match the time period for the estimates in Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos (2004)
A skilled worker is defined as an individual who has completed primary educa-
tion for the baseline analysis. The number of years it takes to complete primary
education is n = 4, which is the minimum for the countries in the dataset. Be-
sides ease of comparison with the previous literature, defining unskilled workers
as workers who are uneducated makes the measure of the human capital embod-
ied in skilled workers comparable across countries. Defining unskilled workers
as individuals who have not completed primary education makes it plausible that
they are the same across countries, with “raw labour power” the only human cap-
ital they posses. Thus, if hj > hi for countries i and j, not only can we say that
skilled workers in country j are of better quality than skilled workers in country i,
we can also say that skilled workers in country j have hj as much human capital
as unskilled workers in both countries i and j. Basically, the quality of workers
who have not completed primary schooling should not vary significantly across
countries, so the reference point for embodied human capital (the denominator) is
comparable.
Completing primary education is also preferable as the definition of skilled,
because as Caselli and Coleman (2006) argue, there are qualitative differences be-
tween a primary educated and an uneducated worker which makes them imperfect
substitutes. The completion of (a good) primary education endows an individual
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with the literate and numerical foundations needed for further education; a skill
not possessed by an uneducated individual. It could be argued that post-primary
education is just adding unto the foundations established by basic schooling. So
primary educated workers may be perfectly substitutable with secondary educated
workers. However, there are several tasks in which no number of illiterate (uned-
ucated) workers can replace one who is literate and has completed primary school-
ing. Notwithstanding the above considerations, for sensitivity, the analysis is also
performed with a secondary-completed definition of skilled.
I construct the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers following Caselli
and Coleman (2006), using an approach which would get the income share of
skilled relative to unskilled workers right. I sum up the proportion of workers
who belong to a given skill category, and weight additional years of education by
relative wages. For example, under the primary definition of skilled, everyone who
has not completed primary schooling is counted as unskilled; but those who have
ever been to primary school (but have not completed) will have more “efficiency
units” of human capital compared to those who have never been. The proportion
of unskilled workers will be the proportion of individuals who have never been to
primary school, plus the proportion of workers who have some primary education
(but not completed) multiplied by their relative wage, exp(β2), where 2 years is
half of a primary education.19 Unskilled workers are the same across countries
since the base group is defined as those who have never been to school.
Similarly, for skilled workers, primary completed workers are the base group,
and individuals who have attained but not completed secondary education will
have more efficiency units of human capital than the base group. Their efficiency
units over the base group is the skill premium consistent with half the number
of years it takes to complete secondary schooling. Secondary educated workers
will have efficiency units over the base group equal to the skill premium consis-
tent with the number of years it takes to complete secondary education, and so on
for higher levels of education. Due to the fact that the number of years it takes
to to compete primary education varies across countries, the proportion of skilled
workers is multiplied by exp(β(nj − 4)). Where nj is the length of time it takes
to complete primary education in country j, and the adjustment converts all mea-
sures of the proportion of skilled into 4-year equivalents. So the base group for
skilled workers are individuals who have completed 4 years of schooling.
Data for the proportion of workers (25+) in each education category, for the
year 1985, is taken from the latest release of the Barro-Lee dataset published in
Barro and Lee (2010). Data on the length of time it takes to complete primary and
secondary schooling is taken from Barro and Lee (1996), and for college education,
I use data from UNESCO (2012). Data for output per capita, y, and the capital
stock per capita, k, are taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2012).
19The number 2 in the expression is half the number of years it takes to complete a basic educa-
tion. Workers who have attained, but have not completed, a given level of education are assumed
to have half the number of years required to complete that level of education. I also experimented
with lumping these workers into the lower education category, but the results do not vary signifi-
cantly.
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Lastly, I take values of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and un-
skilled workers, η, from estimates provided by Ciccone and Peri (2005). As I
mentioned earlier, they find the elasticity of substitution for skilled and unskilled
labour to lie between 1.2 and 2. I use an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4 for
the analysis below, and explore the implication of elasticities of substitution equal
to 1.2, 1.6, 1.8, and 2.20 I set the capital share of output equal to 1/3, which is con-
sistent with Gollin (2002), who finds that the capital-output share does not vary
with income.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Physical Productivity and Human Capital Relative to
U.S.
I focus on results for a degree of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour
equal to 1.4 as in Caselli and Coleman (2006), unless stated otherwise. The results
show significant cross-country variation in relative physical productivities (tech-
nology choice) and human capital embodied in skilled workers. Table 4.1 summa-
rizes the physical productivity and human capital embodied in skilled workers for
the countries in the data relative to the U.S., under various definitions of skilled
labour. For these results, I do not assume that the U.S. is choosing its physical
productivities appropriately. I use skill premiums for immigrants relative to U.S.
natives to solve for embodied human capital relative to U.S natives. I then use
this ratio, and the skill premiums for immigrants relative to natives of their home
countries, to compute physical productivities relative to the U.S.
Table 4.1: Physical Productivity and Embodied Human Capital
Skilled Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. C.o.V. Corry
Embodied Human Capital Relative to U.S.
Primary 49 .86 .09 .11 .46
Secondary 49 .71 .18 .25 .46
College 49 .61 .23 .38 .47
Physical Productivities Relative to U.S.
Primary 49 .03 .15 4.30 .32
Secondary 49 .03 .14 4.76 .24
College 49 .18 .46 2.52 -.022
The average human capital embodied in skilled workers, for all countries in
the data, is about 86% of the U.S. level under the primary-educated definition of
20Most studies use the high school-college as measures of skilled-unskilled labour, but in this
paper, I use the uneducated-primary completed distinction. It is reasonable to believe that the
elasticity of substitution between an illiterate and educated worker is even less than that between
a high school and college educated worker, and lower values in the [1.2, 2] range are more plausible.
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skilled. There is significant variation in the human capital embodied in skilled
workers, even among high-income countries. Skilled workers in Portugal em-
body about about 70% of the human capital embodied in an American worker,
and skilled workers in France embody about 105% of the U.S. level.
The variation in embodied human capital (labour quality) also increases with
the secondary and college-competed definitions of skilled; the coefficient of varia-
tion jumps from .11 for the primary-educated definition of skilled, to .38 for the
college-educated definition. The last column of Table 4.1 show that, relative to the
U.S. level, the human capital embodied in skilled workers strongly increases with
GDP irrespective of the definition of skilled labour. The correlation coefficient is
.46. This is consistent with other studies which find the quality of skilled labour
increases with output (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Erosa et al., 2010; Manuelli
and Seshadri, 2005).
A summary of the ratio of skilled-unskilled worker physical productivity, rela-
tive to the U.S, is shown in the second part of Table 4.1. An interesting finding is
that the relative physical productivity of skilled workers is higher for the college
educated definition of skilled. This could be explained by the finding that cross-
country productivity gaps are larger in agriculture, compared to non-agriculture,
where most college educated workers are employed (Gollin et al., 2011). Thus, the
skilled workers that are relatively less productive in low-income countries are not
the most-educated, but those with intermediate levels of education.
It could also be true that cross-country productivity gaps are larger in sectors
employing relatively more unskilled workers in developing countries, as Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001) find. Acemoglu and Zilibotti interpret this as evidence that
low-income countries adopt technologies, from high-income countries, which are
complementary with highly skilled workers. Further evidence that technologies
are more uniform (do not vary with income), at the college-educated level, can be
seen from the last column of Table 4.1 which shows that college-educated physical
productivity is uncorrelated with output across countries.
However, at the primary and secondary-completed definitions of skilled, there
is significant variation in the physical productivity of skilled workers relative to
the U.S.. High-income countries tend to use skilled workers more productively rel-
ative to unskilled workers, even after controlling for the human capital embodied
in skilled workers. Thus, the analyses from here on will focus on the primary and
secondary completed definitions of skilled, with greater emphasis on the primary-
completed definition.
Also note that most of the cross-country differences in skill premiums are a
result of differences in physical productivities. Under the primary educated def-
inition of skilled for example, the human capital embodied in skilled workers is,
on average, about 86% of the U.S.level. Compare this to the average ratio of the
physical productivity of skilled to unskilled workers being only about 3% of the
U.S. level. Table 4.1 suggests that cross-country differences in embodied human
capital are not very large in comparison to differences in physical productivities,
and this is confirmed in the next part of the analysis.
Next, I present results using insights from the model of appropriate technol-
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ogy to solve for the physical productivity of skilled workers in the U.S., and then
physical productivities for all other countries.
4.4.2 Physical Productivity and Embodied Human Capital
Assuming the U.S. chooses the physical productivity of skilled labour relative to
unskilled labour, as in (4.6), I can compute levels of the physical productivity and
quality of skilled labour for all other countries. The U.S. level of physical produc-
tivity, µU.S., equals .99. This is interpreted as saying that 99% of all machines in
the U.S. are complementary with skilled workers. The result makes intuitive sense
because we expect that almost all machines in the U.S. have to be complementary
with skilled workers since almost all workers in the U.S. are skilled under the
primary-completed definition. This is especially true since the U.S. is considered
the world technology leader.
I find that the physical productivity and human capital embodied in skilled
workers increases with per-capita income. Furthermore, the basic finding that
skilled workers are relatively more productive in high income countries in Caselli
and Coleman (2006) remains true after accounting for differences in embodied
human capital. However, the gap in physical productivities across countries is
now smaller, because some of the differences in the relative productivity of skilled
workers is now accounted for by differences in embodied human capital.
Figure 4.1: Physical Productivity of Skilled Workers and Output (Primary)
Figure 4.1 plots the physical productivity of skilled workers, µj, against output
in logarithmic scale, for various values of the elasticity of substitution for skilled
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and unskilled workers (1.4, 1.2, 1.6, 1.8). It is clear that for all plausible values
of the elasticity of substitution, the physical productivity of skilled workers, rel-
ative to unskilled workers increases with output. High-income countries tend to
adopt proportionally more machines which are complementary with skilled work-
ers, and low-income countries adopt proportionally more machines complementary
with unskilled labour. This result goes against the common idea that low-income
countries may be unproductive because they adopt machines complementary with
skilled workers, but not the unskilled workers who are abundant in these coun-
tries. All countries do not adopt the same production techniques, and Caselli and
Wilson (2004) provide evidence that types of machines imported in different coun-
tries varies with skill level.
Figure 4.2: Embodied Human Capital and Output (Primary)
The estimates also show that the human capital embodied in skilled workers
is higher in high-income countries. Figure 4.2 plots (the log of) embodied human
capital against the log of output. Again, for all plausible values of the elasticity of
substitution, embodied human capital is increasing in output. Thus high-income
countries have better skilled labour quality, and use production techniques which
make skilled workers relatively more productive.
Estimates of physical productivity and embodied human capital increase with
income, because if physical productivities and embodied human capital are as-
sumed to be the same across countries, (4.3) predicts very low skill premiums in
high-income countries. To match observed skill premiums, the model implies that
skill-abundant (high-income) countries must have more embodied human capital,
or be relatively more physically productive with skilled workers. Recall that for
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any given country, the human capital embodied in its skilled workers is chosen to
match the estimate of the skill premium of its natives who are living in the U.S.
Then the physical productivity of its skilled workers is chosen to the match the
average skill-premium in that country, given embodied human capital.
In order to match higher skill premiums for immigrants from high-income
countries, it must be that they have more embodied human capital. However,
the higher human capital embodied in skilled workers from high-income countries
does not completely explain why observed skill premiums in high-income (skill-
abundant) countries are high. Hence, to match the average skill premium in these
countries, it must be that the relative physical productivity of skilled workers is
also higher. This explains why the data implies that the physical productivity and
human capital embodied in skilled workers must be increasing with output. Fig-
ures 4.11 and 4.12 show the same results for the secondary-completed definition
of skilled.
It is interesting that rich countries have higher proportions of skilled workers,
use skilled workers more physically productively relative to unskilled workers,
and also have a higher quality of skilled workers. One might expect that the
quality and quantity of skilled workers may be substitutes, or that the relative
physical productivity of skilled workers may be substitutable with worker quality.
These results call for a framework for understanding why the quantity, quality,
and physical productivity of skilled workers are all complementary and increase
with income.
At this stage, one might wonder whether the estimates of embodied human
capital and physical productivities are consistent with other data. In order to
test the validity of the model in terms of skill premiums, I investigate how the
results match observed skill premiums for immigrants from different countries
in Canada. I compute predicted skill premiums for natives of different countries
living in Canada using estimates of the relative physical productivity of skilled
workers and the observed skilled-unskilled labour ratio in Canada, combined with
estimates of the human capital embodied in skilled workers for natives of different
countries. The predicted skill premiums are then compared to those estimated
from the data taken from Schoellman (2012).
The results are displayed in Figure 4.3 for all 3 definitions of skilled labour.
The Figure plots predicted skill premiums against those estimated from the data,
using an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4. For all countries for which there
are estimates of the skill premium in both Canada and the U.S., the model does a
very good job of matching observed skill premiums in Canada, with Poland being
an exception.21 The correlation coefficient is around .85 for all 3 definitions of
skilled labour, and does not vary greatly using different elasticities of substitution.
I believe this speaks to the validity of using (4.3) as a model of skill premiums
across countries, and also the validity of using returns to education for natives of
21The skill premium does not exactly match observed returns for native-born Canadians in
Canada, because the physical productivity of skilled workers was chosen to match average returns
in Canada.
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different countries residing in a given country in order to understand differences
in skilled labour quality.
Figure 4.3: Predicted Skill Premiums in Canada
Clockwise: Primary, Secondary, College
4.4.3 Appropriateness of Observed Relative Productivities
In summary, rich countries use skilled labour more efficiently relative to unskilled
labour. Caselli and Coleman (2006) interpret this finding as indicating that coun-
tries choose technologies which are appropriate for the composition of their work-
force. Next, I examine the estimates more closely and ask whether the estimated
physical productivities of skilled and unskilled workers are appropriate.
Looking at the estimates for physical productivities across countries, it is un-
likely all countries are choosing the appropriate mix of skilled-unskilled labour
complementary technologies. For example, the estimate for the physical produc-
tivity of skilled workers in Ghana, µj, is equal to .02. This could be interpreted
as saying that in 1990 Ghana, only 2% of all machines are complementary with
skilled workers, or that unskilled workers are more physically productive than the
skilled by a factor of 50. This situation is unlikely to be appropriate since Ghana
has roughly the same number of skilled and unskilled workers over the same time
period; the skilled-unskilled worker ratio is 1.07 (see Table 4.4). Venezuela is an-
other example: in 1990, only 1% of machines are relatively complementary with
skilled workers, and unskilled workers are more physically productive by a factor
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of 100. Just as in Ghana, Venezuela also has an equal share of skilled to unskilled
workers, so it is unlikely that one factor being 100 times more physically produc-
tive is appropriate.
The situation in Ghana and Venezuela is prevalent in many low-income coun-
tries in the data, and suggests that because skilled workers embody more human
capital and are substitutable with unskilled workers, Ghana and Venezuela could
increase output by increasing the physical productivity of skilled workers rela-
tive to the unskilled (leaving aggregate productivity A the same). To formally
investigate the appropriateness of technology choices, I compute the physical pro-
ductivity of skilled workers for all countries, assuming they choose the proportion
of machines complementary with (physical productivities of) each labour type ac-
cording to equation (4.6).
The exercise here is to fix the technology frontier available to each country (A),
and search for a different point on the frontier (µ) which would increase output.
The exercise is not trivial since increasing the physical productivity of one factor
also decreases the physical productivity of the other. I assume that the frontier is
linear, so that countries are able to choose any fraction of skilled-unskilled workers
complementary machines. So a firm can have 98 workers storing files electroni-
cally, and 2 storing files manually if need be. In contrast, Caselli and Coleman
(2006) assume that countries choose technologies appropriately, and then use the
equilibrium equations to estimate what their technology frontiers must be. As I
have argued using examples from Ghana and Venezuela, and coupled with what
we know regarding barriers to technology adoption in some countries, it is unlikely
that the estimated physical productivities are appropriate.22
I primarily report results for the preferred definition of skilled, which is
primary-educated workers, and elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4. I also ex-
plore the implications of other values of the elasticity of substitution.23 The main
result is that just as in Ghana and Venezuela, several countries use skilled work-
ers relatively unproductively; more than 75% of all countries are far away from
their optimal mix of skilled-unskilled productivities as computed from (4.6).
Figure 4.4 plots the (log of) optimal relative physical productivity of skilled
workers against output. As might be expected, high-income countries are sup-
posed to be using technologies which are relatively complementary to skilled work-
ers, who are more abundant in those countries. High income and skill-abundant
22The exact form of the technology frontier is not crucial for the results that follow. While the
true form of the frontier is important for finding the appropriate production technique, the message
here is that current production techniques in many countries are inappropriate. Inappropriate in
the sense that regardless of the form of the technology frontier, Ghana could increase income per
capita by using the ratio of skilled-unskilled worker complementary technologies used in Ecuador
or Greece, leaving the total number of machines the same. In fact, the poorest countries in the data
would increase output by using the mix of skilled-unskilled worker technologies in use by Greece,
and increasing the physical productivity of skilled workers relative to the unskilled. The fact that
these techniques are being used in other countries means that it is possible, so the question is why
are they not being used in Ghana, Kenya and other low-income countries?
23These results also hold for the secondary-educated definition of skilled, so for the sake of
brevity, these results are omitted.
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countries such as the U.S., Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), United Kingdom
(GBR) should be using similar production techniques. On the other hand, coun-
tries such as Bolivia (BOL), Colombia (COL), and Peru (PER) should also be using
similar production techniques, consistent with their level of economic development
and skill endowment.
Figure 4.4: Optimal Physical Productivity and Output
Figure 4.5 plots the estimated physical productivity of skilled workers against
optimal physical productivities. It shows that the estimated physical productivity
of skilled workers increases with optimal productivity. However, the figure reveals
substantial differences in optimal-estimated physical productivities. If all coun-
tries were using their skilled workers optimally, estimated physical productivities
would lie on the (45◦) line, which is clearly not the case as most countries lie below
the line. Thus a lot of countries use inappropriate technologies which make skilled
workers too unproductive, and unskilled workers too productive. For more than
half of the 49 countries in the dataset, the physical productivity of skilled workers
is less than twice what it should be if chosen by profit maximizing firms.
For example, given the proportion of skilled workers in Thailand, profit-
maximizing firms would allocate 87% of all machines to skilled workers. But the
estimated physical productivity of skilled workers that is consistent with the skill
premium in Thailand and individuals from Thailand living in the U.S., is just
.01. Thailand would increase its output (and aggregate productivity) by using
skilled workers more productively, and reducing the physical productivity of the
unskilled.
The degree of the inappropriateness of estimated technologies can also be seen
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Figure 4.5: Optimal versus Estimated Physical Productivity
Note: The line above the data points is a 45◦ line, the x-axis has been truncated.
by comparing the ranges of the optimal and estimated physical productivity of
skilled workers in Figure 4.5. Estimated physical productivities range from -7 to -
.01 in log-scale (µ ranges from .01 to .99), while optimal relative productivities only
range from -.15 to -.01 (optimal µ ranges from .86 to .99). Countries are very simi-
lar in the optimal physical productivity of skilled workers, which is not surprising
since the cross-country variation in the proportion of primary educated workers
is not large. The cross-country variance in optimal physical productivities is con-
sistent with the variance in the the cross-country proportion of primary-educated
workers, but the variance in estimated physical productivities is comparatively
too large.
Regular notions of inappropriate technology, as it relates to factor intensities,
argue that some countries adopt technologies from high skilled countries which
are complementary with skilled workers, but not the vast number of unskilled
workers in these countries (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), and Basu and Weil
(1998), for examples). In the framework here, under the regular notion of inap-
propriateness, one would argue that low-skilled countries use technologies which
are appropriate for the U.S labour force, for example. Such a choice of technol-
ogy is also inappropriate, as it would use skilled workers too productively, and the
large numbers of unskilled workers unproductively. The result here is the opposite
of the regular story of inappropriate technology; after controlling for the human
capital embodied in skilled workers, several countries use too many technologies
which are complementary with unskilled workers, and skilled workers are used
relatively unproductively. Under the preferred calibration, in no case do I find a
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country using skilled workers too productively. Uncovering this result does depend
on controlling for the human capital embodied in skilled workers.
Figure 4.6 shows the optimal-estimated physical productivity relationship
without controlling for cross-country differences in the human capital embodied
in skilled workers. One would conclude from the picture that most countries are
using appropriate technologies, because most countries are in, or around, the 45◦
line. The approach here disentangles embodied human capital from physical pro-
ductivity, which leads to the finding of inappropriate technology. Evidence from
estimates of immigrant returns to education and studies using test scores do show
significant variation in the quality of skilled workers, and provides justification
for the approach.
Figure 4.6: Optimal versus Estimated (No Embodied Human Capital Control)
Note: The line above the data points is a 45◦ line, the x-axis has been truncated.
Furthermore, note that the U.S. is not the only country using its appropriate
technology as was assumed from the outset. As may be seen from Figure 4.5,
a simple t-test cannot reject that countries such as South Korea (KOR), Japan
(JPN), Australia (AUS) and the Netherlands (NLD), are using appropriate tech-
nologies. Thus, we would obtain the same results if we assumed, instead, that any
one of the above countries are choosing the physical productivity of skilled work-
ers appropriately. There does not appear to be anything particularly special about
the assumption that the U.S. is using its skilled and unskilled workers optimally.
A simple t-test would also reject the hypothesis that all countries are using
appropriate technologies. Further, given the significant differences in optimal and
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estimated relative productivities, assuming appropriateness would overstate the
skill premium for individuals living in their home countries. Take Thailand for ex-
ample, if we assumed skilled workers were used appropriately, the skill premium
for natives living in Thailand would be more than 5, whereas it is only 1.6 in the
data. Using a combination of the skill premium for emigrants and natives dis-
ciplines estimates of the human capital capital embodied in skilled workers, and
physical productivities.
Figure 4.7 compares the optimal and estimated physical productivities of
skilled workers under different skilled-unskilled labour elasticities of substitution.
With the exception of very high elasticities of substitution, when the elasticity of
substitution is greater than or equal to 2 or η ≥ 1/2, the result that most countries
use skilled workers relatively unproductively holds. As already explained earlier,
such high elasticities are implausible, but it is worth exploring why the result is
overturned in those cases.
Figure 4.7: Optimal versus Estimated (Other Elasticities)
Note: The line above the data points is a 45◦ line, the x-axis has been truncated.
With very high elasticities of substitution, differences in skilled-unskilled
worker ratios do not matter for the skill premium. So the higher skill premium
in developing countries is not due to the scarcity of skilled workers, but a result
of relatively more productive skilled workers. With high elasticities and increas-
ing returns to scale, firms would like to use only one type of labour. Therefore, to
rationalize the high skill-premiums and presence of skilled workers in skill-scarce
countries, it must be that skilled workers there are relatively very productive.
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However, very high elasticities of substitution are not consistent with evidence on
the behaviour of the skill premium in response to changes in skilled labour en-
dowments.24 They are inconsistent with the observation that the skill premium
declines with the skilled-unskilled labour ratio.
4.4.4 Patterns of Technology Adoption and Income Differ-
ences
I interpret the patterns uncovered above as patterns of technology adoption. Skill-
abundant countries adopt technologies which increase the relative productivity
of abundant skilled labour, and skill-scarce countries adopt technologies which
increase the relative productivity of unskilled workers. In addition, I also find
that several countries are using skilled workers inefficiently. In this section, I
investigate how patterns of technology adoption, that is differences between esti-
mated and optimal relative productivities of skilled workers, are related to GDP
per capita.
Figure 4.8 plots output (GDP per capita) in 1990 against the difference between
optimal and estimated physical productivity of skilled workers (in logs). We see
that poorer countries tend to be further away from their optimal mix of physical
productivities. The correlation coefficient is high at about -.64. The inefficient use
of skilled workers, but not unskilled workers, in low income countries can account
for some of the variation in cross-country aggregate productivity.
Figure 4.9 shows the relationship between output, and the difference between
optimal and estimated physical productivity of skilled workers under different val-
ues of the elasticity of substitution. The relationship remains strongly negative
until we get to higher elasticity values. Now, we find that poorer countries use
skilled labour too well and use unskilled workers too poorly. Again, even though
these high values of the elasticity of substitution are inconsistent with other data,
they still indicate that poorer countries systematically use inappropriate technolo-
gies. The implication is that in several countries, an increase in the physical pro-
ductivity of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, without any change in
inputs, could lead to significant gains in income per capita.
Using the production function in (4.5), I compute GDP-per-capita for all coun-
tries using the estimated relative productivity of skilled workers obtained in Sec-
tion 4.2, and the optimal relative productivity of skilled workers computed from
(4.6). In all cases, I compute the increase in income relative to the U.S. when the
country uses skilled and unskilled workers optimally. Note that in this calcula-
tion, the aggregate TFP term, A, and all inputs, are held constant. Only the value
of the physical productivity of skilled relative to unskilled workers, µj, changes.
Figure 4.10 plots the income gain from the adoption of appropriate technologies
against GDP-per-capita in 1990 relative the U.S., under different values of the
elasticity of substitution. There are three striking findings: income gains from the
24See Blum (2010) for cross-country evidence, and Acemoglu (2002), and Ciccone and Peri (2005)
for time-series evidence from the U.S.
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Figure 4.8: Output and Estimated-Optimal Skilled Productivity Gap
Figure 4.9: Output and Estimated-Optimal Gap (Other Elasticities)
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adoption of appropriate technologies are large, the gains decline with GDP relative
to the U.S., and the gains decline with the elasticity of substitution.
Figure 4.10: Income Gains From Using Appropriate Technology
Under the preferred calibration, many countries can increase per capita in-
comes by a factor of 4, from their 1990 levels, simply by using skilled workers rel-
atively more efficiently. These countries include Thailand, China, Kenya, Ghana,
Pakistan, and Brazil, amongst several others. These are large and significant
gains to income given that there are no changes to inputs and the technology fron-
tier.
Table 4.2 breaks down the gains from appropriate technologies by income quar-
tile. Under the primary completed definition of skilled, the average country in the
dataset could increase its per capita income by a factor of 2, by increasing the effi-
ciency of skilled labour relative to unskilled labour. More than half of all countries
in the dataset could increase per-capita incomes by an average factor of 4.
There is significant variation across income groups. Countries in the lowest
income quartile increase income by a factor of 7 by using appropriate technolo-
gies. Gains decline monotonically across income groups, with countries in the top
income quartile, only experiencing a 23% increase in income by adopting appro-
priate technologies, and this mostly driven by the significant gains accruing to
France.
Gains from adopting appropriate technologies decline with per-capita income
because the difference between optimal and estimated physical productivity of
skilled workers decreases with per-capita income, and poorer countries have a
large proportion of workers who have completed primary education. High-income
countries have a large proportion of skilled workers, but since they are estimated
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Table 4.2: Gains to Using Appropriate Technology
Quartile/Elasticity 1.4 1.2 1.6
Primary Educated
1 7.64 89.54 1.38
2 4.81 33.74 1.24
3 2.82 5.72 1.19
4 1.23 3.18 1.12
Average Country 1.88 4.67 1.18
Secondary Educated
1 1.71 12.52 1.13
2 1.75 29.29 1.02
3 1.94 13.48 1.10
4 1.34 2.58 1.15
Average Country 1.53 4.28 1.11
to be relatively close to their optimal choice of technologies, the gains to improving
the relative productivity of skilled workers are smaller.
Gains from using appropriate technologies decrease with the elasticity of sub-
stitution. With lower elasticities, skilled and unskilled workers are not very sub-
stitutable, so output losses are greater if skilled workers are not being used effi-
ciently. Therefore, gains to moving to the optimal level of technology will be larger
(see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.10). On the other hand, with larger elasticities, skilled
and unskilled workers are more substitutable, and the fact that skilled workers
are not being used as efficiently as they could be, does not translate to large losses
in per-capita income. A similar picture emerges under the secondary-completed
definition of skilled workers, as shown in Table 4.2. More than three-quarters of
all countries can increase per-capita income by a factor of 2 by adopting appro-
priate technologies. However, in this case, the gains do not decline with initial
per-capita income. Even though low-income countries are further behind their op-
timal technological choices, income gains are not larger compared to higher income
countries because in 1990 they do not have a very large proportion of secondary-
educated workers. High-income countries on the other hand, while being closer
to their optimal choice of technologies, have a relatively larger proportion of sec-
ondary educated workers, which translates into income gains similar to lower-
income countries.
To summarize, low income countries tend to be farther away from their appro-
priate choice of technology. Hence, there are large income gains if they use skilled
workers relatively more productively; gains as large as seven-fold increases in in-
come per capita for countries in the lowest income quartile. Next, I discuss some
possible interpretations for the patterns of technology adoption uncovered here,
and how they may be related to other findings in the growth and development
literature.
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4.5 Discussion
In this section, I briefly provide some interpretations for the above findings and
related them to other evidence on the development and growth experience of low-
income countries. I also discuss how the results change with estimates of the
returns to education, which are used in computing the skill premium.
4.5.1 Interpretation of Findings
Barriers to Adoption
The most straightforward interpretation of the finding of “inappropriately back-
ward” technologies, in most low-income countries, is that it is evidence of signif-
icant barriers to technology adoption in the spirit of Parente and Prescott (1994,
1999). This barrier specifically affects skilled workers. This could be the case in a
world in which “traditional” technologies tend to be complementary with unskilled
workers, and recent technologies that are primarily developed in richer economies
are complementary with skilled workers. Then barriers to the adoption of new
technologies would adversely affect the physical productivity of skilled workers
relative to the unskilled.
A report on the Indian economy, by McKinsey (2001), documents the inefficient
use of factors of production in several industries. The authors find that it would be
profitable for most firms to adopt the latest technologies, but many firms do not do
this and operate significantly below optimal scale. They conclude that most firms
use inappropriate technologies, consistent with the findings in this paper. Evi-
dence that non-adoption of the latest techniques primarily affects skilled workers
lies in their finding that in the apparel industry (one of many such industries),
most of the non-adopting firms are unskilled “mom-and-pop” shops.
How are these barriers sustained? Evidence points to a combination of gov-
ernment protection and regulation in an environment where groups of unskilled
workers are better able to organize themselves, and block the adoption of supe-
rior technologies which would make them relatively more unproductive (Bridgman
et al., 2007; Bellettini and Ottaviano, 2005). In the context of India, small-scale
tailor shops could organize and block the establishment of large-scale garment
shops, which are noted as adopters of best technological practices in the McKinsey
study. Recent protests, backed by small-scale firms, against Walmart’s entry into
the Indian retail market provides more evidence of a group of workers blocking
the adoption of more efficient technologies (Pradhan and MacAskill, 2011).
The lack of supporting infrastructure could also pose a barrier to the adoption
of the latest production techniques. The energy intensity of the several production
techniques may prevent low-income countries, who do not produce enough energy,
from adopting these technologies. For example, in 1990, energy consumption per
person was just about 250 kWh in Ghana and 125 kWh in Kenya. These num-
bers are very small compared to per-capita energy consumption of 12,000 kWh in
the U.S, and 9,000 kWh in Australia (The World Bank, 2012). The United States
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produces over 40 times as much energy per person compared to Ghana, a number
which is strikingly similar to the physical productivity of skilled workers in the
United States relative to Ghana (see Table 4.4). The cost of adopting more skilled
worker complementary, but energy intensive, production techniques in Ghana
could pose a significant barrier to adoption. Other barriers include the presence of
financial frictions that prevent firms from achieving optimal scale (Banerjee and
Duflo, 2004; Buera and Shin, 2010).
Misallocation
An interrelated interpretation of the finding is that it reflects the misallocation of
resources in developing countries. Evidence of severe misallocation of resources
are documented in Banerjee and Duflo (2005). For example, it is well known
that productivity in agriculture, which employs a significant portion of the labour
force in many countries, is significantly lower than productivity in non-agriculture
(Gollin et al., 2011; Restuccia et al., 2008). A variety of government land policies,
documented in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2013), could also keep some skilled
workers in agriculture where they are relatively unproductive. Vollrath (2009)
finds that a reallocation of workers from agriculture to non-agriculture could lead
to significant gains in income.
Misallocation of skilled workers could also arise from government policies tar-
geting skilled workers. Assaad (1997) documents the effects of a government pol-
icy in Egypt guaranteeing employment to every college-educated worker. Due to
the relatively large size of the public sector, this leads to a long queue for skilled
workers waiting for their chance at a government job. This could mean the em-
ployment of a large number of skilled workers in a sector in which they are not as
productive as they could otherwise be.
Education Externality
The result that rich countries have a higher proportion of skilled workers, higher
labour quality and use skilled workers more productively, could be taken as evi-
dence of externalities to education as in the endogenous growth models of Lucas
(1988) and Romer (1986). Thus, a skilled worker would be more productive in the
presence of other skilled workers. While there are likely externalities to education,
the available evidence does not point to them being very large.
For example, to explain the 10-fold difference between the physical productivity
of a skilled worker in the U.S. compared to one in Thailand, externalities would
have to be more than 10 times the private return to education. The evidence on
externalities to education show that externalities are not that large. Rauch (1993)
finds externalities of about 3% to 5% for skilled workers, which is inferred from
differences in the proportion of skilled across U.S. cities. Acemoglu and Angrist
(1999) study the cross-state variation in U.S. compulsory schooling laws, and find
externalities to education of less than 1%.
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Over-investment in Education
A related concern is that governments in developing countries have over-invested
in education, relative to available technology. Thus, it is not that there are bar-
riers to education, but that the growth in the proportion of skilled workers has
outpaced the capacity of firms to adopt appropriate technologies. In the exercise of
Section 4.3, there would also be an increase in income for many countries from an
increase in the supply of unskilled workers, relative to the skilled. The decline in
schooling quality associated with the rapid schooling expansion in several devel-
oping countries is often cited as evidence of over-expansion in schooling (Glewwe
and Kremer, 2006).
However, there are no large high-income economies with low proportions of
skilled workers. This points to schooling and the adoption of appropriate tech-
nologies as being prerequisites to achieving higher incomes. Hence, the relevant
question should be why the increase in the quantity of skilled workers in several
low-income countries has not translated into higher incomes? The results in this
paper point to the relatively unproductive use of skilled workers as an answer.
4.5.2 Relative wages and Relative Productivities
Differences in cross-country labour market institutions may sever the relation-
ship between relative wages and relative productivities. For example, the skill
premium may be smaller in countries with more egalitarian labour markets even
when relative productivities are not. Strictly speaking, nothing can be said about
relative physical productivities across countries if wages do not reflect productiv-
ity. In this section, I discuss what deviations from competitive labour markets,
if any, imply for my estimates of cross-country skilled-worker physical productiv-
ities. I find that while there are significant differences in labour market institu-
tions across countries, they do not necessarily imply a break in the link between
productivity and wages. Further, the key patterns in the estimates of physical
productivities between low and high income countries cannot be explained by dif-
ferences in labour market institutions.
I begin with a discussion of how differences in labour market institutions be-
tween low and high-income countries may affect the patterns of relative physical
productivities estimated from information on relative wages. Keep in mind that
the focus of the study is on differences between low and high-income countries.
Low-Income and High-Income Country Labour Markets Recall that the
estimates imply that relative to unskilled workers, skilled workers are less physi-
cally productive in low-income countries. This is because in low-income countries,
the skill premium is too small compared to what it should be from (4.3), given the
proportion of skilled workers and the human capital embodied in those workers.
The validity of this result would be suspect if observed skill premiums are too
small in low-income countries, because relative to high-income countries, wages
are more compressed due to unionization or government policies.
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As Caselli and Coleman (2006) point out, it is well known that forces to re-
duce income inequality are greater in high-income countries. To verify this claim,
I present data on wage compression ratios taken from The World Bank (2011) in
Table 4.3. The wage compression ratio is defined as the ratio of public sector wages
in the 90th percentile of the pay scale to those in the 10th percentile. The data
reveal that if there is wage compression in skill premiums, it is probably in high-
income (OECD) countries. The United States, as might be expected given its more
competitive labour market, has the highest compression ratio of any OECD coun-
try at 3.3. This ratio is small compared to the average compression ratio of 10 for
all the other low-income country groups. Given the cross-country pattern in wage
compression and the estimated higher returns to schooling in low-income coun-
tries in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), I conclude that wage compression in
low income countries cannot explain the low estimated physical productivity of
skilled workers for these countries.25
High-Income Country Labour Markets I briefly examine OECD labour mar-
kets to investigate whether differences in labour market institutions systemati-
cally affect relative wages, and estimates of physical productivities. First, Lazear
and Shaw (2009) compare wage structures across OECD countries using matched
employer-employee datasets and conclude that even with different labour market
institutions, “countries are remarkably similar in their structures of wage levels.”
Secondly, I classify countries into different labour market institutions based
on trade union densities (TUD) and collective bargaining coverage (CBC) rates,
with more egalitarian labour markets having higher TUD and CBC measures. I
summarize the results here, while the details are contained in appendix B.
The first finding is that in line with Lazear and Shaw (2009), the returns to
schooling, from which skill premiums are computed, are similar across labour mar-
ket types and OECD countries. Thus estimates of the returns to schooling do not
vary systematically by labour market institutions. Secondly, assuming that the
return to schooling is the same (at 10%) across every OECD country does not alter
the results in the paper.26 Lastly, if we assume that all countries use the same
technologies, this would imply very high returns to schooling in OECD countries,
in comparison to estimates from the U.S. and even low-income countries.
Having a more egalitarian pay policy in any given country does not necessarily
break the link between marginal productivities and relative wages for a number
of reasons. First, a key response of of firms to inflexible labour markets is to out-
source low-skilled jobs which, combined with generous unemployment benefits,
is a leading cause of the high unemployment rate in many Southern European
countries (OECD, 2004). Furthermore, as Acemoglu (2003) points out, if the skill
25The wage compression ratios come from wages in the public service. But if the government has
no strong incentives to compress wages as a result of inequality concerns, it is unlikely that firms
in the private sector will have more compressed wages.
26Assuming that the return to schooling is the same in OECD and low-income countries would
imply even lower physical productivity of skilled workers in low-income countries, because low-
income countries generally have larger estimated returns to schooling.
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Table 4.3: Wage Compression Ratios
Region Country Ratio
Africa Togo 13
Nigeria 7
Niger 10
Mozambique 9
Malawi 32
Ghana 13
Cote D’Ivoire 9
Burkina Faso 8
Benin 13
East Asia and Pacific Thailand 14.4
Philippines 9.5
Mongolia 3.4
Indonesia 2
Cambodia 5.5
Europe and Central Asia Serbia 9
Montenegro 4.95
Moldova 2.5
Kosovo 2.5
Albania 3
Latin America and Caribbean Uruguay 3.4
Suriname 2.6
Jamaica 15
Dominican Republic 33
Colombia 4
Brazil 22
Belize 9.8
Barbados 5.5
OECD United States 3.3
United Kingdom 1.5
New Zealand 2.4
Netherlands 2.3
Luxembourg 3.1
Finland 2.3
Australia 2.8
Note: Estimates of wage compression ratios are taken from The World Bank (2011). The wage compression ratio is defined
as the ratio of average wages for public servants in the 90th percentile to those in the bottom 10th.
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premium is artificially low in jobs that cannot be outsourced, it encourages firms to
adopt technologies complementary with low-skilled workers. Thus if the skill pre-
mium is initially too low as a result of policies external to firms, firms maintain
the link between productivity and pay by increasing the relative productivity of
unskilled workers. These endogenous responses to different labour market insti-
tutions could explain the low estimated physical productivity of skilled workers in
France, Greece, and Italy, without recourse to a break in the link between relative
pay and relative productivities.
4.5.3 Selective Migration and Estimated Physical Produc-
tivities
The returns to schooling for Italian emigrants living in the U.S. may overestimate
the human capital embodied in Italian skilled workers, and underestimate the
physical productivity of skilled workers in Italy. This would be the case if only the
best skilled Italians leave Italy, for example.
To assess the potential role of selective migration on these estimates, I give all
OECD countries in Table B.1 the lowest estimated embodied human capital for the
countries in the full dataset. This places an upper-bound on the ability of selective
migration to explain differences in the estimated relative physical productivity
of skilled workers. To get an idea of the magnitude of this reduction in embodied
human capital, the lowest estimated embodied human capital is about a quarter of
the human capital embodied in American skilled workers. In France for example,
we are assuming that emigrants embody four times as much human capital as
non-migrants.
The final column of Table B.1 gives the results from assuming that embodied
human capital is as low as it could plausibly be. Compared to column 4 of the same
table, selective migration could account for a lot of the differences in estimated
physical productivities for OECD countries. The estimated physical productivity
of skilled labour jumps from .14 to .36 in Germany, .22 to .5 in the U.K, .03 to
.13 in France, and .42 to .7 in Switzerland. Nevertheless, large differences still
remain across this group of countries even with drastic reductions in estimated
embodied human capital. Skilled workers in OECD countries are estimated to
have the largest embodied human capital, which implies estimated relative phys-
ical productivities would rise the most. For low-income countries, the increase
in estimated physical productivities of skilled workers would be smaller because
estimates of embodied human capital are already small, and further reductions
would not increase estimated physical productivities significantly.
4.5.4 Estimates of Returns to Schooling
While the estimates of returns used here to compute skill premiums across coun-
tries are standard in the literature, there is some concern regarding the reliability
of some of the estimates, especially for a group of African countries. A major con-
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cern is that these estimates overstate the returns to schooling in many countries,
and that returns are the same, at about 10% in most countries (see Banerjee and
Duflo (2005)).
First, most of the troublesome estimates from African countries are excluded
from the dataset. The only African countries included in the analysis are Kenya
and Ghana, for which there are recent and reliable estimates of the returns to
schooling. Secondly, if the returns to schooling are actually lower than the stan-
dard estimates reported by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), it would only
strengthen the result that many countries use skilled workers relatively unpro-
ductively. Recall that the returns to schooling shows up in two places: in com-
puting the skill premium in a particular country, and the proportion of skilled
workers. With lower estimates of the returns to schooling, the skill premium is
lower, and the proportion of skilled workers is also lower (lower efficiency units
for every year of schooling). Estimates of the human capital embodied in skilled
workers do not change, because it is computed from estimates of the returns to
schooling for immigrants in the U.S. A lower proportion of skilled workers in (4.3),
would imply an even higher skill premium in low-skilled countries. To match the
now even lower observed skill premium, it must be that skilled workers are used
even more unproductively relative to the unskilled.
4.6 Conclusion
I have broken down the cross-country productivity of skilled workers relative to
unskilled workers into components due to embodied human capital, and physical
productivities that reflect differences in choice of production techniques. My es-
timates show that skilled workers form high-income countries tend to have more
embodied human capital, and are also more physically productive relative to the
unskilled. I interpret these findings as indicating that skilled workers from high-
income countries are of better quality, and firms in high-income countries adopt
more technologies that are skilled-complementary. Compared to Caselli and Cole-
man (2006), cross-country differences in relative productivities are smaller, but
they remain large because differences in embodied human capital cannot account
for all of the differences in skilled-unskilled worker productivity.
I also find that estimated physical productivities are inappropriate in most
low-income countries. Several countries could increase output by increasing the
physical productivity of skilled workers relative to the unskilled, and adopting
more skilled worker complementary technologies. The finding that very low phys-
ical productivities of skilled workers, relative to the unskilled, are inappropriate
is driven by three factors: skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes, skilled
workers embody significantly more human capital, and under the primary defi-
nition of skilled, skilled workers are just as abundant as the unskilled in most
countries. This result is in contrast to regular notions of appropriate technology,
arguing that low-income countries adopt too many skilled-complementary tech-
nologies relative to the skilled composition of their workforce. For countries in the
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bottom half of the income distribution, output could increase by an average factor
of 4 from using appropriate technologies; increasing the physical productivity of
skilled workers relative to the unskilled.
There is abundant evidence of cross-country differences in the human capital
embodied in workers (see Schoellman (2012); Erosa et al. (2010); Hanushek and
Kimko (2000)), and some more on the skill-complementarity of technologies across
countries. To name a few, Caselli and Wilson (2004) document a positive relation-
ship between the R&D content of imported machines by country skill composi-
tion. Berman et al. (1998) provide evidence of increasingly skilled complementary
technologies in developed countries, and Berman and Machin (2000) find that the
rise in skilled complementary technologies is not prominent in low-income coun-
tries. While these are all consistent with my findings, more firm-level evidence is
needed on whether the different production techniques used in different countries
are indeed appropriate to the workforce. Income differences across countries does
suggest production techniques must be inappropriate in low-income countries, but
more evidence is needed on whether this is indeed related to the low productivity
of skilled relative to unskilled workers.
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4.7 Other Tables and Figures
Figure 4.11: Physical Productivity of Skilled and Output (Secondary)
Figure 4.12: Embodied Human Capital and Output (Secondary)
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Table 4.4: Data and Baseline Estimates
Country WBcode y k ws
wu j
ws
wu
U.S.
j
Lu Ls µbase µopti ygain
Argentina ARG 14805.00 33151.00 1.51 1.24 43.03 129.21 0.14 0.95 2.57
Australia AUS 29858.00 88076.00 1.38 1.29 6.16 188.11 0.97 0.98 1.00
Bolivia BOL 4953.00 9076.00 1.53 1.11 64.54 93.34 0.04 0.92 4.24
Brazil BRA 11297.00 21227.00 1.80 1.20 80.70 78.34 0.02 0.91 5.58
Canada CAN 33337.00 82443.00 1.43 1.43 17.00 166.78 0.61 0.97 1.24
Chile CHL 9323.00 22452.00 1.62 1.34 43.43 143.21 0.17 0.95 2.39
China CHN 2124.00 4156.00 1.63 1.24 60.17 86.27 0.00 0.90 10.75
Colombia COL 9360.00 15434.00 1.75 1.19 66.58 94.86 0.05 0.92 4.03
Costa CRI 9118.00 16695.00 1.55 1.22 45.14 114.34 0.11 0.94 2.85
Cyprus CYP 15805.00 37046.00 1.23 1.23 25.30 106.19 0.16 0.95 2.47
Dom. Rep. DOM 7314.00 12232.00 1.46 1.12 83.91 53.63 0.00 0.89 8.40
Ecuador ECU 8388.00 21190.00 1.60 1.13 43.22 123.59 0.20 0.94 2.07
El Salvador SLV 5548.00 5617.00 1.47 1.09 83.55 48.28 0.00 0.88 8.32
France FRA 28972.00 84929.00 1.49 1.56 46.62 106.75 0.03 0.96 5.62
Ghana GHA 1854.00 1218.00 1.40 1.03 62.65 66.73 0.02 0.90 5.31
Greece GRC 16607.00 42802.00 1.36 1.21 25.45 115.96 0.26 0.95 1.89
Guatemala GTM 7431.00 7773.00 1.81 1.09 93.44 49.39 0.01 0.88 6.92
Honduras HND 4597.00 6175.00 2.02 1.12 100.98 75.64 0.02 0.90 5.11
Hong Kong HKG 21532.00 29128.00 1.28 1.32 34.01 98.97 0.06 0.95 3.95
Hungary HUN 10869.00 33857.00 1.19 1.22 20.30 108.44 0.24 0.95 1.99
India IND 3046.00 3775.00 1.53 1.27 75.90 61.89 0.01 0.91 8.94
Indonesia IDN 3914.00 8084.00 1.97 1.44 85.20 76.06 0.01 0.93 7.73
Israel ISR 23362.00 51768.00 1.29 1.35 11.75 151.68 0.73 0.97 1.13
Italy ITA 29552.00 82318.00 1.10 1.18 17.72 90.23 0.19 0.95 2.24
Jamaica JAM 4596.00 12831.00 3.16 1.23 74.02 171.67 0.53 0.94 1.25
Japan JPN 20807.00 64181.00 1.70 1.48 17.24 225.28 0.84 0.98 1.06
Kenya KEN 1998.00 2748.00 1.93 1.39 77.59 76.59 0.02 0.93 6.81
Malaysia MYS 9472.00 23543.00 1.46 1.48 51.70 90.62 0.02 0.95 6.93
Mexico MEX 15330.00 28449.00 1.76 1.08 72.94 103.61 0.06 0.91 3.29
Netherlands NLD 28550.00 79069.00 1.34 1.37 6.97 151.13 0.91 0.98 1.02
Nicaragua NIC 4453.00 8762.00 1.47 1.10 83.49 51.82 0.00 0.89 8.11
Pakistan PAK 4552.00 3793.00 1.47 1.25 77.54 37.75 0.00 0.89 11.91
Panama PAN 7898.00 19794.00 1.73 1.33 50.14 150.37 0.17 0.95 2.38
Paraguay PRY 6015.00 9689.00 1.58 1.24 76.18 82.53 0.01 0.92 6.59
Peru PER 8387.00 18075.00 1.38 1.15 58.04 85.89 0.03 0.92 5.19
Philippines PHL 4473.00 8042.00 1.38 1.25 42.72 105.17 0.07 0.94 3.72
Poland POL 8439.00 33949.00 1.12 1.11 8.97 109.38 0.74 0.96 1.11
Portugal PRT 12960.00 29437.00 1.49 1.02 41.15 79.67 0.09 0.92 2.82
S. Korea KOR 13483.00 24651.00 1.72 1.12 17.05 200.41 0.92 0.96 1.01
Singapore SGP 21470.00 56218.00 1.71 1.46 64.22 95.59 0.02 0.94 6.14
Sri Lanka LKA 5476.00 5919.00 1.32 1.34 33.94 92.83 0.06 0.95 4.15
Sweden SWE 27886.00 72777.00 1.31 1.33 15.36 139.41 0.55 0.97 1.31
Switzerland CHE 30965.00 107870.00 1.37 1.42 18.82 142.07 0.42 0.97 1.52
Thailand THA 5558.00 7477.00 1.58 1.17 116.90 42.62 0.00 0.87 10.64
UK GBR 25775.00 50409.00 1.31 1.46 21.36 123.97 0.22 0.97 2.17
Uruguay URY 12036.00 23398.00 1.47 1.31 43.23 113.70 0.08 0.95 3.42
USA USA 35439.00 87330.00 1.49 1.48 5.42 236.04 0.99 0.98 1.00
Venezuela VEN 17529.00 42713.00 1.46 1.42 70.22 73.40 0.01 0.93 10.16
W. Germany DEU 28992.00 89368.00 1.36 1.43 31.00 133.97 0.14 0.96 2.70
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
So why is GDP per person in the U.S. 20 times as large as it is in Ghana? This
thesis has made several key contributions to answering this question. Chapter
4 shows that while the difference in the proportion of skilled workers between
the U.S. and Ghana is large, the inappropriate use of skilled workers (relative to
the unskilled) in Ghana is of primary importance. From Table 4.4, we know that
Ghana could increase GDP per person by a factor of 5 if firms use the relatively
few available skilled workers appropriately. This points to significant barriers to
the adoption of production techniques which would increase the productivity of
skilled workers.
These barriers include political and economic factors that deter appropriate in-
vestments. For example, energy production in Ghana is only 300 kWh per person
compared to over 13,000 kWh person in the U.S. As various skill-complementary
technologies (used in developed countries) are energy intensive, the lack of ade-
quate energy infrastructure in Ghana lead firms to adopt less energy intensive
production techniques which are more complementary with unskilled workers.
Other economic factors include the lack of well developed credit markets that con-
strain the ability of firms to invest in appropriate technologies. Political factors
may also play a role in realigning investment incentives. Government job guaran-
tees in many countries may lead to skilled workers working for the government
in sectors where they are not very productive. Political instability which trans-
lates to economic policy uncertainty possibly leads firms to stick with traditional
technologies.
Chapter 3 also shows how bad government policy in the education sector influ-
ences productivity. There, I find that the focus on basic education at the expense
of education at higher levels has led to declines in basic education quality, and has
also constrained increases in productivity. The chapter also shows that the social
returns to higher levels of education could be just as large as the social returns
to basic education if account for externalities to higher levels of education. The
results suggest that good education policy would balance investments in basic and
higher levels of education. While basic education is undoubtedly important, higher
educated workers are also needed to enhance the value of a basic education.
The primacy of increases in productivity is also evident from Chapter 2, which
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assesses the effects of the high emigration of skilled workers (brain drain) in de-
veloping countries. Table 2.10 shows that the brain drain is of secondary concern.
Shutting down skilled emigration in Ghana, which has the highest rate of skilled
emigration at 33%, only increases the proportion of skilled workers from .009 to
.011. This increase is not enough to make a significant difference to GDP per per-
son in Ghana, and certainly does not increase GDP per person by a factor of 5
(as using skilled workers appropriately would). In the chapter, I also find that in-
creasing brain drain does not encourage further investments in schooling, because
brain drain does not help to lower the high cost of schooling (relative to GDP)
in developing countries. Increasing skilled worker productivity would encourage
more skilled workers to stay in their home countries, and would also relax the
borrowing constraints faced by many households which could increase schooling
investments.
In summary, increasing the productivity of workers, especially that of skilled
workers, is the primary key to increasing incomes in Ghana and many other de-
veloping countries. As has been widely addressed in the economic development lit-
erature, productivity could be increased through improvements in schooling years
and quality. This thesis points to significant gains in productivity by having firms
use production techniques which are complementary with skilled workers, a topic
that has not been widely addressed. It leads me into a broader research agenda
that studies the reasons why firms in developing countries use skilled workers in-
appropriately even when more appropriate technologies exist, and the relationship
between the appropriate use of skilled workers and household schooling invest-
ments. This would improve our understanding of how firms work in these coun-
tries, and hopefully help in developing a framework for improving firm productiv-
ity. While there is no single panacea to economic underdevelopment, I believe a
study of the production techniques used by firms would further our understanding
of economic development.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
Description of Data and Sources:
• Data on proportion of educated for individuals aged 25+ is taken from Barro
and Lee (2010).
• Data on education systems; parent-teacher ratios and expenditure per pupil
at the primary and secondary levels of education are taken from Barro and
Lee (1996), and supplemented with data from UNESCO (2012).
• Data on returns to education for immigrants from different countries in the
U.S. is taken from Schoellman (2012).
• Data on human capital quality adjusted agricultural productiviy gap is taken
from Gollin et al. (2011).
• Controls for agricultural physical capital, arable land per agricultural
worker, and population growth are taken from FAOSTAT (2012).
Proof of Results in Chapter 3:
Result 3: Result 3 states that at the optimal proportion of higher educated(σ∗2),
Γ∗ which is positive(see text) is an upper bound on the gap between standard esti-
mates of the social ROR to basic and higher education.
From (3.8), the difference between standard estimates of the social ROR to
basic and higher education is given by:
Af ∗(h∗1 − 1)
Af ∗ + g1
− A(h2 − f
∗h∗1)
Af ∗h∗1 + g2
(1).
From (3.9), we also know that at σ∗2, Γ∗ is given by:
Af ∗(h∗1 − 1)
g1
− A(h2 − f
∗h∗1)
g2
(2).
Subtracting (1) from (2), we find that result 1 will be true if and only if:
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f ∗(h∗1 − 1)
g1
[
Af ∗
Af ∗ + g1
]
>
(h2 − f ∗h∗1)
g2
[
Af ∗h∗1
(Af ∗h∗1 + g2)
]
(3)
From Assumptions 1 through 3, we know that all terms in the expression above
are positive. Since (f ∗(h∗1 − 1))/(g1) > (h2 − f ∗h∗1)/(g2) (because Γ∗ > 0). Result 1
holds if (Af ∗)/(Af ∗ + g1) > (Af ∗h∗1)/(Af ∗h∗1 + g2), or restated a different way:
Af ∗h∗1 + g2 > Af
∗h∗1 + g1h
∗
1.
The expression above is true by the second part of Assumption 3, which re-
quires that (g2/g1) > h1, if the cost of higher education relative to basic education
is sufficiently large.
The second part of the result says that because (2) is positive, (1) cannot be
expected to be equal to zero, since Af ∗h∗1 > Af ∗. However, if (2) is approximately
zero and we know that (g2/g1) > h1, then (1) should also be close to zero.
Result 4: Plugging in the expression for σ1 in (3.6), the first derivative of Γ as
described in (3.9) with respect to σ2 is given by:
h
′′
1 f
f ′ [σ¯1−(1+g2/g1)σ2]+ f
′′
f ′ [1+[σ¯1−(1+g2/g1)σ2](h1−1)−σ2]− [(1+g2/g1)(h1−1)+1]
− h
′
1f
f ′
(1 + g2/g1) + 2h
′
1(σ¯1 − (1 + g2/g1)σ2)
Where ′′ denotes second derivatives, and σ¯1 = G/Ng1. From assumptions 1 and
2, we know that the first 2 parts of the first derivative are negative (h1 and f are
increasing, and concave), and the fact that σ¯1 − (1 + g2/g1)σ2 is positive, since σ1
cannot be negative. The fact that h1 > 1 from Assumption 3 guarantees that the
third part is also negative.
Examining the last two terms, we find that because σ¯1 = σ1 + (1 + g2/g1)σ2 <
1 + (1 + g2/g1), since σ2 and σ1 cannot be greater than one. Simply put, 1 is an
upper bound for σ¯1− (1 + g2/g1)σ2. The sum of the two expressions will be negative
if:
f ′/f < (1 + g2/g1)/2.
Given that the condition above holds, the derivative of Γ with respect to σ2 is
negative which concludes the proof.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
Labour Market Institutions and Relative Wages: I examine the link be-
tween country-specific labour market institutions, the skill premium, and esti-
mates of the relative physical productivity of skilled workers by looking at differ-
ences within high-income countries. Examining the estimates for France, Greece,
and Italy for example, it may appear that the estimated relative physical produc-
tivity of skilled workers is low because of inflexible labour markets that imply skill
premiums may not reflect actual productivity.1
Lazear and Shaw (2009) compare wage structures across countries from
matched employer-employee datasets and conclude that even with different labour
market institutions, “countries are remarkably similar in their structures of wage
levels.” The average coefficient of variation in wages is about .25 (the standard
deviation of wages is about 25% of the mean wage), which is similar across the
countries they study. Nevertheless, there is some variation across countries; from
their estimates, the coefficient of variation in Sweden and France is .3, which is
lower than the coefficient of variation of about .7 in the U.S.2 However, even with
similarly egalitarian labour markets in France and Sweden, their estimated phys-
ical productivities of skilled workers are very different (.03 versus .55 in the third
column of Table B.1), with Sweden looking more like the U.S in this regard even
though it has a labour force that looks like that of France.
I further place countries into “labour market groups,” based on trade union
density (TUD) and collective bargaining coverage (CBC), as defined by the OECD
in 1990.3 I then ask what the skill premium (returns to education) in the more
egalitarian labour markets would have to be in order to explain the estimated
differences in relative physical productivities. A country is defined as being egali-
tarian if its TUD or CBC is higher than or equal to the OECD average.
1Note that if inflexible labour markets lower the productivity of skilled workers because they
are less motivated, then the results still hold. Inflexible labour markets become a problem if high-
ability individuals receive less than their marginal products in wages in order to have a more
egalitarian society, for example.
2See Figure 1.7 in Lazear and Shaw (2009).
3Trade union density is the percentage of workers who belong to a trade union, and collective
bargaining coverage is defined as the percentage of workers covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.
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Table B.1 classifies the labour market in different countries as egalitarian or
non-egalitarian depending on TUD or CBC. The table reflects the well known fact
that the Anglo-countries (Canada, US, UK) have less egalitarian labour market
institutions compared to the Southern European (Italy, France, Greece, Portugal)
and Scandinavian (Sweden) countries. The first two columns of the table, after
the country names, give the CBC and TUD measures for each country. There is a
lot of variation in CBC ratios, from a high of 92% in France, to a low of 18.3% in
the U.S. Collective bargaining coverage rates are well above 70% for the countries
with egalitarian labour markets, and less than 50% for those with non-egalitarian
labour markets.
Table B.1: Estimates and Labour Market Institutions
CBC TUD Skilled Prod Returns to Schooling Skilled Productivity
Data If same Tech If same Returns If Low h
Egalitarian
Australia 80.0 39.6 0.97 0.08 0.13 0.98 0.99
France 92.0 9.9 0.03 0.10 0.64 0.03 0.13
Germany 72.0 31.2 0.14 0.08 0.50 0.19 0.36
Greece 70.0 34.1 0.26 0.08 0.45 0.33 0.38
Hungary 49.1 0.24 0.04 0.43 0.41 0.37
Italy 83.0 38.8 0.19 0.02 0.43 0.41 0.28
Netherlands 82.0 24.3 0.91 0.07 0.21 0.94 0.97
Portugal 79.0 28 0.09 0.10 0.56 0.09 0.09
Sweden 89.0 80 0.55 0.07 0.35 0.66 0.75
Non-Egalitarian
Canada 38 34 0.61 0.09 0.36 0.65 0.84
Chile 18.2 0.17 0.12 0.54 0.13 0.34
Japan 23.0 25.4 0.84 0.13 0.31 0.77 0.95
Poland 30.4 0.74 0.03 0.26 0.88 0.79
S. Korea 17.2 0.92 0.14 0.26 0.87 0.94
Switzerland 48.0 22.7 0.42 0.08 0.40 0.49 0.70
UK 54 38.2 0.22 0.07 0.46 0.31 0.50
USA 18.3 15.5 0.99 0.10 0.10 0.99 1.00
OECD 70.3 40.1
Note: Data for collective bargaining coverage rates (CBC) and trade union densities (TUD) are taken from OECD (2004).
Data on regular returns to schooling are taken from Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). Refer to the text for the calculation
of all other variables.
The third column reproduces the physical productivity of skilled workers esti-
mated in section 4.1. The estimated physical productivity of skilled workers (µ)
tends to be higher in the non-egalitarian countries compared to the egalitarian
markets, .39 versus .57 respectively. However, it is worth pointing out that this
difference is small compared to the difference between low and high income coun-
tries as a group, a difference greater than .4 on average. There is also significant
variation within country-groups, Australia is an egalitarian labour market with
physical productivity of skilled workers equal to .97, compared to France at .03, or
Italy at .19. Sweden with its highly egalitarian labour market has an estimated
physical productivity of skilled workers equal to .55, which is greater than that
of the non-egalitarian UK and Switzerland at .22 and .42 respectively. From this
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simple classification, it is clear that link between labour market institutions and
the estimated physical productivity of skilled labour is not straightforward.
One might wonder if all OECD countries use the same technologies, but the
variation in estimated physical productivities arise from skilled workers in some
countries being paid well below their marginal products? To assess the plausibility
of this claim, the fourth and fifth columns of Table B.1 contain the returns to
schooling for each country, and what the returns would be if all countries use
the U.S. technology respectively. If we believed all OECD countries use the U.S.
technology, the returns in the column 5of Table B.1 tell us what the returns to
education must be if not for differences in labour market institutions.
The results show it is unlikely that all of these countries have the same physi-
cal productivity of skilled workers, because the implied returns to schooling would
be too high.4 For example, if we believed that France has the same skilled worker
physical productivity as the U.S., but this is not reflected in wages due to an egal-
itarian labour market, then the true return to schooling in France is .64, which
is more than 6 times as large as the estimate of .10 (which is also the estimated
returns to schooling in the US). Also, in countries such as Italy and Hungary, the
estimatd returns to schooling would have to be compressed by factors of 20 and
10 respectively if they use th same technologies as the U.S. Ultimately, the simi-
larity of returns to schooling across the different country groups is evidence skill
premiums reflect relative productivities.5 With the exception of Poland, Italy, and
Hungary, most of the estimates lie between .07 and .1.
The sixth column of Table B.1 computes the physical productivity of skilled
labour (µ) if all OECD countries had the same returns to education, equal to that
of the U.S.. Assuming that differences in returns to education are due to differ-
ences in labour market institutions, it gives us what the physical productivity of
the skilled would be if all countries had the U.S. return. The big changes here
(compared to the estimates in Table 4) are in the estimated physical productivi-
ties of skilled workers in Hungary, Italy, the UK, and Greece as a result of their
relatively lower estimated returns to schooling. In general, significant differences
in the physical productivity of skilled workers remain between OECD countries
even when returns to schooling are forced to be equal. As already pointed out in
the previous paragraph, one has to assume very high and unrealistic returns to
schooling if physical productivities are equal across these countries.
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